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The objective of this thesis is to develop and analyze coding schemes for information-
theoretic security, which could bridge a gap between theory and practice. We focus on
two fundamental models for information-theoretic security: secret-key generation for
a source model and secure communication over the wire-tap channel. Many results
for these models only prove the existence of codes, and few attempts have been made
to design practical schemes. The schemes we would like to propose should account for
practical constraints to avoid oversimplifying the problems. From a practical point of
view, many constraints should be taken into account; we, however, restrict our study
to the following ones: (i) computationally bounded legitimate users, in particular, one
should not solely rely on proofs showing the existence of codes with exponential com-
plexity in the block-length; (ii) a rate-limited public communication channel for the
secret-key generation model, to account for bandwidth constraints; (iii) a non-uniform
and rate-limited source of randomness at the encoder for the wire-tap channel model,
since a perfectly uniform and rate-unlimited source of randomness might be an expen-
sive resource. The main contributions of this thesis are coding schemes for secret-key




Secure communications and data privacy in large-scale networks have become a major
concern with economical and safety issues at stake not only for individuals but also
for companies, or governments. For instance, the increasing amount of personal data
collected in databases is threatening users privacy, while the nature of the transmission
medium of wireless communication, over which a significant amount of sensitive data
is carried, is prone to malicious and undetected acts of eavesdropping.
Information-theoretic security aims at enhancing security and privacy-preserving
properties of future and emerging information and communication systems. It in-
cludes providing solid mathematical foundations, through an analysis of the funda-
mental security and communication limits under an information-theoretic framework,
as well as practical solutions. Taking the example of wireless communication, all upper
layers of typical communication protocols already have their own set of cryptographic
primitives, whereas the physical layer, at which channel coding is implemented and
on which all others layers rely, is currently not intrinsically secured against eaves-
dropping. Information-theoretic security could be used to secure this layer and thus
enhance the security of wireless communication protocols. Unlike complexity-based
cryptography, it would also have the advantage of making no assumption on the
computational power of adversaries, and thus of being everlastingly usable.
Nevertheless, little progress has been made toward a widespread use of systems
implementing physical-layer security since the introduction of information-theoretic
security. To date, information-theoretic security still needs to be further explored and
better understood to pursue this goal. Specifically, the need exists for models with
as few simplifying assumptions as possible and for constructive schemes.
1
1.1 Background on information-theoretic security
Cryptography has a long history and is intimately related to the development of com-
munication systems and recent wars. Prior to the 19th century, most cryptographic
techniques relied on alphabet substitutions or letter permutations and transpositions.
However, at the beginning of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, the inventions of telegraphy and wireless telegraphy, respectively, exacerbated
the need for better encryption. Moreover, these inventions played a key role dur-
ing the American Civil-War, World War I, and World War II. Consequently, new
cryptographic techniques emerged.
A major breakthrough in cryptography occurred in the aftermath of World War II,
when Shannon publicly released its work on secure communication in 1949 [1]. As
illustrated in Figure 1, Shannon formalized the problem as follows. Consider two
legitimate users, Alice and Bob, who share a secret key K. Alice aims at securely
sending a message M to Bob, called plaintext, over a public error-free channel. On
Alice’s side, an encoder takes as inputs the message M and the secret-key K. The
output of the encoder C is publicly transmitted by Alice to Bob and is called the
ciphertext. The objective for Bob is to recover M from the ciphertext C and the
secret-key K, whereas Eve should obtain no information about M given C. The
latter statement is quantified in an information-theoretic sense as I(M ;C) = 0, where
I is Shannon’s mutual information. Shannon proved that an encoder exists such that
the message M can be securely transmitted if the key K satisfies three conditions.
Specifically, the key K must be distributed according to a uniform distribution, this
key must be at least as large as the entropy of the message M , and finally, this key
must only be used once.
The one-time pad, illustrated in Figure 2, is an instance of secure communication
under this model. The encoding consists in performing the modulo-2 addition, be-





















C = K  M cM = C  K = M
C = 100111010
cM = 001001110
Figure 2. An instantiation of symmetric encryption: the one-time pad.
which Eve gains no information about M . As for Bob, he recovers M by performing
the modulo-2 addition of the ciphertext C with the secret-key K.
The problem of secure communication against a computationally unbounded eaves-
dropper is thus solved by the one-time pad. However, the difficulty is transferred to
the problem of secret-key generation, which still remains a challenging task in itself.




Information-theoretic secret-key generation protocols are a fundamental primitive for
information-theoretic security, as explained in the previous section. We first formally
describe such problems and then provide a literature survey.
1.2.1 Model
Information-theoretic secret-key generation was first formally introduced in [2, 3],
and can abstractly be described as follows in a multi-terminal configuration [4]. Let
m > 2 be the number of terminals that wish to generate a common secret-key. We set
M , J1,mK, and let Z and Xi, for i ∈ M, be arbitrary finite alphabets. We define
XM , (X1,X2, . . . ,Xm) and consider a discrete memoryless source (XMZ, pXMZ),
where XM , (X1, X2, . . . , Xm). For i ∈M, Terminal i observes n realizations of the
component Xi of (XMZ, pXMZ), whereas an eavesdropper observes n realizations of
the component Z. The source is assumed to be outside the control of all parties, but its
statistics are known to all parties. Communication is allowed between terminals over
an authenticated1 noiseless public channel with communication rate Rp ∈ R+∪{+∞}.
All the public inter-terminal communications are collectively denoted by F and are
subject to the constraint H(F) 6 NRp. The case of m = 2 legitimate users and



















Figure 3. Model for secret-key generation: two-users case and two-way one-round
public communication with F , (A,B).
1In others words, Eve has total access to Alice and Bobs messages, but cannot tamper with the
messages over the channel.
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The rules by which the legitimate users compute the messages they exchange over
the public channel and agree on a key define a secret-key generation strategy. The
performance of a secret-key generation strategy that allows the m terminals to agree
on the key K is measured in terms of the following metrics.
• The average probability of error between the keys:
lim
n→∞
P[∃i ∈M, K 6= Ki] = 0,
• The information leakage to the eavesdropper:
lim
n→∞
I(K;ZnF) = 0, 2 (1)
• The uniformity of the key:
lim
n→∞
logd2nRe −H(K) = 0.
Moreover, the maximum number of secret-key bits per observation is called the wire-
tap secret-key (WSK) capacity. This quantity is simply called the secret-key (SK)
capacity for the special case Z = ∅, i.e., when the eavesdropper has no correlated
observation of the source.
We briefly comment on two hypotheses made in this model.
• We assume the existence of a memoryless source with known but uncontrollable
statistics. In practice, it can, for instance, be obtained in a wireless communi-
cation setting [5–7]. Assume that we denote cA→B the channel from Alice to
Bob, cB→A the channel from Bob to Alice, cA→E the channel from Alice to Eve,
and cB→E the channel from Bob to Eve. We can then set X as the channel gain
of cA→B, Y as the channel gain of cB→A, and Z as the pair of channel gains for
(cA→E,cB→E).
2This condition corresponds to strong secrecy, whereas limn→∞ I(K;ZnF)/n = 0 corresponds to
weak secrecy.
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• We also assume the existence of an authenticated public channel. In practice, a
solution to ensure authentication would be to have the legitimate users share a
secret sequence of random bits. This solution is acceptable since the size of this
secret sequence can be chosen in the order of the logarithm of the length of the
message [2,8], which is negligible compared to the length of the key generated.
We now list additional constraints that will be taken into account in this thesis to
avoid oversimplifying the model.
• Computationally bounded legitimate users. A secret-key generation scheme
should be implementable by computationally bounded users, and not solely rely
on a proof showing existence of codes with exponential complexity in the num-
ber of observations n.
• Rate-limited public communication. The public communication constraint
Rp should be considered finite. Indeed, channels with unlimited communication
rate do not exist. Moreover, we can expect sharp performance degradation for
applications in which strong bandwidth constraints hold, as for instance in a
wireless sensor network. We will see that the main difficulty introduced by this
constraint is the need for vector quantization of the source observation.
From a practical point of view, many other constraints should be taken into account,
such as finite block-length, unknown eavesdropper’s statistics, or arbitrary eavesdrop-
per’s alphabet. Proposing a scheme that is able to account for all these constraints
is a challenging problem. A first step towards this goal will consist in dealing with
subsets of these constraints.
We conclude this section by pointing out other models for secret-key generation.
The model we have introduced is called the “source model” for secret-key generation.
A variant of this model is the “channel model” for secret-key generation, in which the
source is partially controlled by one of the legitimate users. Upper and lower bounds
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of the WSK capacity for the channel model in different settings, often derived from
bounds of WSK capacity for the source model or obtained with similar techniques, can
be found in [2, 3, 9, 10]. Secret-key generation is also studied in the quantum setting,
and relies on arguments of a totally different nature, such as quantum entanglement
or quantum superposition. Quantum secret-key generation first appeared in [11, 12]
and has since then attracted interest, as well [13–15].
1.2.2 Literature Survey
Closed-form expressions and bounds for the WSK capacity with m = 2, i.e. two
legitimate users, have been established for a large variety of models [2–4,9,10,16–22].
However, usual achievability proofs only prove existence of codes, and do not always
provide direct insight into the design of practical key-generation strategies.
The only exception is sequential strategies when rate-unlimited public communi-
cation is considered. The main benefit of such strategies is to successively deal with
reliability and secrecy by means of a reconciliation protocol and privacy amplifica-
tion, respectively. Indeed, reconciliation can be efficiently implemented with LDPC
codes [23] and privacy amplification can be performed with extractors [24, 25]. Note
that uncertainty about the eavesdropper’s statistics is addressed, since extractors are
universal and can thus be chosen such that security holds when the statistics of Z are
known to belong to a given set SZ . Specifically, the length of the output of the ex-
tractors is chosen such that security holds for p∗Z , where p
∗
Z , arg maxpZ∈SZ I(X;Z).
Moreover, in the case of non-memoryless source, [26] addresses the finite-length regime
with a sequential strategy. A finite-length analysis of privacy amplification is also pro-
vided in [27], and in [28] by means of malleable extractors [28, 29].3 Note also that,
for a related model,4 [30] deals with computationally bounded legitimate users, and
3The model considered in [28] is the following. The legitimate users observe the same component
of a non-memoryless source, while the eavesdropper observes a correlated component of the source.
Moreover, two-way one-round public communication over an unauthenticated channel with unlimited
capacity is assumed.
4The model considered in [30] is the following. The legitimate users observe the components of
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the finite-length regime.
To the best of our knowledge, only non-constructive schemes deal with rate-limited
public communication. For discrete memoryless sources, the WSK capacity with
one-way rate-limited public communication, and bounds for the WSK capacity with
two-way one-round rate-limited public communication are provided in [4]. The WSK
capacity for one-way rate-limited public communication is extended to the case of
continuous degraded memoryless sources in [20].
For a multi-terminal setting, that is, the number m of legitimate users is such that
m > 2, upper and lower bounds for the WSK capacity are derived in [4, 9, 21, 31].
The analysis of such a setting is considerably more involved than the case of two
legitimate users. Moreover, most results only hold when the eavesdropper observes
the inter-terminal public communication, but has no side observation Z of the source
observed by the legitimate users. Again, for these settings, the proofs in the literature
only provide existence of codes but no explicit code constructions. We can, though,
mention the exception of [32,33], that are based on explicit algorithms for tree packing,
and [34], that relies on channel coding. The protocol proposed in the latter reference
is, however, computationally intractable, because it requires standard arrays that
grow exponentially with the number of source observations.
1.3 Communication over a wire-tapped channel
In this section, we discuss a model related to secret-key generation, called the wire-
tap channel. We first formally introduce the problem and then review relevant known
results.
1.3.1 Model
Communication over the wire-tap channel model can be seen as a secret-key genera-
tion problem for the channel model, in which the source of randomness stems from
a non-memoryless source, that are close with respect to certain metrics, while the eavesdropper has
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Figure 4. The wire-tap channel model.
the transmission medium, in which there is no error-free public channel for commu-
nication, and in which the key is fixed by the transmitter ahead of time. Because
of this distinction, coding mechanisms for the wire-tap channel and secret-key gen-
eration are very different. The wire-tap channel model was first introduced in [35],
and can be described as follows. As illustrated in Figure 4, consider two legitimate
users, Alice and Bob, connected by a communication channel, which is abstracted by
the conditional probability distribution pY |X . Consider also an eavesdropper, Eve,
which observes the communication of Alice and Bob through a channel defined by
the conditional probability distribution pZ|X . Alice aims at secretly transmitting to
Bob a message M , which is encoded in Xn, and received as Y n and Zn by Bob and
Eve, respectively. It is assumed that Alice has access to a source of uniform random-
ness (R, pR) to randomize the encoding of M . Similar to the secret-key generation
model described in Section 2.2.1, the performance of a coding scheme for the wiretap
channel is measured in terms of the following metrics.
• The average probability of error between M and M̂ :
lim
n→∞
P[M 6= M̂ ] = 0,
• Information leakage, measured by the mutual information between the message
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M and all the information available to Eve through Zn:
lim
n→∞
I(M ;Zn) = 0.
The highest rate at which Alice can securely transmit messages to Bob is called the
secrecy capacity. It is shown in [35], that the secrecy capacity is strictly positive if
Bob’s channel, pY |X , is less noisy than Eve’s channel, pZ|X – see, for instance, [23,
Proposition 3.6] for a formal description of “less noisy”. In the latter case, unlike in
Section 2.1 for symmetric encryption, secure communication is possible without the
need of a shared secret-key for the legitimate users, by harnessing the communication
noise introduced by the transmission medium.
We now list additional constraints that will be taken into account in the thesis to
avoid oversimplifying the model.
• Computationally bounded legitimate users. A coding scheme for the wire-
tap channel should be implementable by computationally bounded users, and
not solely rely on a proof showing existence of code with exponential complexity
in the number of observations n.
• Non-uniform and rate-limited source of randomness. As depicted in Fig-
ure 4, an implicit assumption made in the original wire-tap channel model [35] is
the availability at the encoder of a perfectly uniform and rate-unlimited source
of randomness. Such a resource may be expensive or not available at all. Con-
sequently, we introduce the constraint that only a possibly non-uniform and
rate-limited source of randomness is available at the encoder.
• Bandwidth efficiency. The secrecy capacity, which is always less than the
capacity, suggests that secrecy can only be achieved at the cost of reducing
communication rates. This decrease in achievable communication rates could
be a factor that may hinder the adoption of physical-layer security schemes in
communication systems.
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Similar to secret-key generation schemes, from a practical point of view, other con-
straints, such as finite block-length, unknown eavesdropper’s statistics, or arbitrary
eavesdropper’s alphabet, should be taken into account. We will, however, restrict our
analysis to the three aforementioned constraints.
1.3.2 Literature survey
Although closed-form expressions for the secrecy capacity are known [35, 36], tradi-
tional achievability proofs only prove the existence of codes, and, again, do not always
provide direct insight into the design of practical coding schemes.
Recent works have tackled the constraint of computationally bounded legitimate
users with polar codes [37], when symmetric channels are assumed [38, 39]. We can
also mention a constructive scheme with efficiently invertible extractors based on
finite field multiplication [40, 41] for symmetric or additive channels, and LDPC-
based constructions [42–44] for erasure channels. However, none of these solutions
allows the treatment of arbitrary channels.
Rate-limited randomness at the encoder has been studied in [45, 46]. In [45], the
authors precisely analyze the trade-off between the rates of secret message, public
message, and local uniform randomness in the broadcast channel with confidential
messages. Moreover, [46, 47] investigates the case of non-uniform randomness at the
encoder.
Bandwidth efficiency can be improved by multiplexing public and confidential
messages. This idea implicitly appears in the original work of Csiszár and Körner [36],
and is explicitly formalized in [48, 49]. In [50], the authors analyze the possibility of
guaranteeing secrecy with dependent messages and non-uniform randomization.
The constraints of unknown eavesdropper’s statistics is, for instance, addressed
in [51–53]. [52] handles a Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output setting and shows
that if the eavesdropper’s statistics are unknown, one can obtain a strictly positive
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secrecy capacity when the legitimate users have more antennas than the eavesdrop-
per. However, no constructive scheme is known in this case. The case of an arbi-
trary eavesdropper’s alphabet and arbitrary wiretap channels can be treated with
information-spectrum methods using non-constructive schemes, see for instance [54].
A non-asymptotic treatment of the wire-tap channel model by means of non-
constructive schemes is also possible, see for instance [14].
Finally, the assumption regarding a source of uniform randomness available at
the encoder is partially relaxed with non-constructive schemes in [46, 47, 55], where
non-uniform or rate-limited sources of randomness are considered.
1.4 Outline of the dissertation and related publications
Chapters 2 and 3 are related to secret-key generation, while Chapters 4 and 5 are
related to secure communication over a wire-tap channel. Each chapter may be read
independently from the other chapters.
Chapter 2 considers secret-key generation with two-way one-round rate-limited
communication between two legitimate users. Specifically, we study a sequential key-
generation strategy that handles reliability and secrecy successively, and show its
optimality (under the assumption of degraded sources for two-way communication).
We, however, show that although reliability and secrecy can be treated successively,
they might not always be treated independently, thereby exhibiting the limits of
sequential strategies to rate-limited public communication. Chapter 2 is based on the
results obtained in the following references:
• R. Chou and M. Bloch. Separation of Reliability and Secrecy in Rate-Limited
Secret-Key Generation, in IEEE transactions on Information Theory, Vol. 60,
no. 8. 2014.
• R. Chou and M. Bloch. One-Way Rate-Limited Sequential Key-Distillation.
Proc. of IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). 2012.
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Chapter 3 considers polar coding for different models of secret-key generation.
Specifically, we propose secret-key capacity-achieving and low-complexity schemes for
the following models: (i) the degraded binary memoryless source (DBMS) model with
rate-unlimited public communication, (ii) the DBMS model with one-way rate-limited
public communication, (iii) the 1-to-m broadcast model, (iv) the Markov tree model
with uniform marginals, (v) several models for biometric systems. Chapter 3 is based
on the results obtained in the following references:
• R. Chou, M. Bloch, and E. Abbe. Polar Coding for Secret-Key Generation.
Accepted to IEEE transactions on Information Theory. May, 2015.
Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.4746
• R. Chou, M. Bloch, and E. Abbe. Polar Coding for Secret-Key Generation.
Proc. of IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW). 2013.
Chapter 4 considers a source-channel coding scheme for the wiretap channel.
We show that multiplexing unprotected and protected data allows, first, to avoid the
necessity of additional randomness at the encoder and, second, to efficiently use the
bandwidth available between the legitimate users. Specifically, the overall commu-
nication rate of the same channel without secrecy constraints is maintained. The
scheme leverage results about lossless source coding with uniform encoder output.
Chapter 4 is based on the results obtained in the following references:
• R. Chou, M. Bloch, B. Vellambi, and J. Kliewer. Source-Channel Coding
Schemes for Achieving Strong Security at Negligible Cost. To be submitted to
IEEE transactions on Information Theory. 2015.
• R. Chou and M. Bloch. Uniform Distributed Source Coding for the Multi-
ple Access Wiretap Channel. Proc. of IEEE Conf. on Communications and
Network Security (CNS). 2014.
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• R. Chou and M. Bloch. Data Compression with Nearly Uniform Output. Proc.
of IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT). 2013.
Chapter 5 considers polar coding for the wiretap channel model. Specifically, we
propose a low-complexity and secrecy capacity achieving scheme. Our scheme extends
previous work by using an optimal rate of uniform randomness in the stochastic
encoder, and avoiding assumptions regarding the symmetry or degraded nature of the
channels. Moreover, we describe a close conceptual connection between our coding
scheme and a random binning proof of the secrecy capacity region. An extension to
the broadcast channel with confidential messages is also proposed. Chapter 5 is based
on the results obtained in the following references:
• R. Chou and M. Bloch. Polar Coding for the Broadcast Channel with Confi-
dential Messages and Constrained Randomization. Submitted to IEEE trans-
actions on Information Theory. November, 2014.
Available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1411.0281
• R. Chou, M. Bloch. Polar Coding for the Broadcast Channel with Confidential
Messages. Proc. of IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW). 2015.
14
CHAPTER 2
SEPARATION OF RELIABILITY AND SECRECY IN
SECRET-KEY GENERATION
2.1 Summary
For a discrete or a continuous source model, we study in this chapter the problem of
secret-key generation with two-way one-round of rate-limited public communication
between two legitimate users. Although we do not provide new bounds on the wire-
tap secret-key (WSK) capacity for the discrete source model, we use an alternative
achievability scheme that may be useful for practical applications. As a side result,
we conveniently extend known bounds to the case of a continuous source model.
Specifically, we consider a sequential key-generation strategy, that implements a rate-
limited reconciliation step to handle reliability, followed by a privacy amplification
step performed with extractors to handle secrecy. We prove that such a sequential
strategy achieves the best known bounds for the rate-limited WSK capacity (under
the assumption of degraded sources in the case of two-way communication). However,
we show that, unlike the case of rate-unlimited public communication, achieving the
reconciliation capacity in a sequential strategy does not necessarily lead to achieving
the best known bounds for the WSK capacity. Consequently, reliability and secrecy
can be treated successively but not independently, thereby exhibiting a limitation of
sequential strategies for rate-limited public communication. Nevertheless, we provide
scenarios for which reliability and secrecy can be treated successively and indepen-
dently, such as the two-way rate-limited SK capacity, the one-way rate-limited WSK
capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources, and the one-way rate-limited WSK




A sequential key-generation strategy consists of (i) a reconciliation step, during which
Alice and Bob communicate over the public channel to agree on a common bit se-
quence, which might not be totally hidden from Eve, (ii) a privacy amplification step,
during which Alice and Bob apply a deterministic function to their shared sequence
to generate their common secret key, this time completely unknown from Eve. The
main benefit of sequential key-generation strategies is to separate how one deals with
reliability and secrecy,1 and thus to provide a perhaps more practical key-generation
design. Indeed, reconciliation can be efficiently implemented with LDPC codes [58,59]
and privacy amplification can be performed with extractors [24, 25]. While sequen-
tial key-generation is studied in [23, 25] for a public channel of unlimited capacity,
we focus on the performance of sequential key-generation strategies in the case of
rate-limited public communication.2
Although, we do not improve the rate-limited WSK capacity bounds for the dis-
crete source model, we provide an achievability scheme that might be easier to trans-
late into practical designs. Specifically, we show that sequential strategies, that are
known to be optimal for rate-unlimited public communication, are also optimal for
rate-limited communication. We, however, also qualify the robustness of sequential
strategies to rate-limited public communication, as we show in this case that it may
not be optimal to achieve the reconciliation capacity in a sequential strategy. That is,
reliability and secrecy can be handled successively but not necessarily independently,
thereby limiting the coding scheme flexibility. The main results of this chapter are:
1We mean that the key-generation can be performed by the succession of two protocols, one, free
from any secrecy constraint, dealing with reliability, and the other dealing with secrecy. A stronger
result would be that optimizing both protocols independently, in a sense defined in Section 2.3.4,
leads to the best possible key-generation strategy. In Section 2.5, we prove that this stronger result
holds in some scenarios.
2Note that the achievability scheme of [21, Theorem 4.1], which only holds for Gaussians sources
and when there is no side information at the eavesdropper, is very close to the sequential approach
that we study, even though their model is different in that it deals with a quantized source and
unrestricted public communication.
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• an alternative achievability scheme that separates reliability and secrecy by
means of a reconciliation protocol and a privacy amplification step performed
with extractors, which achieves
(i) the best known bound of the two-way one-round rate-limited WSK capac-
ity for degraded sources in Theorem 2.4.3;
(ii) the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity in Theorem 2.4.4;
(iii) the two-way one-round rate-limited SK capacity (no side information at
the eavesdropper) in Theorem 2.4.5;
As a side result, we extend the bounds for a discrete source model in [16], to the
case of a continuous source model in Corollary 2.4.2 (the case of the one-way
rate-limited WSK capacity is treated in [60], but only for degraded sources) ;
• scenarios for which achieving the reconciliation capacity is optimal in a sequen-
tial key-generation strategy, as it is not necessarily the case in general when
constraints are imposed on public communication. Such results are important
to obtain a flexible coding scheme; Specifically, we treat the case of
(i) the two-way rate-limited SK capacity in Section 2.5.1;
(ii) the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric
sources in Section 2.5.2;
(iii) the one-way rate-limited WSK capacity for degraded Gaussian sources in
Section 2.5.3;
As side results, we obtain a characterization of the rate-limited reconciliation
capacity in Proposition 2.5.2, which corresponds to the best trade-off between
the length of the sequence shared by Alice and Bob after reconciliation and
the quantity of information publicly exchanged; we also obtain a closed-form
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expression of the one-way WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources
with Proposition 2.5.4, as illustrated in Example 2.5.2.
Our proofs techniques mainly rely on the analysis of randomness extraction with
extractors, Wyner-Ziv coding, and a fine analysis with robust typicality [61] to ex-
tend the discrete case to a continuous setting. The determination of the one-way
WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources relies on perhaps less standard
techniques, as we use the Krein-Milman Theorem to simplify a convex optimization
problem under convex constraints.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.3, we introduce
the problem and provide some background on the topic. Specifically, we formally
introduce the problem studied in Section 2.3.1, and recall known bounds for the
secret-key capacity in Section 2.3.2. In Section 2.3.3, we describe the two steps
of a sequential strategy and recall known bounds achieved by such a strategy. In
Section 2.3.4, we introduce the notion of independence between the two steps of
a sequential strategy, when constraints are imposed on public communication. In
Section 2.4, we prove that the sequential application of reconciliation and privacy
amplification with extractors is an optimal key-generation strategy. In Section 2.5,
we provide scenarios for which these two phases can be treated independently of each
other. Specifically, we provide the case of the two-way SK capacity in Section 2.5.1,
the one-way WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric sources in Section 2.5.2,
and the one-way WSK capacity for degraded Gaussian sources in Section 2.5.3. All
proofs are gathered in the appendices to streamline presentation.
2.3 Problem statement and background
2.3.1 Model
We consider in this chapter a special case of the model introduced in Section 1.2.1.
As illustrated in Figure 5, two legitimate users, Alice and Bob, and one eavesdropper,




















Figure 5. Source model for secret-key generation.
be either discrete (DMS) or continuous (CMS). The three components X, Y and Z,
are observed by Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The MS is assumed to be outside
the control of all parties, but its statistics are known. Alice and Bob’s objective is
to process their observations and agree on a key K, about which Eve should have
no information. We assume a two-way one-round communication between Alice and
Bob, that is, we suppose that Alice first sends a message to Bob, and that in return
Bob sends a message to Alice.3 We also assume that the messages are exchanged over
an authenticated noiseless public channel with limited rate; in others words, Eve has
total access to Alice and Bob’s messages, but cannot tamper with the messages over
the channel. We now formally define a key-generation strategy.
Definition 2.3.1. A
(
2nR, n, R1, R2
)
key-generation strategy Sn for a source model
with MS (XYZ, pXY Z) consists of





• two alphabets A, B respectively used by Alice and Bob to communicate over the
public channel;
• two encoding functions f0 : X n → A, g0 : Yn ×A → B;
• two functions κa : X n × B → K, κb : Yn ×A → K;
3One could also suppose that Bob is the one who sends messages, in which case one only needs
to exchange the role of X and Y in the following.
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and operates as follows.
• Alice observes Xn while Bob observes Y n;
• Alice transmits A = f0(Xn) subject to H(A) 6 nR1;
• Bob transmits B = g0(Y n, A) subject to H(B) 6 nR2;
• Alice computes K = κa(Xn, B) while Bob computes K̂ = κb(Y n, A).
The performance of a
(
2nR, n, R1, R2
)
key-generation strategy Sn is measured in
terms of the average probability of error between the key K generated by Alice and
the key K̂ generated by Bob
Pe(Sn) , P[K 6= K̂|Sn],
in terms of the information leakage to the eavesdropper
L(Sn) , I(K;ZnAB|Sn),






Definition 2.3.2. A WSK rate R is achievable for a source model if there exists a
sequence of
(
2nR, n, R1, R2
)
key-generation strategies {Sn}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞
Pe(Sn) = 0 (reliability),
lim
n→∞
L(Sn) = 0 (strong secrecy),
lim
n→∞
U(Sn) = 0 (strong uniformity).
Moreover, the WSK capacity of a source model with MS (XYZ, pXY Z) is the supre-
mum of achievable WSK rates, and is denoted by CWSK. In the following, we also
consider situations in which the eavesdropper has access to the public messages ex-
changed by Alice and Bob, but has no side information Zn. In such cases, the WSK
capacity is simply called the secret-key (SK) capacity and is denoted by CSK.
20
2.3.2 Known bounds for CWSK and CSK
For convenience, we recall known results regarding the model described in Section 2.3.1.
Note that these results only hold for DMS.
Theorem 2.3.1 ( [16, Theorems 2.5, 2.6]). Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a DMS.
(a) For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the two-way one-round WSK capacity satisfies
CWSK(R1, R2) > RWSK(R1, R2),
where
RWSK(R1, R2) , max
U,V
(
[I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U)]+ + [I(X;V |U)− I(Z;V |U)]+
)
subject to
R1 > I(X;U)− I(Y ;U),
R2 > I(Y ;V |U)− I(X;V |U),
U—X—Y Z, V—Y U—XZ,
|U|6 |X |+2, |V|6 |Y|.
(b) For R1 ∈ R+, the one-way WSK capacity is
CWSK(R1, 0) = max
U,V
(I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U))
subject to
R1 > I(X;V )− I(Y ;V ),
U—V—X—Y Z,
|U|, |V|6 |X |+2.
Corollary 2.3.1 ( [16, Theorems 2.2, 2.3, 2.4]). Let (XY , pXY ) be a DMS.
(a) For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the two-way one-round SK capacity is
CSK(R1, R2) = max
U,V
(I(Y ;U) + I(X;V |U))
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subject to
R1 > I(X;U)− I(Y ;U),
R2 > I(Y ;V |U)− I(X;V |U),
U—X—Y , V—Y U—X,
|U|6 |X |+2, |V|6 |Y|.
(b) For R1 ∈ R+, the one-way SK capacity is








In the following, we use the term sequential key-generation strategy, for a key-
generation strategy consisting of the succession of a reconciliation protocol and a
privacy amplification with extractors.
2.3.3.1 Reconciliation
During the reconciliation phase, Alice and Bob send messages to each other over an
authenticated public channel with limited rate. Alice and Bob then process their
observations to agree on a common bit sequence S. At this stage the sequence is
not subject to any secrecy constraint. Formally, a two-way one-round rate-limited
reconciliation protocol is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3.3. Let R1, R2 ∈ R+. A rate-limited reconciliation protocolRn(R1, R2),
noted Rn for convenience, for a source model with MS (XY , pXY ) consists of
• an alphabet S = J1,MK;
• two alphabets A, B respectively used by Alice and Bob to communicate over the
public channel;
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• two encoding functions f : X n → A, g : Yn ×A → B;
• two functions ηa : X n × B → S, ηb : Yn ×A → S;
and operates as follows
• Alice observes Xn while Bob observes Y n;
• Alice transmits A = f(Xn) subject to H(A) 6 nR1;
• Bob transmits B = g(Y n, A) subject to H(B) 6 nR2;
• Alice computes S = ηa(Xn, B) while bob computes Ŝ = ηb(Y n, A).
The reliability performance of a reconciliation protocol is measured in terms of
the average probability of error
Pe(Rn) , P[S 6= Ŝ|Rn].
In addition, since the reconciliation protocol, which generates the common sequence
S, is followed by the privacy amplification step to generate a secret-key, it is desirable
to leak as little information as possible over the public channel. As in [23] we define





Definition 2.3.4. For a given (R1, R2), a reconciliation rate R is achievable, if there
exists a sequence of rate-limited reconciliation protocols {Rn}n>1 such that
lim
n→∞
Pe(Rn) = 0 and lim
n→∞
R(Rn) > R.
Moreover, the two-way one-round rate-limited reconciliation capacity Crec(R1, R2) of
a MS (XY , pXY ) is the supremum of achievable reconciliation rates.
Intuitively, the reconciliation capacity characterizes the best trade-off between the
length of the sequence shared by Alice and Bob after reconciliation and the quantity
of information publicly exchanged.
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2.3.3.2 Privacy amplification
During the privacy amplification phase, Alice and Bob generate their secret key by
applying a deterministic function, on which they publicly agreed ahead of time, to
their common sequence S obtained after reconciliation. This phase is performed with
extractors [62], which are functions that take as input a sequence of n arbitrarily
distributed bits and output a sequence of k nearly uniformly distributed bits, using
another input of d truly uniformly distributed bits. Define the min-entropy of a
discrete random variable X as












pY (y)H∞(X|Y = y).
The following theorem provides a lower bound on the size of the key, on which the
legitimate users agree.
Theorem 2.3.2 ([25], [23, Theorem 4.6]). Let S ∈ {0, 1}n be the random variable that
represents the common sequence shared by Alice and Bob, and let E be the random
variable that represents the total knowledge about S available to Eve. Let e be a
particular realization of E. If Alice and Bob know that
H∞(S|E = e) > γn, for some γ ∈]0, 1[,
then there exists an extractor g : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}k with d 6 nδ(n) and k >
n(γ − δ(n)), where δ(n) satisfies limn→+∞ δ(n) = 0.
Moreover, if Ud is a random variable uniformly distributed on {0, 1}d and Alice and
Bob choose K = g(S, Ud) as their secret key, then
H(K|Ud, E = e) > k − δ∗(n),






Note that, the size d of the uniformly distributed input sequence is negligible,
compared to n, so that the effect on the rate of public communication is negligible.
Moreover, extractors that extract almost the entire min-entropy of the input S and
require comparatively negligible amount of uniform randomness can be efficiently
constructed [62].
2.3.3.3 Known results concerning sequential strategies
For a DMS, in the absence of rate constraint between Alice and Bob, i.e. R1, R2 =
+∞, [25], [23, Theorem 4.7] state that one can handle reliability and secrecy succes-
sively to achieve the WSK capacity CWSK(+∞,+∞), by means of a reconciliation
step, and a privacy amplification step. Figure 6 schematically illustrates the role
of each step in terms of information shared by each party. At the beginning of the
protocol, we assume, without loss of generality [2, 63], that Bob has an advantage
over Eve in terms of the amount of information he has about Alice’s observations
of the source. The reconciliation step aims at correcting the discrepancies between
Alice’s and Bob’s observations. Hence, after this step, Alice and Bob share a common
sequence S, while Eve has gained some information about S from the public commu-
nication that occurred during reconciliation. Finally, the privacy amplification step
allows Alice and Bob to extract from S a shorter sequence K totally independent
from Eve’s total knowledge.
2.3.4 Independence between reconciliation and privacy amplification
In this section, we define a notion of independence between reconciliation and privacy
amplification, when constraints hold on the public communication rate. As explained
earlier, we would like to ensure that reliability and secrecy can be handled not only
successively but also independently, to obtain a flexible coding scheme. We will show
in the following section that the reconciliation capacity is given by the following
proposition.
















































Figure 6. Schematic representation of information shared between the users and the
eavesdropper during a sequential strategy for secret-key generation.
capacity Crec(R1, 0) is given by
Crec(R1, 0) = CSK(R1, 0).
As shown in Example 2.3.1, unlike the case of rate-unlimited communication, in
the case of rate-limited communication, it is not necessarily optimal to first achieve the
reconciliation capacity in Proposition 2.3.1 and then to perform privacy amplification.
In other words, if a sequential strategy is known to achieve the secret-key capacity,
it does not tell us at which rate we should perform the reconciliation step. In the
following, we say that reconciliation and privacy amplification are independent if
achieving the reconciliation capacity in a sequential strategy leads to achieving the
secret-key capacity.
Example 2.3.1. Consider the scenario presented in Figure 7, in which |X |= |Y|=
|Z|= 2, X—Y—Z forms a Markov chain, and X ∼ B(p). We assume a one-way
rate-limited public communication, i.e R1 ∈ R and R2 = 0. We set the parameters as
follows. R1 = H(X|Y )/3, p = 0.23, β1 = 0.01, β2 = 0.03, γ1 = 0.03 and γ2 = 0.01.
We note Hb the binary entropy function and define for p ∈ [0, 1], p̄ , 1− p.
We will show in the next section that a sequential strategy achieves the WSK
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capacity CWSK(R1, 0). Moreover, we can show that
CWSK(R1, 0) = max
α1,α2
(f − g)(α1, α2),
subject to (h− f)(α1, α2) = R1, (2)
Crec(R1, 0) = max
α1,α2
f(α1, α2),
subject to (h− f)(α1, α2) = R1, (3)
where
f(α1, α2) , Hb(py)− puHb(a)− p̄uHb(b),
g(α1, α2) , Hb(pz)− puHb(c)− p̄uHb(d),
h(α1, α2) , Hb(p)− puHb(α1)− p̄uHb(α2),
with pu = (ᾱ2 − p)/(ᾱ2 − α1), py = p̄β̄1 + pβ2, pz = pyγ̄1 + p̄yγ2, a = α1β2 + ᾱ1β̄1,
b = α2β̄1 + ᾱ2β2, c = γ̄1a+ γ2ā, d = γ̄1b+ γ2b̄.
Numerically,
CWSK(R1, 0) > 0.050 > 0.045 > (f − g)(α∗1, α∗2),
where (α∗1, α
∗
2) achieves Crec(R1, 0). Hence, for this example, achieving the reconcil-
iation capacity in a sequential key-generation is not optimal and incurs a rate loss
above 10%.
Remark 2.3.1. Deriving (2) and (3) is not straightforward. We used Proposi-
tion 2.5.3 given in the following sections, which shows that equality holds in the public
communication rate constraint (4) and that |U|6 |X |.
In Section 2.4, for R1, R2 ∈ R+, we study the achievability of RWSK(R1, R2),
CWSK(R1, 0), given in Theorem 2.3.1 and CSK(R1, R2) given in Corollary 2.3.1, with
a sequential key-generation strategy. Moreover, in Section 2.5, we identify scenarios




















Figure 7. Example of a binary DMS studied in Example 2.3.1.
2.4 Sequential strategies achieve the best know bounds of
CWSK and CSK
In this section, we provide one of our main result. That is, the successive combina-
tion of reconciliation and privacy amplification, achieves the best known rates of the
secret-key capacity (under the assumption of degraded sources in the case of two-way
communication), when constraints are imposed on the public communication. As a
side result, we extend known bounds of CWSK and CSK for DMS to the case of CMS.
Before we state our results, we provide a high-level description of our coding
schemes. The main difficulty introduced by rate-limited public communication is the
need for vector quantization of the source in the reconciliation step to better control
the amount of information sent over the public channel. We use Wyner-Ziv cod-
ing, i.e. lossy source coding with side information, to handle this part. The privacy
amplification step is performed with extractors, that is, functions that take as in-
put a sequence of n arbitrarily distributed bits and a sequence of d truly uniformly
distributed bits to output a sequence of k nearly uniformly distributed bits. Specifi-
cally, Alice and Bob publicly agree on a sequence Ud of d truly uniformly distributed
bits, and use the extractors, using S and Ud as inputs, to form their secret-key K.
Observe that the extractors must be chosen such that the size d of Ud must be negli-
gible, compared to n, so that the effect of the transmission of Ud on the rate of public
communication is negligible. Moreover, the extractors must extract almost the entire
min-entropy of the input, that is, all the randomness of the input, to maximize the
length of the secret-key generated. As already mentioned, such extractors are, for
instance, explicitly constructed in [62].
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The next major difficulty is to combine reconciliation and privacy amplification,
since the output of the reconciliation step is not an independently and identically
distributed random variable because of the vector quantization. Crucial ingredients to
successfully perform this combination are Markov’s Lemma (see for instance [61]) and
a repetition of the reconciliation protocol. A schematic representation of the scheme is
illustrated in Figure 8 for one-way rate-limited public communication. Specifically, a
reconciliation protocol, operating over sequences of size n, is repeated m times. Then,
an overall reconciliation step is performed, followed by an overall privacy amplification
step. After the overall reconciliation step, Alice and Bob have agreed on a common
sequence S , UN , where N , n × m. Finally, Alice and Bob perform privacy
amplification by using an extractor with inputs UN and a uniform random variable
Ud. Note that the eavesdropper’s total knowledge is thus Z
N , his observation of the
source, F , (A,B), the public communication of Alice and Bob, and Ud. We now
Reconciliation protocol
Alice! S = Un
Bob! bS = bUn
P[bUn 6= Un]   ✏(n)
Reconciliation protocol
Alice! S = Un
Bob! bS = bUn
P[bUn 6= Un]   ✏(n)
Reconciliation protocol
Alice! S = Un
Bob! bS = bUn
P[bUn 6= Un]   ✏(n)
Reconciliation protocol
Alice! S = Un
Bob! bS = bUn
P[bUn 6= Un]   ✏(n)
Reconciliation protocol
Alice! S = Un
Bob! bS = bUn
P[bUn 6= Un]   ✏(n)
Reconciliation protocol
Alice! S = Un
Bob! bS = bUn
P[bUn 6= Un]   ✏(n)
Reconciliation protocol
Alice ! S = Un
Bob ! bS = bUn
Ext : {0, 1}N ⇥ {0, 1}d ! {0, 1}k
Alice ! K = Ext(UN , Ud)




P[bUn 6= Un]   ✏(n)
Information available to Eve after reconciliation: ZN , F , Ud
 
 
Figure 8. Schematic representation of sequential-key generation for one-way rate-
limited public communication. The scheme starts with m repetitions of a reconcili-
ation protocol, during which Alice and Bob agree on Un, a quantized version of Xn,
with an error probability bounded by δε(n), with limn→∞ δε(n) = 0, and ε > 0. Privacy
amplification with extractors is then performed to form the shared secret-key.
state our results as follows.
Theorem 2.4.3. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a MS such that X—Y—Z. For R1, R2 ∈ R+,
all WSK rates R that satisfy
R < RWSK(R1, R2)
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are achievable with sequential key-generation strategies.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.
Remark 2.4.2. Note that we assume X—Y—Z. For two-way communication, the
necessity of this hypothesis might be an inherent weakness of a scheme that consists
of a successive design of reconciliation and privacy amplification, rather than a joint
design as in [16] (see the proof in Appendix 2.A for more details). Observe, however,
that for a one-way public communication, in Theorem 2.4.4, this assumption is not
required.
Theorem 2.4.4. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a MS. For R1 ∈ R+, all WSK rates R that
satisfy
R < CWSK(R1, 0)
are achievable with sequential key-generation strategies.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Theorem 2.4.5. Let (XY , pXY ) be a MS. For R1, R2 ∈ R+, all SK rates R that
satisfy
R < CSK(R1, R2)
are achievable with sequential key-generation strategies.
We omit the proof of Theorem 2.4.5, which is similar to the one of Theorem 2.4.3
without the random variable Z.
Note that putting constraints on the public communication leads to auxiliary random
variables in the expression of the secret-key capacity and the reconciliation capacity,
as seen in Section 2.3. Hence, as demonstrated in Example 2.3.1, auxiliary random
variables that achieve the reconciliation capacity, may not achieve the secret-key ca-
pacity. In other words, reliability and secrecy can be handled successively, but cannot
necessarily be treated independently, as defined in Section 2.3.4. Nevertheless, in the
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next section, we identify scenarios for which reconciliation and privacy amplification
can be treated independently.
As a side result, we have extended known bounds for the secret-key capacity for
DMS to the case of CMS. We summarize this result in the following corollary, which
is directly deduced from Theorems 2.4.3, 2.4.4, and 2.4.5.
Corollary 2.4.2. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a MS.
(a) Assume that X—Y—Z. For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the two-way WSK achievable bound
RWSK(R1, R2) given in Theorem 2.3.1.a, remains valid for a CMS.
(b) For R1 ∈ R+, the expression of the one-way WSK capacity CWSK(R1, 0) given in
Theorem 2.3.1.b, remains valid for a CMS.
(c) For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the two-way SK capacity CSK(R1, R2) given in Corollary 2.3.1,
remains valid for a CMS.
2.5 Scenarios for which independence holds between reliabil-
ity and secrecy
As seen in the Example 2.3.1, achieving the reconciliation capacity might not lead to
achieving the secret-key capacity. In this section, we identify special cases for which
independence holds between reconciliation and privacy amplification. Specifically, we
prove that independence holds for the two-way one-round SK capacity, the one-way
WSK capacity in the case of binary symmetric degraded sources, and the one-way
WSK capacity in the case of Gaussian degraded sources. As a side result, we obtain
an expression for the two-way rate-limited reconciliation capacity and a closed-form
expression for the secret-key capacity CWSK(R1, 0) in the case of degraded binary
symmetric sources.
2.5.1 Two-way rate-limited SK capacity
In this section, we consider the two-way rate-limited SK capacity. That is, the eaves-
dropper has no correlated observation of the source.
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We first show that the two-way rate-limited SK capacity is equal to the two-way
rate-limited reconciliation capacity in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5.2. Let (XY , pXY ) be a MS. For R1, R2 ∈ R+, the rate-limited rec-
onciliation capacity Crec(R1, R2) is
Crec(R1, R2) = CSK(R1, R2).
Proof. See Appendix 2.C.
Hence, by Proposition 2.5.2, the auxiliary random variables that achieve the recon-
ciliation capacity, also achieve the secret-key capacity; combined with Theorem 2.4.5,
we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5.3. Let (XY , pXY ) be a MS and R1, R2 ∈ R+. The two-way rate-limited
SK capacity CSK(R1, R2) is achievable by a sequential strategy, moreover, reconcili-
ation and privacy amplification steps can be handled independently, as defined in
Section 2.3.4.
2.5.2 One-way rate-limited WSK capacity for degraded binary symmetric
sources
In this section, we assume a degraded DMS. We first refine Proposition 2.5.2 and
Theorem 2.3.1.b in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5.3. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a DMS such that X—Y—Z. Assume R1 ∈
R+ and R2 = 0. We tighten the rate constraint in (4), (6) and the range constraint
in (5), (7) as follows.
(a) The one-way rate-limited reconciliation capacity is
Crec(R1, 0) = max
U
I(Y ;U)
subject to R1 = I(X;U |Y ), (4)
U—X—Y,
|U|6 |X |. (5)
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(b) The one-way rate-limited secret-key capacity is




R1 = I(X;U |Y ), (6)
U—X—Y—Z,
|U|6 |X |. (7)
Proof. See Appendix 2.D.
Remark 2.5.3. The expression of the WSK capacity in Proposition 2.5.3.b is ob-
tained from Theorem 2.3.1.b and is due to Watanabe [60]. We refine this result by
proving that equality holds in the rate constraint and by improving the range con-
straint of U ; The argument used to show the equality in the rate constraint of Propo-
sitions 2.5.3.a and 2.5.3.b, is one that applies to various convex maximization prob-
lems: the maximum principle (see Appendix 2.D). This refinement is critical for the
analysis of binary sources, especially to solve the optimization problem for the WSK
capacity in Proposition 2.5.4, and thus to determine the WSK capacity for degraded
binary symmetric sources in Example 2.5.2.
Remark 2.5.4. As soon as R1 is at least H(X|Y ), Crec(R1, 0) (resp. CWSK(R1, 0))
attains the same maximum I(X;Y ) (resp. I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z)) as in the case R1 =
+∞.
The solution of the maximization problem in Proposition 2.5.3.b can be obtained
explicitly, when the source has symmetry properties.
Proposition 2.5.4. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a DMS such that X—Y—Z. Assume that
|X |= 2 and let R1 ∈ R∗+.
If the channels pY |X and pZ|X are symmetric [64], then the auxiliary random












Figure 9. Binary DMS studied in Example 2.5.2.
pU |X is a BSC with parameter β0, with β0, any of the two symmetric solutions of
R1 = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ).
Proof. See Appendix 2.E.
Although the result stated in Proposition 2.5.4 seems intuitive and non-surprising,
the proof is not straightforward, as a crucial step is the improvements proposed in
Proposition 2.5.3. Hence, if the channels pY |X and pZ|X are symmetric, by Proposi-
tion 2.5.4, the auxiliary random variable U achieving Crec(R1, 0) in Proposition 2.5.3.a
also achieves CWSK(R1, 0) in Proposition 2.5.3.b; combined with Theorem 2.4.4, we
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5.4. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a DMS such that X—Y—Z and |X |= 2. Let
R1 ∈ R∗+. We assume the channels pY |X and pZ|X to be symmetric. The one-way rate-
limited WSK capacity CWSK(R1, 0) is achievable by a sequential strategy, moreover,
reconciliation and privacy amplification steps can be handled independently, as defined
in Section 2.3.4.
The following example illustrates Proposition 2.5.4 and Corollary 2.5.4.
Example 2.5.2. As depicted in Figure 9, assume that X and Y (respectively Y and
Z) are connected by a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with crossover probability p
(respectively q). We also assume X ∼ B(1/2) to obtain simpler expressions; however,
the application of Proposition 2.5.4 remains valid for X ∼ B(α), α ∈ [0, 1]. By
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Figure 10. Reconciliation capacity Crec(R1, 0).





1−Hb(p ? β0), if R1 6 H(X|Y ),
1−Hb(p), if R1 > H(X|Y ),





Hb (p ? β0 ? q)−Hb(p ? β0), if R1 6 H(X|Y ),
Hb(p ? q)−Hb(p), if R1 > H(X|Y ),
with β0, any of the two symmetric solutions of the equation Hb(p ? β0)−Hb(β0) = R1
and where, for p, q ∈ [0, 1], we have defined the following associative and commutative
operation p ? q , p(1− q) + (1− p)q; observe that [0, 1] is closed with respect to ?.
Figure 11 (resp. Figure 10) illustrates Remark 2.5.4 and the fact that the reconcili-
ation capacity Crec(R1, 0) (resp. the secret key-capacity CWSK(R1, 0)) is monotonically
increasing in the communication rate constraint.
35


































Figure 12. Binary erasure channel studied in Example 2.5.2.
Corollary 2.5.4 states that choosing a test-channel pU |X as a BSC with parameter
β0, achieves Crec(R1, 0) and CWSK(R1, 0), so that reconciliation and privacy amplifi-
cation can be designed independently. Consequently, for any other channel pZ|Y , as
long as pZ|X stays symmetric, the reconciliation capacity and the optimal reconcili-
ation protocol for sequential key-generation remains the same. It is for instance the
case if we choose pZ|Y as a binary erasure channel (BEC), as depicted in Figure 12.








ε(1−Hb(p ? β0)), if R1 6 H(X|Y ),
ε(1−Hb(p)), if R1 > H(X|Y ),
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where ε is the erasure probability characterizing pZ|Y .
Remark 2.5.5. We can show that the sequential strategy used in this section can also
be applied to similar models for biometric secrecy [65].
2.5.3 One-way rate-limited WSK capacity for degraded Gaussian sources
In this section, we consider a degraded Gaussian MS with one-way rate-limited pub-
lic communication. We assume that X, Y , and Z are zero-mean correlated Gaussian
sources on R, and that Alice, Bob, and Eve know the covariance matrix of (X, Y, Z).
We first refine the reconciliation capacity and the secret-key capacity to give the
counterpart of Proposition 2.5.3. We then provide the reconciliation capacity and
the secret-key capacity, and show that reconciliation and privacy amplification can
be treated independently. We also briefly discuss the performance of vector quanti-
zation compared to scalar quantization for the reconciliation step, thereby providing
a counterpart of Remark 2.5.4.
Proposition 2.5.5. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a zero-mean Gaussian MS such that
X—Y—Z. Assume R1 ∈ R+ and R2 = 0.
(a) The one-way rate-limited reconciliation capacity is




R1 = I(X;U |Y ), (8)
U—X—Y, .
(b) The one-way rate-limited WSK capacity is




R1 = I(X;U |Y ),
U—X—Y—Z,
37





















Figure 13. Reconciliation capacity Crec(R1, 0) for different correlation coefficients ρXY .


















Figure 14. WSK capacity CWSK(R1, 0), for different correlation coefficients ρXY (ρXZ =
0.1, ρY Z = 0.4).
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Proposition 2.5.5 follows from Proposition 2.5.6.
Proposition 2.5.6. Assume that (XYZ, pXY Z) is a degraded zero-mean Gaussian
source. Let R1 ∈ R+.
The auxiliary random variable U achieving Crec(R1, 0) in Proposition 2.5.5.a is a
zero-mean Gaussian with variance
σ0 , σx
(
1 + (1− ρXY )(e2R1 − 1)−1
)
that satisfies the rate-constraint (8), where ρXY is the correlation coefficient between
X and Y . Moreover, the same auxiliary random variable U achieves CWSK(R1, 0) in
Proposition 2.5.5.b.

















(1− ρ2Y Z)(1− ρ2XZ)− (ρXY − ρY ZρXZ)2 e−2R1
(1− ρ2Y Z)(1− ρ2XZ)− (ρXY − ρY ZρXZ)2
.
Proof. (b) is due to Watanabe [60], and the proof of (a) is similar to the one of (b).
Proposition 2.5.6 states that both arguments of the maximum for the auxiliary
random variable U , in (a) and (b) of Proposition 2.5.5 are identical; combined with
Theorem 2.4.4, we deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 2.5.5. Assume that (XYZ, pXY Z) is a degraded zero-mean Gaussian source.
Let R1 ∈ R+. The one-way rate-limited WSK capacity CWSK(R1, 0) is achievable by
a sequential strategy, moreover, reconciliation and privacy amplification steps can be
handled independently, as defined in Section 2.3.4.
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As shown by Proposition 2.5.6.a (resp. Proposition 2.5.6.b), and as illustrated in
Figure 13 (resp. Figure 14), the reconciliation capacity (resp. the WSK capacity)
does not reach I(X;Y ) (resp. I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z)) when R1 exceed a certain value.
As mentioned in [60] and Remark 2.5.4, unlike the case of discrete random variables,
Crec(R1, 0) (resp. CWSK(R1, 0)) can only approach I(X;Y ) (resp. I(X;Y )−I(X;Z))
asymptotically. Nevertheless, we show in the following proposition a continuous coun-
terpart of Remark 2.5.4.
The achievability of CWSK(R1, 0) with our sequential strategy is based on Wyner-
Ziv coding. For a practical implementation, additional structure needs to be intro-
duced, for instance with vector quantization. Since scalar quantization is the simplest
and often the most computationally efficient type of quantization, it is natural to ask
how scalar quantization performs compared to vector quantization. We answer this
question in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5.7. Let n ∈ N∗, and a > 0. Define U as a uniformly quantized
version of X. Specifically,
∀k ∈ J1, nK, pU(uk) ,
∫ tk+1
tk
pX(x)dx, with tk , a(2 k−1n−1 − 1).
If n is large enough, then
|I(X;Y )− I(Y ;U)|6 ε(a) + a ·Keh(X|Y )−R1 ,
where R1 is the communication rate constraint, K is a constant, and ε(a) decreases
exponentially fast to zero as a goes to infinity.
Proof. See Appendix 2.F.
Proposition 2.5.7 gives a continuous counterpart of Remark 2.5.4. Indeed, when
R1 > h(X|Y ), by Proposition 2.5.7, if X is quantized finely enough, then I(Y ;U)
approach I(X;Y ) exponentially fast as R1 increases.
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Figure 15. Reconciliation capacity obtained for a scalar quantization of X with ρXY =
0.75, h(X|Y ) ≈ 1.
Hence, the improvement of vector quantization compared to scalar quantization
decays rapidly as the communication rate increases beyond h(X|Y ). Note that, in
practice, we can optimize the scalar quantization, so that the loss could be even
smaller than predicted by Proposition 2.5.7. Figure 15 illustrates this point by com-
paring the reconciliation capacity with numerical values of achievable rates obtained
when X is scalar-quantized.4 Nevertheless, for low communication rates, Figure 15
shows that vector quantization improves the performance; in this case, we could im-
plement, for instance, trellis coded vector quantization (TCVQ) [66].
4We have increased the number of interval of quantization of X from 2 to 15 and chosen their
bounds by a standard gradient method to maximize I(XQ;Y ).
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2.6 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the one-way rate-limited capacity is achievable by a sequential
strategy that separates reliability and secrecy thanks to a reconciliation step followed
by a privacy amplification step with extractors; in the case of two-way communication,
the sequential design seems to suffer a loss of performance compared to the joint
design and similar secret key rates have only been established for degraded sources or
when there is no side information at the eavesdropper (SK capacity). We have also
qualified robustness of sequential strategy to rate-limited communication, by showing
that achieving the reconciliation capacity in a sequential strategy is, unlike the case of
rate-unlimited communication, not necessarily optimal. We further provide scenarios
for which it stays optimal. As a side result, we have extended known bounds of
the WSK capacity for a discrete source model to the case of a continuous source
model, and derived a closed-form expression of the one-way rate-limited capacity for
degraded binary symmetric sources.
A strength of sequential key-generation is to easily translate into practical de-
signs. Even more interestingly, the proposed scheme can be made very flexible with
the following modifications.
Rate-compatible reconciliation: We can adapt to the characteristics of the legitimate
users by the use of rate-compatible LDPC codes, to perform the reconciliation phase,
as demonstrated in [67, 68]. Note, however, that vector quantization might be re-
quired, which could complexify the reconciliation phase.
Rate-compatible privacy amplification: Privacy amplification can also be performed
with universal families of hash functions, in which case the counterpart of Theo-
rem 2.3.2 is found in [24].5 Hence, one can design privacy amplification methods eas-
ily adjustable to the characteristics of the eavesdropper’s observations, if we make k
5However, it requires more random bits than extractors, on the order of n random bits, since
functions must be chosen at random in universal families. Consequently, our scheme needs to be
adapted to account for it.
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vary in the following universal family of hash functions H = {GF(2n)→ {0, 1}k, x 7→
(k bits of the product xy)|y ∈ GF(2n)}, where the k bits are fixed but their position
can be chosen arbitrarily [69].
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APPENDICES
2.A Proof of Theorem 2.4.3
2.A.1 Discrete case
Let ε > 0. Let R1, R2 ∈ R+. Let m,n ∈ N, and define N , nm. Let k ∈ N to be
determined later. Consider a sequential key-distillation strategy SN that consists of
• m repetitions of a reconciliation protocol Rn based on Wyner-Ziv coding. The
protocol Rn operates as described in Appendix 2.C.2. Hence, after one repeti-
tion of the protocol, Alice obtains Sn , UnV̂ n, whereas Bob has Ŝn , ÛnV n
and P[Ŝn 6= Sn|Rn] 6 Pe(ε, n).6 In addition, the information disclosed over the
public channel during the m repetitions of the reconciliation protocol is upper
bounded by
log|A|m+ log|B|m= N(I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ) + I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;X|U) + r0(ε)),
with limε→0 r0(ε) = 0.
7 An additional round of reconciliation is then per-
formed to ensure P[(Ŝn)m 6= (Sn)m|Rn] 6 δe(m), where limm→∞ δe(m) = 0,
for any fixed n. We note log|C|m the information communicated to perform
this last step. Hence, the overall information disclosed is upper bounded by
lrec , log(|A|N |B|N |C|m), that is
lrec = N(I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ) + I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;X|U) + r1(ε, n)), (9)
with r1(ε, n) ,
1 + ε
n
H(Sn|Ŝn) + r0(ε) (10)
arbitrarily small for n large enough by Fano’s inequality, so that the communi-
cation rates R1 and R2 remain asymptotically unchanged.
• privacy amplification, based on extractors with output size k, at the end of which
6By Appendix 2.C.2, Pe(ε, n) decreases exponentially to zero as nε
2 goes to infinity.
7r0(ε) , 6εH(U) + 12εH(V |U) by Appendix 2.C.2.
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Alice computes her key K , g(SN , Ud), while Bob computes K̂ , g(ŜN , Ud),
where Ud is a sequence of d uniformly distributed random bits.
The total information available to Eve after reconciliation consists of her observation
ZN , the public messages Am and Bm, respectively sent by Alice and Bob, the pub-
lic message Cm, and Ud. The strategy SN is also known to Eve, but we omit the
conditioning on SN for convenience.
We first show that, for a suitable choice of the output size k, the quantity
k − H(K|UdZNAmBmCm) vanishes to zero for N large enough. Then, we show
that the corresponding WSK rate achieves the lower bound on the WSK capacity of
Theorem 2.3.1. We first state Lemma 2.1.1, a refined version of the results in [23,25],
that is obtained by using the notion of robust typicality developed in the appendix
of [61], to later extend our result to the continuous case.
Lemma 2.1.1 ( [23, 25], Refined version). Consider a DMS (XZ, pXZ) and define





1 if (Xn, Zn) ∈ T n2ε(XZ) and Zn ∈ T nε (Z),
0 otherwise.
Then, P[Θ = 1] > 1 − δ0ε (n), with δ0ε (n) , 2|SX |e−ε
2nµX/3 + 2|SXZ |e−ε2nµXZ/3, where
SX , {x ∈ X : p(x) > 0} and µX , minx∈SX p(x) . Moreover, if zn ∈ T nε (Z),
H∞(X
n|Zn = zn,Θ = 1) > n(H(X|Z)− δ0(ε)) + log(1− δ1ε (n)),
where δ0(ε) , εH(X|Z) and δ1ε (n) , 2|SX,Z |e−ε
2nµX,Z/6.
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By Lemma 2.1.1 applied to the DMS (UnVnZn, pUnV nZn), P[Θ = 1] > 1− δ0ε (m), and
by [25, Lemma 10], P[Υ = 1] > 1−2−
√










×H(K|UdZNAmBmCm,Υ = 1,Θ = 1). (11)
To lower bound H(K|UdZNAmBmCm,Υ = 1,Θ = 1), we first lower bound
H∞(S
N |zN , am, bm, cm,Θ = 1,Υ = 1) to be able to use Theorem 2.3.2. By definition
of Υ,
H∞(S
N |zN , am, bm, cm,Θ = 1,Υ = 1)




> m(H(Sn|Zn)− nr2(ε, n,m))− lrec, (12)
where (a) follows from Lemma 2.1.1 with
r2(ε, n,m) , ε
H(Sn|Zn)
n
−N−1 log(1− δ1ε (m)) +N−1/2.8 (13)
8The m repetitions of the protocol Rn allow us to link H∞(·) to H(·).
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We now lower bound H(Sn|Zn).
H(Sn|Zn) = H(Ŝn|Zn) +H(Sn|ŜnZn)−H(Ŝn|SnZn)
(b)
> H(Ŝn|Zn)− δε(n)
= I(Y n; Ŝn|Zn) +H(Ŝn|Y nZn)− δε(n)
= H(Y n|Zn)−H(Y n|ZnŜn) +H(Ûn|Y nZn)
+H(V n|Y nÛnZn)− δε(n)
(c)
= nH(Y |Z)−H(Y n|ZnŜn) +H(Ûn|Y nZn)− δε(n), (14)
where (b) follows from Fano’s inequality where limn→∞ δε(n) = 0 by the exponential
decrease of Pe(ε, n) with ε
2n, and (c) holds because V n is a function of (Y nÛn), and
the Yi’s and Zi’s are i.i.d.. We first lower bound H(Û
n|Y nZn).
H(Ûn|Y nZn) = H(Un|Y nZn) +H(Ûn|UnY nZn)−H(Un|ÛnY nZn)
(d)
> H(Un|Y nZn)− δε(n)
> I(Xn;Un|Y nZn)− δε(n)
(e)
= nH(X|Y Z)−H(Xn|Y nZnUn)− δε(n), (15)
where (d) follows from Fano’s inequality where limn→∞ δε(n) = 0 by the exponential
decrease of Pe(ε, n) with ε






















P[Γ = γ|∆ = δ]P[∆ = δ]H(Xn|Y nZnUn,Γ = γ,∆ = δ)
(f)
62 +H(Xn|Y nZnUn,Γ = 1,∆ = 1) + n(2δ2ε (n) + δ4ε (n)) log|X |, (16)
where (f) holds since P[∆ = 0] , δ2ε (n),9 and P[Γ = 0|∆ = 1] 6 δ4ε (n).10 In-
deed, we can apply Markov Lemma [70] (see the version given in [61]), since we have
















p(yn, zn, un|1, 1)(nH(X|Y ZU)(1 + 2ε))
6 nH(X|Y ZU)(1 + 2ε). (17)
Hence, combining (15), (16), and (17), we obtain
H(Ûn|Y nZn) > n(H(X|Y Z)−H(X|Y ZU)− r3(ε, n)), (18)
where
r3(ε, n) , 2H(X|Y ZU)ε+ (2δ2ε (n) + δ4ε (n)) log|X |+2/n+ δε(n)/n. (19)
9We have δ2ε (n) 6 Pe(ε, n) by Appendix 2.C.2.
10By Markov Lemma, we have δ4ε (n) , 2|SUXY Z |e−ε
2nµUXY Z/6.
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P[Γ1 = γ1|∆1 = δ1]P[∆1 = δ1]H(Y n|ZnŜn,Γ1 = γ1,∆1 = δ1)
(g)
62 +H(Y n|ZnŜn,Γ1 = 1,∆1 = 1) + n(2δ3ε (n) + δ5ε (n)) log|Y|, (20)
where (g) holds since P[∆1 = 0] , δ3ε (n),11 and P[Γ1 = 0|∆1 = 1] 6 δ5ε (n).12 In-
deed, we can apply Markov Lemma, since we have for every (yn, zn), p(zn|yn) =
n∏
i=1
pZ|Y (zi|yi), and (ÛnV n)—Y n—Zn, which follows from the assumptionX—Y—Z.13
H(Y n|ZnŜn,Γ1 = 1,∆1 = 1) =
∑
zn,ŝn








p(zn, ŝn|1, 1)(nH(Y |ZUV )(1 + 2ε))
6 nH(Y |ZUV )(1 + 2ε). (21)
11We have δ3ε (n) 6 Pe(ε, n) by Appendix 2.C.2.
12By Markov Lemma, we have δ5ε (n) , 2|SUV Y Z |e−ε
2nµUV Y Z/6.
13Note that the assumption of degraded sources is only necessary here. The use of this hypothesis is
the weakness, at least for two-way communication (for one-way communication this assumption is not
necessary), of a proof that consists of a successive design of reconciliation and privacy amplification,
rather than a joint design as in [16], where the joint design is exploited to get the joint typicality of
(V n, Y n, Ûn, Zn).
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Hence by (20), (21),
H(Y n|ZnUnV n) 6 n(H(Y |ZUV ) + r4(ε, n)), (22)
where
r4(ε, n) , 2H(Y |ZUV )ε+ (2δ3ε (n) + δ5ε (n)) log|Y|+2/n. (23)
Combining (14), (18), (22),
H(Sn|Zn) > n[H(Y |Z) +H(X|Y Z)−H(X|Y ZU)
−H(Y |ZUV )− r3(ε, n)− r4(ε, n)]− δε(n). (24)
Then, remark that
H(Y |Z) +H(X|Y Z)−H(X|Y ZU)−H(Y |ZUV )
= I(Y ;UV |Z) + I(X;U |Y Z)
= H(U |Z) +H(V |UZ)−H(V |UY Z)−H(U |XY Z)
(h)
>H(U |Z) +H(V |UZ)−H(V |UY )−H(U |X)
= I(U ;X)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U) + I(V ;Y |U), (25)
where (h) holds because conditioning reduces entropy. Hence, by (9), (12), (24),
and (95)
H∞(S
N |zN , am, bm, cm,Θ = 1,Υ = 1)
> N [I(U ;Y ) + I(V ;X|U)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U)− r5(ε, n,m)], (26)
where
r5(ε, n,m) , r1(ε, n) + r2(ε, n,m) + r3(ε, n) + r4(ε, n) + δε(n)/n. (27)
Set k to be less than the lower bound in (26) by
√
N :




Now with (26) and (28), we can apply Theorem 2.3.2 to lower bound










Thus, we can finally lower bound H(K|UdZNAmBmCm) in (11):
H(K|UdZNAmBmCm) >
(





















Moreover, the leakage is such that
I(K;UdZ
NAmBmCm) = H(K)−H(K|UdZNAmBmCm) 6 r6(ε, n,m), (29)
with r6(ε, n,m) vanishing to zero for a fixed n as m goes to infinity. The keys com-
puted by Alice and Bob are asymptotically the same for a fixed n as m goes to infinity,
since
P[K 6= K̂] 6 P[(Sn)m 6= (Ŝn)m] 6 δe(m). (30)
Then, by (10), (13), (19), (23), (27), we have that r5(ε, n,m) vanishes to zero
for n large enough and as m goes to infinity, thus the secret key rate R , k/N is
asymptotically as close as desired to
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) + I(V ;X|U)− I(V ;Z|U).
Note that it is not exactly the bound proposed in Theorem 2.3.1.a for the WSK ca-
pacity. We finish the proof as follows. If I(V ;X|U) 6 I(V ;Z|U), in the reconciliation
we set R2 = 0 so that the asymptotic secret key rate is now as close as desired to
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z) + [I(V ;X|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+.
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Then, if I(U ;Y ) 6 I(U ;Z), in the reconciliation protocol, we choose Sn = V n (see
the beginning of the proof), and we assume that UN is provided by a genie to Eve.
Consequently, we obtain instead of Equation (12),
H∞(V
N |zN , uN , bm, cm,Θ = 1,Υ = 1)
> m(H(V n|ZnUn)− nr2(ε, n,m))−N(I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;X|U)− r1(ε, n)),
and conclude in the same manner, to obtain an asymptotic secret key rate as close as
desired to
[I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z)]+ + [I(V ;X|U)− I(V ;Z|U)]+.
2.A.2 Continuous case
We use the following lemma to extend the result to the continuous case by means of
quantization.
Lemma 2.1.2 ( [71–73]). Let X and Y be two real-valued random variables with
probability distribution PX and PY respectively. Let E∆1 = {Ei}i∈I, F∆2 = {Fj}j∈J
be two partitions of X and Y such that for any i ∈ I,PX(Ei) = ∆1, for any j ∈
J ,PY (Fj) = ∆2, where ∆1,∆2 > 0. Let X∆1, Y∆2 be the quantized version of X, Y
with respect to the partitions E∆1, F∆2 respectively. Then, we have
I(X;Y ) = lim
∆1,∆2→0
I(X∆1 , Y∆2).
Note that a quantization of the eavesdropper observation Zn might underestimate
its knowledge from the legitimate users point of view and implicitly increase the
leakage. However, by Lemma 2.1.2, for any δ > 0, if the quantized version Zn∆n of Z
n
is fine enough, then the leakage is not compromised and
|I(K;MZn)− I(K;MZn∆n)|< δ.
This argument is also used in [6, 74,75].
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We perform the quantization as follows. As in Lemma 2.1.2, we jointly quantify
X, Y , Z, U and V to form X∆X , Y∆Y , Z∆Z , U∆U , V∆V such that ∆X = ∆Y = ∆Z =
∆U = ∆V = l
−b and |X∆X |= |Y∆Y |= |Z∆Z |= |U∆U |= |V∆V |= lb with b > 0. We now
apply the proof of the discrete case to the random variables X∆X , Y∆Y , Z∆Z , U∆U ,
V∆V . By Lemma 2.1.2, we can fix l large enough such that
|I(U∆U ;Y∆Y )− I(U ;Y )|< δ/4,
|I(V∆V ;X∆X |U∆U )− I(V ;X|U)|< δ/4,
|I(U∆U ;Z∆Z )− I(U ;Z)|< δ/4,
|I(V∆V ;Z∆Z |U∆U )− I(V ;Z|U)|< δ/4,
and Equation (28) becomes
k > bN [I(Y ;U)− I(V ;X|U)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U)− r5(ε, n,m)− δ]−
√
Nc.
At this point, we cannot conclude with the last inequality. Indeed, in the term
r5(ε, n,m) are hidden the following terms:
H(X∆X |ZY∆Y U∆U )ε (see (19)),
H(Y∆Y |Z∆ZU∆UV∆V )ε (see (23)),
H(U∆U )ε and H(V∆V |U∆U )ε (by definition of r0(ε)),
which do not vanish to 0 as l get large. Now, if we choose ε = n−a, where a ∈]0, 1/2[,
so that for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 5}, δiε(n) vanishes as n get large for l fixed,14 then the
asymptotic secret-key rate, for n large enough and as m goes to infinity becomes as
close as desired to
I(Y ;U)− I(V ;X|U)− I(U ;Z)− I(V ;Z|U).
Moreover, the leakage in (29), and the key error probability between Alice an Bob
in (30), still vanish to zero for n large enough and as m goes to infinity.
14Recall that Pe(ε, n) decreases exponentially to zero as nε
2 goes to infinity.
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2.B Proof of Theorem 2.4.4
As in [4], Theorem 2.4.4 is not directly deduced from Theorem 2.4.3. We first consider
the case of one-way public communication, in which Alice sends messages to Bob, a
first time with rate R′1 and a second time with rate R
′













[I(U ;Y ) + I(V ;Y |U)]
subject to
R′1 > I(X;U |Y ) (31)
R′2 > I(V ;X|Y U) (32)
U—X—Y, V—UX—Y.









[I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U)]+ +[I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U)]+
)
,
subject to rate constraints (31), (32) and Markov conditions
U—X—Y Z, V—UX—Y Z, (33)
by a reconciliation phase followed by a privacy amplification phase performed with
extractors, and this time without the assumption X → Y → Z. Note that Markov
condition
U—V—X—Y Z, (34)
implies Markov conditions (33), and that if Markov condition (34) holds, then the
rate constraint (32) becomes
R′2 > I(X;V |U)− I(Y ;V |U) > I(X;V )− I(Y ;V )−R′1.
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Hence, for R′1, R
′











[I(Y ;V |U)− I(Z;V |U)],
subject to rate constraint R1 > I(X;V ) − I(Y ;V ) and Markov condition (34). We
conclude by observing that CWSK(R1, 0) > R∗WSK(R′1, R′2).
2.C Proof of Proposition 2.5.2
2.C.1 Converse
Let R1, R2 ∈ R+. We first establish the rate constraints on R1 and R2. We have
nR1 > H(A)
> I(A;Xn)− I(A;Y n)
(a)
= n[I(A;XJ |Ũ)− I(A;YJ |Ũ)]
(b)
= n[I(U ;XJ)− I(U ;YJ)], (35)
where (a) holds by [76, Lemma 4.1], if we set Ũ , XJ−1Y NJ+1J and J is a random
variable uniformly distributed on J1, nK, independent of all previous random variables,




> H(B|Xn) +H(Ŝ|S)− nδ(ε)
(d)
> I(Ŝ;B|Xn) +H(Ŝ|BXn)− nδ(ε)
= H(Ŝ|Xn)− nδ(ε) (36)
= H(Ŝ|A)− I(Ŝ;Xn|A)− nδ(ε)
(e)
= I(Ŝ;Y n|A)− I(Ŝ;Xn|A)− nδ(ε)
(f)
= n[I(V ;YJ |U)− I(V ;XJ |U)]− nδ(ε),
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where (c) holds because A is a function of Xn and by Fano’s inequality, since for any
ε > 0, there exists a reconciliation protocol such that P[S 6= Ŝ] 6 δ(ε),15 (d) holds
since S = ηa(X
n, B), (e) holds since Ŝ = ηb(Y
n, A), (f) holds by [76, Lemma 4.1] and
if we set V , Ŝ.

















P[J = i]I(ŜXJ−1Y nJ+1;XJ |J = i)
= nI(ŜŨ ;XJ |J)
6 nI(V U ;XJ), (37)
where (a) holds because the Xi’s are i.i.d.. Then,
H(Ŝ)−H(AB) = I(Ŝ;Xn) +H(Ŝ|Xn)−H(A)−H(B|A)
(b)
6 nI(V U ;XJ)−H(A) + nδ(ε)
(c)
6 n[I(V ;XJ |U) + I(U ;YJ) + δ(ε)],
where (b) holds by (37) and since H(Ŝ|Xn) 6 H(B|A) + nδ(ε) by (36), and (c) holds
by (35).
For a DMS, standard techniques [76] show that |U|6 |X |+2 and |V|6 |Y|.
2.C.2 Achievability
The proof for a DMS is similar to Wyner-Ziv coding [77], we only describe the proto-
col. In the following, for n ∈ N and ε > 0, we note T nε (X) the set of ε-letter-typical
sequences [78] (also called “robustly typical sequence” in [61]) with respect to pX . We
15δ(ε) denotes a function of ε such that limε→0 δ(ε) = 0.
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also define conditional typical sets as follows, T nε (Y |xn) , {yn : (xn, yn) ∈ T nε (XY )}.
We note µX , minx∈supp(pX) pX(x). Let ε > 0, and define ε1 , 12ε, ε2 , 2ε.
Code construction: Fix a joint probability distribution pUX on U × X and pUV Y
on U × V × Y .
• Define Ru = I(X;U |Y ) + 6εH(U),
R′u = I(Y ;U)− 3εH(U).
Generate 2n(Ru+R
′
u) codewords, labeled un(ω, ν) with (ω, ν) ∈ J1, 2nRu K×J1, 2nR′uK,
by generating the symbols ui(ω, ν) for i ∈ J1, nK and (ω, ν) ∈ J1, 2nRu K ×
J1, 2nR′uK independently according to pU .
• Define Rv = I(V ;Y |XU) + 6ε2H(V |U),
R′v = I(V ;X|U)− 3ε2H(V |U).
For each (ω, ν), generate 2n(Rv+R
′
v) codewords, labeled vn(ω, ν, k, l) with (k, l) ∈
J1, 2nRv K × J1, 2nR′vK, by generating the symbols vi(ω, ν, k, l) for i ∈ J1, nK and
(k, l) ∈ J1, 2nRv K× J1, 2nR′vK independently according to pV |U=ui(ω,ν).
Step1. At Alice’s side:
• Given xn, find a pair (ω, ν) s.t (xn, un(ω, ν)) ∈ T nε (XU). If we find several
pairs, we choose the smallest one (by lexicographic order). If we fail we choose
(ω, ν) = (1, 1).
• Define sn1 , un(ω, ν).
• Transmit a , ω.
Step2. At Bob’s side:
• Given yn and a, find ν̃ s.t (yn, un(ω, ν̃)) ∈ T nε (Y U) and define ŝn1 , un(ω, ν̃). If
there is one or more such ν̃, choose the lowest, otherwise set ν̃ = 1. Find a pair
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(k, l) such that (ŝn1 , y
n, vn(ω, ν̃, k, l)) ∈ T nε2 (UY V ). If there is one or more such
(k, l), choose the lowest, otherwise set (k, l) = (1, 1).
• Transmit b = k.
• Define ŝn2 , vn(ω, ν̃, k, l) and ŝn , (ŝn1 , ŝn2 ).
Step3. At Alice’s side:
• Given sn1 = un(ω, ν) and b, find l̃ s.t (xn, sn1 , vn(ω, ν̃, k, l̃)) ∈ T nε2 (XUV ). If there
is one or more such l̃, choose the lowest, otherwise set l̃ = 1.
• Define sn2 , vn(ω, ν̃, k, l̃) and sn , (sn1 , sn2 ).
We can show by standard arguments that there exists a code, such that after one
repetition of the protocol, Alice obtains Sn = UnV̂ n, whereas Bob has Ŝn = ÛnV n
with P[Ûn 6= Un] 6 δε(n),16 P[V̂ n 6= V n] 6 δε(n), P[Ŝn 6= Sn|Rn] 6 Pe(ε, n)17
and (Un, Xn), (Ûn, Y n), (Ûn, Y n, V n), (Un, V̂ n, Xn) jointly typical with probability
approaching one for n large.
To extend the result to a CMS, we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 2.4.3.
2.D Proof of Proposition 2.5.3
2.D.1 Proof of Part i)
The achievability and converse proof can be found in [56], it remains to prove that
equality holds in the rate constraint (4) and that |U|6 |X |.
2.D.1.1 Equality constraint
We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4.3. f(U) , I(Y ;U) and f1(U) , I(X;U |Y ) are convex in pU |X .
Proof. Let λ ∈ [0, 1], let U1, U2 defined by pU1|X and pU2|X respectively, be s.t.
U1—X—Y and U2—X—Y .
16δε(n) denotes a function of ε and n such that limn→∞ δε(n) = 0.
17We can show that Pe(ε, n) decreases exponentially to zero as nε
2 goes to infinity.
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1 with probability λ,
2 with probability 1− λ.
I(Y ;U) 6 I(Y ;UQ)
= I(Y ;Q) + I(Y ;U |Q)
(a)
= I(Y ;U |Q)
= λI(Y ;U1) + (1− λ)I(Y ;U2),
where (a) holds since Y and Q are independent.
I(X;U |Y ) 6 I(X;UQ|Y )
= I(X;Q|Y ) + I(X;U |Y Q)
(b)
= I(X;U |Y Q)
= λ(I(X;U1|Y ) + (1− λ)(I(X;U2|Y ),
where (b) holds because H(X|Y Q) = H(X|Y ), since Q and (X, Y ) are independent.
By Lemma 2.4.3, f(U) and f1(U) are convex in pU |X . Define ∆ , {u ∈ R|U||X | :
∀i, j ∈ J1, |U|K× J1, |X |K,∑|U|k=1 ukj = 1, uij > 0}, and C , {u ∈ ∆ : f1(u) 6 R1}.
We first show that C is convex compact, with extreme points in {u ∈ ∆ : f1(u) = R1}:
• C is the preimage of [0, R1] by the continuous function f1, thus C is closed. We
deduce that C is compact, since C ⊂ [0, 1]|U||X | and [0, 1]|U||X | is compact.
• C is convex by convexity of f1, since the sublevels of a convex function are
convex sets.
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• Let u1 ∈ C s.t. f1(u1) = R1 − δ, with δ > 0. By continuity of f1, ∃ε0,∀u ∈








uλ = λu0 + (1− λ)u1.
Then ||uλ−u1||= ||λ(u0−u1)||6 |λ|ε0, which means uλ ∈ C. Hence, 12uλ=+1/2 +
1
2
uλ=−1/2 = u1, and we conclude that u1 is not an extreme point. Hence, the
set of extreme points of C is a subset of {u ∈ ∆ : f1(u) = R1}.
Since f is continuous, it reaches a maximum umax on the compact C. Then, since f is
convex and C is a convex compact, by the Krein-Milman Theorem,18 umax is a convex
linear combination of extreme points of C (existence of such extreme points comes





k=1 λk = 1 , λ1, λ2, . . . , λn > 0 and u1,u2, . . . ,un extreme points of C. By











λk(f(umax)− f(uk)) = 0,
which means that there exists i ∈ J1, nK s.t f(umax) = f(ui). We conclude that umax
is an extreme point of C. This result is known as the maximum principle [79].
2.D.1.2 Cardinality bound |U|6 |X |
This result is a special case of a more general one that we prove in Appendix 2.D.2.2.
2.D.2 Proof of Part ii)
The proof is partially found in [60] and all that remains to be proved are the equality
in the communication rate constraint and the range constraint |U|6 |X |.
2.D.2.1 Equality in the constraint
To prove that equality holds in the constraint for the argument of the maximum in
Proposition 2.5.3.b, we can reuse the proof of Proposition 2.5.3.a in Appendix 2.D.1.1,
18A compact convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space is the closed convex hull
of the set of its extreme points. Actually, only a weaker version is used since a finite dimensional
space is considered.
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so that we only need to show that f(U) = I(Y ;U) − I(Z;U) is convex in pU |X .
To obtain the convexity of f , we replace (X, Y ) by (Y, Z) in the function f1 of
Lemma 2.4.3.
2.D.2.2 Range constraint |U|6 |X |
The proof relies on a technique used in [80].
Define
R , {(R,R1) : R > I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U),
R1 > I(X;U)− I(Y ;U), with U—X—Y—Z} ,
C , {(R,R1) : R > I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U),
R1 = I(X;U)− I(Y ;U), with U—X—Y—Z} .
Note that the capacity region C is from Proposition 2.5.3.b and that the equality in




(R,R1) : ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ R+, λ1R + λ2R1 > G(λ1, λ2)
}
,
where ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ R+,
G(λ1, λ2) , inf
U s.t
U—X—Y—Z
[λ1(I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U)) +λ2(I(X;U)− I(Y ;U))] .
Consequently G(λ1, λ2) is sufficient information to describeR. Then, we show that for
all λ1, λ2 ∈ R+, G(λ1, λ2) can be achieved by considering a discrete random variable
U such that |U|6 |X |.
Let λ1, λ2 ∈ R+, let P in [80, Lemma 2] be the |X |-dimensional probability sim-
plex, and let X = {xi}|X |i=1. Consider P as a set of elements of the form
(P[X = x1|U = u],P[X = x2|U = u], . . . , P[X = x|X ||U = u]
)
,
with u ∈ U . Then, each probability distribution on U defines a measure µ on P .
Define HP (X), HP (Y ), and HP (Z) as the entropies of X, Y , and Z respectively,
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when the distribution of X is P ∈ P . Define
f1(P ) , λ1(HP (Z)−HP (Y )) + λ2(HP (Y )−HP (X))
fj(P ) , P (xj), for j ∈ J2, |X |K.
Let P ∗X achieve G(λ1, λ2), and let µ
∗ be such that
∫
P Pµ
∗(dP ) = P ∗X . Denote by
H∗(X) the entropy of X under probability distribution P ∗X . Then, by [80, Lemma 2],
there exists P1, P2, . . . , P|X |, and α1, α2, . . . , α|X | such that,
∑|X |
i=1 αi = 1,



















From P ∗X(xj), j ∈ J2, |X |K, we can compute H∗(X), H∗(Y ), and H∗(Z), then
λ1(H
∗(Y )−H∗(Y |U)−H∗(Z) +H∗(Z|U))
+ λ2(H
∗(X)−H∗(X|U)−H∗(Y ) +H∗(Y |U))
= λ1(I
∗(Y ;U)− I∗(Z;U)) + λ2(I∗(X;U)− I∗(Y ;U))
= G(λ1, λ2).
We have thus shown that we can choose U such that |U|6 |X | to achieve G(λ1, λ2).
Consequently, it is enough to consider U such that |U|6 |X |, to form the set R, as
well as the set C, since C ⊂ R.
2.E Proof of Proposition 2.5.4
If R1 > H(X|Y ), then by Proposition 2.5.3.b CWSK(R1, 0) = I(X;Y ). Assume
R1 ∈]0;H(X|Y )[ in the following. We note X = {0, 1} and by Proposition 2.5.3.b, we
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can assume U = {u1, u2}. We note β1 = p(X = 1|U = u1) and β2 = p(X = 0|U = u2).
We can write



















with ∀y ∈ Y ,
p(y|u1) = (1− β1)p(y|X = 0) + β1p(y|X = 1), (39)
p(y|u2) = β2p(y|X = 0) + (1− β2)p(y|X = 1). (40)
Moreover, since the channel pY |X is symmetric, there exists a permutation π ∈ S|Y|
such that
∀y ∈ Y ,∀x ∈ X , p(y|x) = p(π(y)|x⊕ 1), (41)
where ⊕ denotes the modulo 2 operation. Thus by (38), (39), (40), (41) there exists
gY |X
19 such that H(Y |U = u1) = gY |X(β1), H(Y |U = u2) = gY |X(β2). Then,








Similarly, by using that the channel pZ|X is symmetric, there exists gZ|X such that
H(Z|U = u1) = gZ|X(β1) and H(Z|U = u2) = gZ|X(β2). Thus, we also have








19The exact description of gY |X is not important here, what matters is that H(Y |U = u1) and
H(Y |U = u2) can be expressed with the same function.
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Consider the region R1 ,
⋃
β0∈[0,1]




Rβ0 , {(R,R1) : R 6 H(Y )−H(Z)− gY |X(β0) + gZ|X(β0),
R1 6 H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(β0) + gY |X(β0)
}
,
Rβ1,β2 , {(R,R1) : R 6 I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U), R1 6 I(X;U)− I(Y ;U)} .
We can verify that both regionsR1 andR2 are convex and thatR1 ⊂ R2. We will use
a similar technique as in [81], based on Lemma 2.5.4, to show that R1 = R2.20 Then,
thanks to the refinement proposed in Proposition 2.5.3.b (equality in the constraint),






such that R1 = H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(β0)+gY |X(β0).
Lemma 2.5.4 ( [81] [79]). Let C ⊂ Rd be convex. Let C1 ⊂ C2 be two bounded convex
subsets of C, closed relative to C. If every supporting hyperplanes of C2 intersects with
C1, then C1 = C2.
Let (R,R1) ∈ R2, and let α ∈ [0, 1], then we have by (42), (43)




p(ui)[α(H(Y )−H(Z)− gY |X(βi) + gZ|X(βi))
+ (1− α)(H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(βi) + gY |X(βi))]
6 α(H(Y )−H(Z)− gY |X(β∗) + gZ|X(β∗)) + (1− α)
× (H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(β∗) + gY |X(β∗)), (44)
20Note that the fact that R1 and R are both lower bounds in R1 and R2 is crucial to show
R1 = R2. The same argument cannot apply if R is a lower bound and R1 an upper bound, whence





(α(H(Y )−H(Z)− gY |X(β) + gZ|X(β))
+ (1− α)(1−H(Y )−Hb(β) + gY |X(β))).
With the last inequality, we show that every supporting plane of R2 intersects R1.
Note that the weight coefficients of (R,R1) have been taken of the form (α, 1 − α)
with α ∈ [0, 1], because by positivity and convexity of R2, we only needed to consider
hyperplanes (lines) with negative slope to apply Lemma 2.5.4.
Let (R0, R01) be a boundary point of R2. There exists a supporting hyperplane H0 at
(R0, R01) defined by (α
0, 1− α0). By Equation (44), there exists β∗0 ∈ [0, 1] such that
α0R0 + (1− α0)R01 6 α0R∗ + (1− α0)R∗1,
where
(R∗, R∗1) , (H(Y )−H(Z)−gY |X(β∗0)+gZ|X(β∗0), H(X)−H(Y )−Hb(β∗0)+gY |X(β∗0)).
Then, since (R∗, R∗1) ∈ R1 ⊂ R2, we also have, by definition of H0
α0R∗ + (1− α0)R∗1 6 α0R0 + (1− α0)R01.
Hence, α0R∗ + (1− α0)R∗1 = α0R0 + (1− α0)R01, and thus (R∗, R∗1) ∈ H0.
2.F Proof of Proposition 2.5.7






























Let l ∈ N∗ and k ∈ J1, lK. Define tk , a(2k−1l−1 − 1) and ∆ , 2al−1 . Let U be a scalar





∀y ∈ Y , pU |Y (uk|y) , pX|Y (x̄k|y)∆,
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where x̄k ∈ [tk, tk+1] by the mean value theorem for integration. Hence,




Observe that SU is a Riemann sum that approaches h(X) = −
∫
pX log pX . Thus, if
we set f(x) , −pX(x) log pX(x), we can show that for any a ∈ R+,21




















with K1(a) , amax[−a,a]|f ′|, ε1(a) , e
− a
2
2σ2x [α1a+ β1], and α1, β1 constants.
Similarly, if we define





pXY (x̄k, y) log pX|Y (x̄k|y)dy,
and g(x) ,
∫
pXY (x, y) log pX|Y (x|y)dy, then, as previously, we can show that for any
a ∈ R+,
|h(X|Y )− SU |Y |6 ε2(a) +K2(a)∆,
with K2(a) , amax[−a,a]|g′|, ε2(a) , e
− a
2
2σ2x [α2a+ β2], and α2, β2 constants. Thus,
log ∆− (ε2(a) +K2(a)∆) 6 h(X|Y )−H(U |Y ) 6 log ∆ + ε2(a) +K2(a)∆.
Hence, for any a ∈ R+, if we take ∆ small enough, then |log ∆| ε2(a) + K2(a)∆,
such that h(X|Y )−H(U |Y ) ≈ log ∆, and
|I(X;Y )− I(Y ;U)| = |h(X)− SU + SU |Y − h(X|Y )|
6 ε(a) +K(a)∆
6 ε(a) +K(a) exp[h(X|Y )−H(U |Y )]
= ε(a) +K(a) exp[h(X|Y )−R1],
21We used a standard Riemann sum error bound, and erfc(x) 6 e−x2 .
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where ε(a) , ε1(a) + ε2(a), K(a) , K1(a) +K2(a).
To sum up, ∆ chosen small enough ensures that I(Y ;U) approaches I(X;Y )
exponentially fast as R1 > h(X|Y ) increases.
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CHAPTER 3
POLAR CODING SCHEMES FOR SECRET-KEY
GENERATION
3.1 Summary
Practical implementations of secret-key generation are often based on sequential
strategies, which, as seen in the previous chapter, handle reliability and secrecy in
two successive steps, called reconciliation and privacy amplification. In this chap-
ter, we propose an alternative approach based on polar codes that jointly deals with
reliability and secrecy. Specifically, we propose secret-key capacity-achieving polar
coding schemes for the following models: (i) the degraded binary memoryless source
(DBMS) model with rate-unlimited public communication, (ii) the DBMS model
with one-way rate-limited public communication, (iii) the 1-to-m broadcast model
and (iv) the Markov tree model with uniform marginals. For models (i) and (ii)
our coding schemes remain valid for non-degraded sources, although they may not
achieve the secret-key capacity. For models (i), (ii) and (iii), our schemes rely on
pre-shared secret seed of negligible rate; however, we provide special cases of these
models for which no seed is required. Finally, we show an application of our results
to secrecy and privacy for biometric systems. We thus provide the first examples of
low-complexity secret-key capacity-achieving schemes that are able to handle vector
quantization for model (ii), or multiterminal communication for models (iii) and (iv).
This chapter is based on the results obtained in [82,83].
3.2 Introduction
This chapter presents low-complexity secret-key capacity-achieving schemes based on
polar codes [37] for some classes of source models. Note that polar codes have already
been successfully used for secrecy in the context of the symmetric wire-tap channel
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model [38, 39,84–86], and for the Slepian-Wolf coding problem [87–90], which is par-
ticularly relevant to secret-key generation. Note also that in [91], the journal version
of [89], a first application of polar coding to a basic secret key generation setting
was proposed. Unlike sequential methods, which successively handle reliability and
secrecy, our schemes jointly deal with reliability and secrecy (see Definition 3.3.2 for
more details). Both the sequential reliability-secrecy approach, and the direct ap-
proach with polar codes have their advantages. On the one hand, we have seen in
Chapter 2 that sequential methods offer flexibility in design by separating reliabil-
ity and secrecy and, unlike polar coding schemes, remain optimal for two-way rate-
limited communication and continuous non-degraded sources. On the other hand,
polar coding schemes may be easier to design and operate at lesser complexity in
some scenarios. They also appear to be convenient to deal with vector quantization
when the public communication is rate-limited.
The main result of this chapter is to develop polar coding schemes that achieve
the secret-key capacity for the following models.
• The degraded binary memoryless source (DBMS) model with rate-unlimited
public communication;
• The DBMS model with one-way rate-limited public communication;
• The 1-to-m broadcast model;
• The Markov tree model with uniform marginals.
For the first two models, the proposed polar coding schemes may also be used to
generate secret keys for non-degraded sources, although they may not achieve the
secret-key capacity. For the first three models, we assume that the legitimate users
initialize their communication with a shared secret seed,1 whose length is negligible
1If one assumes an authenticated public channel [2, 3] a shared small secret seed in the order of
the logarithm of the length of the messages is also required for authentication [8].
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compared to the number of source samples used to generate a key. As shown in
Sections 3.5-3.7, there also exist special cases of the source statistics for which no
seed is required.
Note that [92], obtained independently from the present work, develops an alterna-
tive polar coding solution for the BMS model with rate-unlimited public communica-
tion. The major difference between their approach and ours is that their construction
is sequential, i.e., it successively deals with reliability and secrecy by means of recon-
ciliation and privacy amplification, whereas our approach jointly deals with reliability
and secrecy. The construction in [92, Th. 7] has the advantage of not requiring a
seed. On the other hand, our protocol only requires one “polarization layer,” whose
construction is efficient, whereas the sequential approach of [92] requires an inner
and an outer layer, the latter having no known efficient code construction as discussed
in [92, Section III.C].
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.3 formally intro-
duces some notation and recall the general multi-terminal secret-key generation prob-
lem, which encompasses all the models specialized in subsequent sections. Section 3.4
describes polar coding primitives used in our proposed schemes. Section 3.5, describes
a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar codes for the DBMS model with
unlimited communication rate. Section 3.6 provides a secret-key capacity-achieving
scheme with polar codes for the DBMS model with one-way rate-limited public com-
munication. Section 3.7 develops a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar
codes for the 1-to-m broadcast model. Section 3.8 studies a Markov tree model with
uniform marginals and provides a secret-key capacity-achieving scheme with polar
codes in special cases. Finally, Section 3.9, shows how to apply the results to the
related problem of privacy and secrecy for some biometric systems.
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3.3 Definitions and notation
We start by introducing some notation used throughout the chapter. For n ∈ N





be the source polarization transform defined
in [87]. We note the components of a vector, X1:N with superscripts, i.e., X1:N ,
(X1, X2, . . . , XN). For any set A , {ij}|A|j=1 of indices in J1, NK, we define U1:N [A] ,
[
U i1 , U i2 , . . . , U i|A|
]
.
We now describe the general model for multiterminal secret-key generation intro-
duced in Section 1.2.1 in a more formal way. Let m > 2 be the number of termi-
nals that wish to generate a common secret-key. Set M , J1,mK, and let Z and
Xi, for i ∈ M be arbitrary finite alphabets. Define XM as the Cartesian product
of X1,X2, . . . ,Xm. Consider a discrete memoryless multiple source (XMZ, pXMZ),
where XM , (X1, X2, . . . , Xm) and the Cartesian product XM ×Z is abbreviated as
XMZ. For i ∈M, Terminal i observes the component Xi of (XMZ, pXMZ), whereas
an eavesdropper observes the component Z. The source is assumed to be outside the
control of all parties, but its statistics are known to all parties. Communication is
allowed between terminals over an authenticated noiseless public channel with com-
munication rate Rp ∈ R+∪{+∞}. A key-generation strategy is then formally defined
as follows.
Definition 3.3.1. Let Rp ∈ R+ ∪ {+∞}. Let K be a key alphabet of size 2NR. The
protocol defined by the following steps is called a (2NR, N,Rp) key-generation strategy
with public communication, and is denoted by SN .
1. Terminal i, i ∈M, observes X1:Ni .
2. The m terminals communicate, possibly interactively, over the public channel.
All the public inter-terminal communications are collectively denoted by F and
satisfy H(F) 6 NRp.
3. Terminal i, i ∈M, computes Ki(X1:Ni ,F) ∈ K.
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Let K be a random variable taking values in K. The performance of a key-
generation strategy SN that allows the terminals in M to agree on the key K is
measured in terms of the average probability of error between the keys
Pe(SN) , P[∃i ∈M : K 6= Ki],
the information leakage to the eavesdropper
L(SN) , I(K;Z1:NF),
the uniformity of the key
U(SN) , logd2NRe −H(K).
Definition 3.3.2. A secret-key rate R is achievable if there exists a sequence of










Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the secret-key capacity and is
denoted CWSK(Rp). In the special case where Eve has no access to the component Z
of the source, the secret-key capacity is denoted CSK(Rp). One also says that perfect
secrecy is achieved if L(SN) = 0.
In this chapter, we develop low-complexity secret-key capacity-achieving schemes
based on polar codes for special cases of the general model presented in Defini-
tion 3.3.1. In the following, the blocklength, N , used by the legitimate users is a
power of 2. Moreover, we say that the legitimate users share a secret seed, if they
share a secret sequence of dN ∈ N uniformly distributed bits, and we define the seed
rate as dN/N . To avoid modifying the secret-key capacity with the introduction of a
seed, we only consider schemes with vanishing seed rate.
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3.4 Polar coding primitives for secret-key generation
We describe two polar coding primitives that capture the essence of our secret-key
generation schemes. The first one implements source coding with side information,
while the second one implements privacy amplification. Unlike the previous chapter,
polar coding constructions will allow us to perform these two steps simultaneously
instead of successively, as we will see in the next sections.
Later, in Chapter 5, a connection between these polar coding primitives and ran-
dom binning will also be developed and exploited in our polar coding schemes for the
wiretap channel.
3.4.1 Source polarization
Consider a discrete memoryless source defined by the distribution (XY , pXY ), where
N is a power of two and |X |= 2. Polar source coding [87] can be seen as the decom-
position of X1:N , into N bit sources. Specifically, for i ∈ J1, NK, the i-th source is
defined by U i, where U1:N , X1:NGN . As N goes to infinity, any of these N resulting
source has either an entropy essentially equal to one or essentially equal to zero, that
is, is either totally random or deterministic. More formally, for δN , 2−N
β
, β < 1/2,
we define the set of “high entropy bits” given Y 1:N as
HX|Y , {i ∈ J1, NK : H(U i|U1:i−1Y 1:N) > δN}.
The following theorem shows how asymptotically optimal lossless compression of X1:N
can be performed.
Theorem 3.4.1 ([87]). X1:N can be reconstructed with error probability in O(NδN)
from U1:N [HX|Y ] and Y 1:N by successive cancellation decoding, whose complexity is








Consider a discrete memoryless source defined by the distribution (XZ, pXZ), where
N is a power of two and |X |= 2. Similar to source polarization, we define U1:N ,
X1:NGN . We also define, for δN , 2−N
β
, β < 1/2, a set of “very high entropy bits”
given Z1:N as
VX|Z , {i ∈ J1, NK : H(U i|U1:i−1Z1:N) > 1− δN}.
The rate of |VX|Z | is given in the following lemma.






Proof. See Appendix 3.A.3.
Note that limN→+∞|HX|Y |/N = H(X|Y ) follows from [87], but Lemma 3.4.1
requires a different proof based on Lemma 3.1.16 in the appendix.
We claim that the bits U1:N [VX|Z ] are almost uniformly distributed and indepen-
dent from Z1:N . We make this statement clear in the following proposition.





6 NδN (independence with Z1:N),
|K|−H(K) 6 NδN (uniformity).





























where (a) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (b) holds by definition of VX|Z .
Proposition 3.4.1 thus provides a polar coding counterpart to privacy amplification
performed with extractors in Section 2.3.3.2.
3.5 Model 1: Secret-key generation with rate-unlimited pub-
lic communication
The precise model and known results are described in Section 3.5.1. Our proposed















Figure 16. Model 1: Secret-key generation for the BMS model with rate-unlimited
public communication.
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3.5.1 Secret-key generation model
As illustrated in Figure 16, Model 1 consists of m = 2 legitimate terminals. We use
X instead of X1 and Y instead of X2 for convenience. We assume that X = {0, 1}
and that the public channel has an unlimited communication rate Rp = +∞. We call
this setup the BMS model with rate-unlimited public communication. The following
results are known for this model.
Theorem 3.5.2 ([2, 3]). Consider a BMS (XYZ, pXY Z). If X → Y → Z, then the
secret-key capacity CWSK(+∞) is
CWSK(+∞) = I(X;Y )− I(X;Z).
Moreover, the secret-key capacity can be achieved by one-way communication.
When the eavesdropper has no access to the source component Z, one obtains the
following expression for the secret-key capacity.
Corollary 3.5.1 ( [2, 3]). Consider a BMS (XY , pXY ). The secret-key capacity
CSK(+∞) is
CSK(+∞) = I(X;Y ).
Moreover, the secret-key capacity can be achieved using only one-way communication.
Such a model is motivated by the sources of randomness that can be generated
from wireless communication channel gains [5–7]. In such settings, the wireless chan-
nel gains cA→B characterizing the channel from Alice to Bob, cB→A characterizing the
channel from Bob to Alice, and the pair (cA→E, cB→E), characterizing the channels
to Eve, may be used as the variables X, Y , and Z, respectively, of Model 1.
3.5.2 Polar coding scheme
In the following, we assume that I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) > 0 but we do not assume that
X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain; we discuss at the end of the section how the
coding scheme simplifies when X → Y → Z holds.
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Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. Set U1:N , X1:NGN . For δN , 2−Nβ , where β ∈]0, 1/2[,
define the following sets
VX|Z ,
{
















The exact encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 1 and Algo-
rithm 2, respectively, and we provide here a high-level discussion of their opera-
tion. The set HX|Y is the set of indices containing “high-entropy bits” such that
U1:N [HX|Y ] allows Bob to near losslessly reconstruct U1:N from Y 1:N [87]. In our
coding scheme, Alice therefore publicly transmits U1:N [HX|Y ] to allow Bob to recon-
struct U1:N . By construction, the set VX|Z is the set of indices containing “very-
high entropy bits” such that U1:N [VX|Z ] is almost uniform and independent of the
eavesdropper’s observations Z1:N . Consequently, the secret-key should be chosen as
a subvector of U1:N [VX|Z ]; specifically, since U1:N [HX|Y ] is publicly transmitted, it
is natural to use U1:N [VX|Z\HX|Y ] as the secret key. Unfortunately, HX|Y 6⊂ VX|Z
in general, so that the public communication of U1:N [HX|Y ] leaks some information
about U1:N [VX|Z\HX|Y ]. To circumvent this issue, our protocol uses a secret seed to
protect the transmission of the bits in positions HX|Y \VX|Z with a one-time-pad. In
addition, our scheme operates over k blocks of size N to handle non-degraded sources
and to make the seed rate negligible. In every Block i ∈ J1, kK Alice generates a
secret key Ki together with a seed K̃i used in the next block. Overall, Alice obtains a
vector of secret keys K1:k , [K1, K2, . . . , Kk] while Bob obtains a vector of estimates
K̂1:k , [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k].
Remark 3.5.1. For convenience, Algorithm 1 does not distinguish the last block from
the others; however, there is no need to create a seed in Block k, so that one may
actually use U1:Nk [VX|Z\HX|Y ] as the key Kk and slightly increase the key rate. For a
large number of blocks k, this distinction has negligible impact on the achievable rates.
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Algorithm 1: Alice’s encoding algorithm for Model 1
Require: K̃0, a secret key of size |HX|Y \VX|Z | shared by Alice and Bob
beforehand; for every Block i ∈ J1, kK, the observations X1:Ni from
the source; AXY Z a fixed subset of VX|Z\HX|Y with size
|HX|Y \VX|Z |.
1 for Block i = 1 to k do
2 U1:Ni ← X1:Ni GN
3 K̃i ← U1:Ni [AXY Z ] {Fraction of the key used as a seed for the next block}
4 Ki ← U1:Ni [(VX|Z\HX|Y )\AXY Z ]
5 Fi ← U1:Ni [VX|Z ∩HX|Y ]
6 F ′i ← U1:Ni [HX|Y \VX|Z ]
7 Transmit Mi ← [Fi, F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1] publicly to Bob
8 end
return : K1:k ← [K1, K2, . . . , Kk]
Algorithm 2: Bob’s decoding algorithm for Model 1
Require: K̃0, a secret key of size |HX|Y \VX|Z | shared by Alice and Bob
beforehand; the set AXY Z defined in Algorithm 1; for every Block
i ∈ J1, kK, the observations Y 1:Ni from the source and the message Mi
transmitted by Alice.
1 for Block i = 1 to k do
2 Form U1:Ni [HX|Y ] from Mi and K̃i−1
3 Create an estimate Û1:Ni of U
1:N
i with the successive cancellation decoder
of [87]
4 K̂i ← Û1:Ni [(VX|Z\HX|Y )\AXY Z ]
5 K̃i ← Û1:Ni [AXY Z ]
6 end
return : K̂1:k ← [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k]
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Remark 3.5.2. The need for a seed is not an artifact of our proof, but a fundamental
requirement of our single polarization approach to generate secret keys and public
messages. In fact, a memoryless source cannot be near losslessly compressed at a
rate close to the entropy and simultaneously ensure that the encoded messages are
nearly uniformly distributed in variational distance [93, Section V]. In the context of
secret-key generation with polar codes, this translates into the condition HX|Y 6⊂ VX|Z
and in the impossibility of simultaneously ensuring strong secrecy and reliability. Our
solution follows ideas from Section 4.4 in Chapter 4, showing that the impossibility
may be circumvented if the encoder and the decoder share a small seed beforehand;
without seed, only weak secrecy would be ensured.
As shown in Section 3.5.3, a careful analysis of the algorithms leads to the following
result.
Theorem 3.5.3. Consider a BMS (XYZ, pXY Z). Assume that Alice and Bob share
a secret seed. The secret-key rate I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) is achieved by the polar coding
scheme of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size
N , and whose computational complexity is O(kN logN). Moreover, the seed rate can




, α < 1/2.
Proof. See Section 3.5.3.
Corollary 3.5.2. When X → Y → Z, the secret-key capacity of Theorem 3.5.2 is
achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Moreover, one
does not need to encode over several blocks, i.e., one can choose k = 1, and the seed
rate is o(N). However, encoding over several blocks for this case allows one to reduce
the seed rate from o(N) to o(2−N
α
), α < 1/2.
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.1.
Note that, in the special case of a symmetric degraded BMS,2 Corollary 3.5.2 may
2That is, when X, Y , and Z are connected by symmetric channels.
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be indirectly obtained from wiretap codes and [39], following the approach of [2], [23,
Section 4.2.1]. However, this indirect proof might not translate into practical imple-
mentations because it requires much more public channel communication.
Although the seed rate in Theorem 3.5.3 or Corollary 3.5.2 may be made arbitrarily
small, it is valuable to identify examples for which no seed is required. We provide two
such examples in Proposition 3.5.2, which corresponds to the privacy amplification
setting of [24], and in Proposition 3.5.3, which corresponds to a case when the source
has uniform marginals and the eavesdropper has no access to correlated observations
of the source.
Proposition 3.5.2. Consider a BMS (XYZ, pXY Z). Assume that Alice and Bob have
the same observations, i.e., X = Y ; then the secret-key capacity CWSK = H(X|Z) is
achievable with a polar coding scheme, whose computational complexity is O(N logN).
Proof. See Section 3.4.2.
Proposition 3.5.3. Consider a BMS (XY , pXY ) with X ∼ B(1/2). The secret-key
capacity CSK(+∞) given in Corollary 3.5.1 is achievable with perfect secrecy with a
polar coding scheme, whose computational complexity is O(N logN).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.2.
Note that the model studied in Proposition 3.5.3 includes [34, Model 1] as a
special case, and does not require the construction of a standard array, whose size
grows exponentially with the blocklength.
3.5.3 Analysis of polar coding scheme: proof of Theorem 3.5.3
A functional dependence graph of the block encoding scheme of Section 3.5.2 is de-
picted in Figure 17 to help the reader identify the dependencies among the variables
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Figure 17. Functional dependence graph of the proposed block encoding scheme
3.5.3.1 Existence of AXY Z
Observe that |VX|Z\HX|Y |−|HX|Y \VX|Z |= |VX|Z |−|HX|Y |. Hence, by Lemma 3.4.1
and [87], we have
lim
N→∞
(|VX|Z\HX|Y |−|HX|Y \VX|Z |)/N = H(X|Z)−H(X|Y ).
Since I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) > 0 by assumption, we conclude that
|VX|Z\HX|Y |−|HX|Y \VX|Z |> 0
for N large enough and AXY Z exists.
3.5.3.2 Asymptotic key rate





= k|(VX|Z\HX|Y )\AXY Z |
= k(|VX|Z\HX|Y |−|HX|Y \VX|Z |)
= k(|VX|Z |−|HX|Y |).





> I(X;Y )− I(X;Z).
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3.5.3.3 Reliability
Let i ∈ J2, kK. Note that F ′i is correctly received only when Bob possesses a correct
estimate of the seed K̃i−1, i.e., when U
1:N
i−1 is correctly reconstructed. We note F̂
′
i the
estimate of F ′i formed by Bob from Û
1:N
i−1 and define the event EF ′i , {F ′i 6= F̂ ′i}. Then,
P[Ki 6= K̂i] 6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni ]
= P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |EcF ′i ]P[E
c
F ′i
] + P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |EF ′i ]P[EF ′i ]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |EcF ′i ] + P[EF ′i ]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |EcF ′i ] + P[U
1:N
i−1 6= Û1:Ni−1 ]
(a)
6 NδN + P[U1:Ni−1 6= Û1:Ni−1 ]
(b)
6 (i− 1)NδN + P[U1:N1 6= Û1:N1 ]
(c)
6 iNδN ,
where (a) follows because Bob can reconstruct U1:Ni from (Fi, F
′
i ) = U
1:N
i [HX|Y ] and
Y 1:Ni with error probability less than NδN [87], (b) holds by induction, (c) holds
by [87] and because K̃0 is known to Bob. Using the union bound,


















We first prove the uniformity of the key in each block i using the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.5.2. In every block i ∈ J1, kK, the vector [Ki, K̃i] is nearly uniform, in the
sense that
|Ki|+|K̃i|−H(KiK̃i) 6 NδN .
In particular, |K̃i|−H(K̃i) 6 NδN and |Ki|−H(Ki) 6 NδN .
Proof.













where (a) holds because conditioning reduces entropy, (b) holds by definition of VX|Z
and because conditioning reduces entropy. Finally, note that since |Ki|−H(Ki|K̃i) >
0, we have
|K̃i|−H(K̃i) 6 |K̃i|−H(K̃i) + |Ki|−H(Ki|K̃i)
= |Ki|+|K̃i|−H(KiK̃i).


















where (a) holds because X1:Ni is independent of of X
1:N
1:i−1 for any i ∈ J1, kK, and (b)
holds by Lemma 3.5.2. Hence,
U(SN) = |K1:k|−H(K1:k) 6 kNδN . (46)
3.5.3.5 Strong secrecy
We first show that secrecy holds for each block using the following lemma .














6 |Ki|+|K̃i|−H(KiK̃iFi|Z1:Ni ) +H(Fi|Z1:Ni )
6 |Ki|+|K̃i|+|Fi|−H(KiK̃iFi|Z1:Ni )
(a)
= |VX|Z\HX|Y |+|VX|Z ∩HX|Y |−H(U1:Ni [(VX|Z\HX|Y ) ∪ (VX|Z ∩HX|Y )]|Z1:Ni )












6 NδN , (47)
where (a) holds by definition of Ki, K̃i, and Fi, (b) holds because conditioning reduces







i ⊕ K̃i−1)Z1:Ni )
= I(KiK̃i;FiZ
1:N
i ) + I(KiK̃i;F
′
i ⊕ K̃i−1|FiZ1:Ni )
(e)
6 NδN + I(KiK̃iFiZ1:Ni F ′i ;F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1)
= NδN +H(F
′
i ⊕ K̃i−1)−H(F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1|KiK̃iFiZ1:Ni F ′i )
= NδN +H(F
′




6 NδN + |K̃i−1|−H(K̃i−1)
(f)
6 2NδN ,
where (d) holds by definition of Mi, (e) holds by (47), (f) holds by Lemma 3.5.2.
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We now state two lemmas that will be used to show that secrecy holds for the
global scheme.
Lemma 3.5.4. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough








2N log 2× 2−Nβ/2
)
. (48)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.4




















Proof. See Appendix 3.A.5.
We thus obtain







































6 2kNδN + (k − 1)δ∗N , (49)












one-way noiseless authenticated public channel with limited rate




Figure 18. Model 2: Secret-key generation for the BMS model with one-way rate-
limited public communication.
3.5.3.6 Seed rate












Note that the seed rate may be chosen to decrease exponentially fast to zero with
N since we may choose k = 2N
α
, α < β and still have limN→∞Pe(SN) = 0 by (45),
limN→∞Ue(SN) = 0 by (46), and limN→∞ Le(SN) = 0 by (49) and (48).
3.6 Model 2: Secret-key generation with rate-limited public
communication
We now move to the second key generation model, which differs from Model 1 by
restricting the public communication to be rate-limited and one way from Alice to
Bob. The organization follows that of Section 3.6.
3.6.1 Secret-key generation model
As illustrated in Figure 18, we set again m = 2 and we use X instead of X1, Y
instead of X2 for convenience. We assume that X = {0, 1} and that Alice and Bob
are constrained to only use one-way communication over an authenticated noiseless
public channel with limited rate Rp ∈ R. We call this setup the BMS model with
rate-limited public communication. The following results are known for the model.
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Theorem 3.6.4. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a BMS and Rp ∈ R+ be the public commu-






Rp = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y → Z,
|U|6 |X |.
Closed form expressions of the secret-key capacity are only known for specific
sources. See the following example.
Example 3.6.1. Assume X = Y = Z = {0, 1} and X ∼ B(1/2). Set Y , X ⊕ B1
and Z , Y ⊕B2, with B1 ∼ B(p), B2 ∼ B(q), where ⊕ denotes the modulo-2 addition.





Hb(p ? β0 ? q)−Hb(p ? β0), if Rp 6 H(X|Y ),
Hb(p ? q)−Hb(p), if Rp > H(X|Y ),
where β0 must satisfy
4
Hb(p ? β0)−Hb(β0) = Rp, (50)
Hb(·) is the binary entropy function, and the associative and commutative operation
? is defined as p ? β0 = (1− β0)p+ β0(1− p).
When the eavesdropper has no access to the source component Z, one obtains the
following expression for the secret-key capacity.
3See Proposition 2.5.3 and Remark 2.5.3 in Chapter 2.
4Note that (50) has two symmetric solutions.
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Corollary 3.6.3. Let (XYZ, pXY Z) be a BMS and Rp ∈ R+ be the public communi-





Rp = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y,
|U|6 |X |.
The practical justification for Model 2 is similar to that for Model 1; however,
Model 2 allows us to account for rate-limited communication constraints, which is
relevant in applications with stringent bandwidth constraints, such as wireless sensor
networks. We will also see in Section 3.9 that such constraint may account for privacy
leakage constraints in biometric systems.
The main challenge in designing a coding scheme for Model 2 is to address the
problem of vector quantization with side information at the receiver. Previous polar
coding results on lossy source coding with lossless reconstruction of the vector quan-
tized version of the source are reported in [94,95]; our contribution is to extend these
results when side information is available at the receiver, and to show how to apply
such technique to secret-key generation with rate-limited public communication.
3.6.2 Polar coding scheme
Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. Fix a joint probability distribution pXU such that I(Y ;U)−
I(Z;U) > 0, but we do not assume X → Y → Z. Denote V 1:N , U1:NGN , the
polar transform of a vector U1:N with i.i.d components according to the marginal
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distribution pU . For δN , 2−N
β
, where β ∈]0, 1/2[, define the following sets.
HU ,
{


















i ∈ J1, NK : H
(







i ∈ J1, NK : H
(














The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4.
The high-level principles are similar to that of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, and
we only highlight here the differences. Instead of directly operating on the source
symbols, Alice first constructs a vector quantized version Ṽ 1:N of X1:N , whose distri-
bution is close to that of V 1:N . This statement is made more precise in Lemma 3.6.6,
but a crucial part of the proof is to introduce a stochastic encoder, as in successive
cancellation encoding for lossy source coding [94, 95]. The randomness R1 used in
the encoder is publicly transmitted to Bob and reused over several blocks so that its
rate vanishes to zero as the number of blocks increases; however, reusing R1 creates
additional dependencies between the variables of the different blocks, which must be
carefully taken into account in the secrecy analysis. The choice of public messages
and keys is then similar to those in Section 3.5.2, using Ṽ 1:N instead of X1:N .
Remark 3.6.3. One may actually use U1:Nk [VU |Z\HU |Y ] as the key Kk and slightly
increase the key rate in Algorithm 3. However, one does not distinguish the last block
from the others for convenience – see Remark 3.5.1.
As shown in Section 3.6.3, the analysis of Algorithm 3 and Algotithm 4 leads to
the following result.
Theorem 3.6.5. Consider a BMS (XYZ, pXY Z). Assume that Alice and Bob share
a secret seed and let Rp ∈ R+ be the public communication rate. The secret-key rate
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Algorithm 3: Alice’s encoding algorithm for Model 2
Require: K̃0, a secret key of size |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z | shared by Alice and
Bob beforehand; for every Block i ∈ J1, kK, the observations X1:Ni
from the source; AUY Z a subset of VU |Z\HU |Y with size
|(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |; a vector R1 of |VU |X | uniformly distributed bits.
1 Transmit R1 publicly to Bob
2 for Block i = 1 to k do
3 Ri ← R1
4 Ṽ 1:Ni [VU |X ]← Ri
5 Given X1:Ni , successively draw the remaining bits of Ṽ
1:N
i according to
p̃V 1:Ni X1:Ni ,
∏N








j|Ṽ 1:j−1i X1:Ni )
,
{
pV j |V 1:j−1X1:N (v
j|Ṽ 1:j−1i X1:Ni ) if j ∈ HU\VU |X
pV j |V 1:j−1(v
j|Ṽ 1:j−1i ) if j ∈ HcU
. (51)
6 K̃i ← Ṽ 1:Ni [AUY Z ]
7 Ki ← Ṽ 1:Ni [(VU |Z\HU |Y )\AUY Z ]
8 Fi ← Ṽ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X) ∩ VU |Z ]
9 F ′i , Ṽ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z ]
10 Transmit Mi ← [Fi, F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1] publicly to Bob.
11 end
return : K1:k ← [K1, K2, . . . , Kk]
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Algorithm 4: Bob’s decoding algorithm for Model 2
Require: The secret-key K̃0 and the set AUY Z defined in Algorithm 3; for
every Block i ∈ J1, kK, the observations Y 1:Ni from the source, the
message Mi. transmitted by Alice; the vector R1 transmitted by
Alice.
1 for Block i = 1 to k do
2 Form Ṽ 1:Ni [HU |Y ] from Mi and K̃i−1
3 Create an estimate V̂ 1:Ni of V
1:N
i with the successive cancellation decoder
of [87]
4 K̂i ← V̂ 1:Ni [(VU |Z\HU |Y )\AUY Z ]
5 K̃i ← V̂ 1:Ni [AUY Z ]
6 end





subject to Rp = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y,
|U|6 |X |.
is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 4, which involves
a chaining of k blocks of size N , and whose computational complexity is O(kN logN).




, α < 1/2.
Proof. See Section 3.6.3.
The following corollary states sufficient conditions to avoid block encoding.
Corollary 3.6.4. If X → Y → Z, X ∼ B(1/2), and the test-channels pY |X and pZ|X
are symmetric,5 then the secret-key capacity of Theorem 3.6.4 is achieved by the polar
coding scheme for Block 1 in Algorithm 3 with AUY Z = ∅, R1 a constant sequence,
and a seed rate in o(N).














Block i + 1
Ri 1
F 0i+1








Figure 19. Functional dependence graph of the block encoding scheme
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.1.
Finally, the following proposition provides sufficient conditions to avoid block
encoding and a pre-shared seed. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.6.5 and
Corollary 3.6.4 and is omitted.
Proposition 3.6.4. If the eavesdropper has no access to correlated observations of
the source, X ∼ B(1/2), and the test-channel pY |X is symmetric, then the secret-key
capacity of Corollary 3.6.3 is achieved by the polar coding scheme for Block 1 in Al-
gorithm 3 with AUY Z = ∅, Z = ∅, F ′1 = ∅, K1 , Ṽ 1:N1 [HcU |Y ], F1 , Ṽ 1:N1 [HU |Y \VU |X ],
and R1 a constant sequence.
3.6.3 Analysis of polar coding scheme: Proof of Theorem 3.6.5
A functional dependence graph for the coding scheme of Section 3.6.2 is depicted in
Figure 33 for convenience.
3.6.3.1 Preliminary result
Lemma 3.6.6. For every i ∈ J1, kK, the random variable Ṽ 1:Ni resulting from Algo-
rithm 3 has a joint distribution p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni , p̃V 1:Ni |X1:NpX1:N with X
1:N
i such that
D(pX1:NV 1:N ||p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni ) 6 NδN ,
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Hence, by Pinsker’s inequality





Proof. See Appendix 3.B.2.
3.6.3.2 Existence of AUY Z
Observe that
|VU |Z\HU |Y |−|(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z | = |VU |Z |−|HU |Y |+|(HU |Y ∩ VU |X)\VU |Z |
> |VU |Z |−|HU |Y |.
Hence, by Lemma 3.4.1 and [87], we have
lim
N→∞
(|VU |Z\HU |Y |−|(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |)/N > H(U |Z)−H(U |Y ).
Since I(Y ;U) − I(Z;U) > 0, |VU |Z\HU |Y |−|(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |> 0 for N large
enough, and we conclude that AUY Z exists.
3.6.3.3 Communication rate




(|Fi|+|F ′i |) = |R1|+
k∑
i=1
|HU |Y \VU |X |
= |VU |X |+k|HU |Y \VU |X |
= |VU |X |+k(|HU |Y |−|VU |X |)
where the last equality holds because U → X → Y and thus VU |X ⊂ VU |Y ⊂ HU |Y .
Hence, the communication rate is by Lemma 3.4.1 and [87],
lim
N→∞
|VU |X |+k(|HU |Y |−|VU |X |)
kN










= k|(VU |Z\HU |Y )\AUY Z |
= k(|VU |Z |−|HU |Y |+|(HU |Y ∩ VU |X)\VU |Z |)
> k(|VU |Z |−|HU |Y |).





> I(Y ;U)− I(Z;U).
3.6.3.5 Reliability
For i ∈ J1, kK, Bob forms V̂ 1:Ni from (Fi, F ′i , Ri) = Ṽ 1:Ni [HU |Y ] and Y 1:Ni with the
successive cancellation encoder of [87]. Consider an optimal coupling [94,96] between
p̃V 1:Ni and pV 1:Ni such that P[E ] = V(p̃V 1:Ni , pV 1:Ni ), where E , {Ṽ
1:N
i 6= V 1:Ni }. For
i ∈ J2, kK, note that F ′i is correctly received only when Bob has K̃i−1, i.e., when Ṽ 1:Ni−1
is correctly reconstructed. We note F̂ ′i the estimate of F
′




and define EF ′i , {F ′i 6= F̂ ′i}. We then have
P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= Ṽ 1:Ni ]
= P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= Ṽ 1:Ni |E ∪ EF ′i ]P[E ∪ EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N
i 6= Ṽ 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]P[E
c ∩ EcF ′i ]
6 P[E ∪ EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N
i 6= Ṽ 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
6 P[E ] + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N
i 6= Ṽ 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
= V(p̃V 1:Ni , pV 1:Ni ) + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N
i 6= Ṽ 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
= V(p̃V 1:Ni , pV 1:Ni ) + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N
i 6= V 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ]
6 V(p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni , pX1:Ni V 1:Ni ) + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N






NδN + P[EF ′i ] + P[V̂
1:N
























where (a) holds by Lemma 3.6.6, (b) holds because P[V̂ 1:Ni 6= V 1:Ni |Ec ∩ EcF ′i ] 6 NδN
by [87], (c) holds by recurrence, (d) holds by [87] and because K̃0 is known to Bob.




NδN + NδN). Then, similar to Section 3.5.3.3,










We first show the key is nearly uniform for every block in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.6.7. For every block i ∈ J1, kK, the vector [Ki, K̃i, Fi, R1] is nearly uniform,
in the sense that












6 V(p̃V 1:Ni [VU ], qUVU )
(b)






























where (a) holds because VU |Z ⊂ VU and VU |X ⊂ VU with qUVU the uniform distribution
over J1, 2|VU |K, (b) holds by the triangle inequality, (c) holds by Lemma 3.6.6, (d)
holds by Pinsker’s inequality, (e) holds because similar to the proof of Lemma 3.5.2
|VU |−H(V 1:Ni [VU ]) 6 NδN .
From Lemma 3.6.7, we derive the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.6.8. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough













In particular, we also have |Ki|−H(Ki) 6 δ(1)N and |K̃i|−H(K̃i) 6 δ
(1)
N .
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.3.
Lemma 3.6.9. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough
















Proof. See Appendix 3.B.4.

































= |K1:k|−k(δ(1)N + δ
(2)
N )
where (a) holds becauseKi → R1 → K1:i−1 for any i ∈ J1, kK, (b) holds by Lemma 3.6.9,
(c) holds by Lemma 3.6.8. Hence,




Because of the successive cancellation encoding, the secrecy analysis is more involved
than for Model 1.
Lemma 3.6.10. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough













Proof. See Appendix 3.B.5.
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The following lemma shows that secrecy holds for each block.












Proof. By the proof of Lemma 3.6.7, we have





where qUVU|Z is the uniform distribution over J1, 2
|VU|Z |K, and by the proof of Lemma 3.6.8,
we have






6 |Ki|+|K̃i|−H(KiK̃iR1FiZ1:Ni ) +H(R1FiZ1:Ni )
= |Ki|+|K̃i|−H(KiK̃iR1Fi|Z1:Ni ) +H(FiR1|Z1:Ni )
6 |Ki|+|K̃i|+|Fi|+|R1|−H(KiK̃iR1Fi|Z1:Ni )
(a)
6 |VU |Z |−H(Ṽ 1:Ni [VU |Z ]|Z1:Ni )
= |VU |Z |−H(Ṽ 1:Ni [VU |Z ]) + I(Ṽ 1:Ni [VU |Z ];Z1:Ni )
(b)
6 δ(1)N + I(Ṽ 1:Ni [VU |Z ];Z1:Ni )
(c)
6 δ(1)N + δ
(3)
N , (58)
where (a) holds because (Ki, K̃i, R1, Fi) is a subvector of Ṽ
1:N
i [VU |Z ] noting that









i ⊕ K̃i−1|R1FiZ1:Ni )
(e)
6 I(R1KiK̃iFiF ′iZ1:Ni ;F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1)
= H(F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1)−H(F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1|R1KiK̃iFiF ′iZ1:Ni )
= H(F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1)−H(K̃i−1|R1KiK̃iFiF ′iZ1:Ni )
(f)
= H(F ′i ⊕ K̃i−1)−H(K̃i−1|R1)
6 |K̃i−1|−H(K̃i−1|R1)
= |K̃i−1|−H(K̃i−1) + I(K̃i−1;R1)
(g)
6 δ(1)N + δ
(2)
N , (59)
where (d) holds by definition of Mi, (e) holds by the chain rule and positivity of
mutual information, (f) holds because K̃i−1 → R1 → KiK̃iFiF ′iZ1:Ni , (g) holds by
Lemma 3.6.8 and Lemma 3.6.9. Finally, we conclude combining (58) and (59).
We now state a lemma that will be used to show that secrecy holds for the global
scheme.


































































































where (a) follows from Lemma 3.6.12, (b) holds by Lemma 3.6.9, (c) holds by Lemma 3.6.11.
3.6.3.8 Seed rate












Note that the seed rate could be chosen decrease exponentially fast to zero with N ,
since we may choose k = 2N
α
, α < β, and still have limN→∞Pe(SN) = 0 by (52),
limN→∞Ue(SN) = 0 by (55), and limN→∞ Le(SN) = 0 by (60) along with (53), (54),
(56).
3.7 Model 3: A multiterminal broadcast model
In this section, we develop a polar coding scheme for a multiterminal broadcast model.
Sections 3.7.1- 3.7.3 analyze a model with an arbitrary number of terminals but
specific source statistics. The extension of the model to general sources is discussed

























Figure 20. Model 3: Secret-key generation for the 1-to-m broadcast model
3.7.1 Secret-key generation model
As illustrated in Figure 20, we assume that every Terminal i ∈ M\{1} observes a
degraded version of the observation of Terminal 1. For i ∈ M, we assume that Xi =
{0, 1} and for i ∈M\{1}, we setXi = X1⊕Bi, withX1 ∼ B(p) andBi ∼ B(pi−1), pi ∈
[0, 1], independent of X1. Furthermore, we suppose that the eavesdropper does not
have access to an observation of the source. We call this setup the 1-to-m broadcast
model, and we recall expression of the secret-key capacity in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.7.5 ( [16]). Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model. The secret-key




3.7.2 Polar coding scheme
Define imin , argmini∈M\{1}I(X1;Xi) such that imin − 1 = argmaxi∈M\{m}pi. Let
n ∈ N and N , 2n. We set U1:N , X1:N1 GN . For δN , 2−N
β
, where β ∈]0, 1/2[,
define for j ∈M\{1} the sets
HX1|Xj ,
{








We also define the sets
VX1 ,
{
















The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6,
respectively. The high-level principle behind the operation of the algorithm is the
following. The set HX1|Xi contains the indices such that U1:N [HX1|Xi ] allows Ter-
minal i ∈ M\{1} to near losslessly reconstruct U1:N from X1:Ni by [87]. Using a
universality argument formalized in Lemma 3.7.13, we will show that it is actually
sufficient to transmit U1:N [HX1|Ximin ] to allow all the terminals to near losslessly re-
construct U1:N . The secret key common to all terminals may then be chosen as a
subset of U1:N [VX1 ]; since U1:N [HX1|Ximin ] has been publicly transmitted, the secret-
key is chosen as U1:N [VX1\HX1|Ximin ]. In general, HX1|Ximin 6⊂ VX1 , and the public
communication may leak some information about the key; consequently, as in Model
1 and Model 2, the protocol requires a pre-shared seed to protect the transmission of
U1:N [HX1|Ximin\VX1 ].
Algorithm 5: Encoding algorithm for Terminal 1 in Model 3
Require: K̃, a secret key of size |HX1|Ximin\VX1| shared by all terminals
beforehand; the observations X1:N1 from the source.
1 U1:N ← X1:N1 GN
2 K ← U1:N [VX1\HX1|Ximin ]
3 F , U1:N [VX1 ∩HX1|Ximin ]
4 F ′ , U1:N [HX1|Ximin\VX1 ]
5 Transmit M ← [F, F ′ ⊕ K̃] publicly to Terminals {Xj}j∈M\1
return : K
As shown in Section 3.7.3, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.7.6. Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model of Section 3.7.1. Assume
that all terminals share a seed, whose rate can be chosen in o(N). The secret-key
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Algorithm 6: Decoding algorithm for Terminal j ∈M \ {1} for Model 3
Require: K̃, a secret key of size |HX1|Ximin\VX1| shared by all terminals
beforehand; the observations X1:Nj from the source, the message M
transmitted by Terminal 1.
1 Form Û1:N from M and K̃ using the successive cancellation decoder of [87].
2 K̂ ← Û1:N [VX1\HX1|Ximin ]
return : K̂
capacity CSK(+∞) given in Proposition 3.7.5 is achieved by the polar coding scheme
in Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6, whose computational complexity is O(N logN).
Proof. See Section 3.7.3.
The following corollary shows that no seed is required when the source has uniform
marginals.
Corollary 3.7.5. Consider the 1-to-m broadcast model. Assume that the source has
uniform marginal, that is, X1 ∼ B(1/2). The secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) given
in Proposition 3.7.5 is achievable with perfect secrecy with the polar coding scheme
of Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 6 choosing F ′ = ∅ and replacing the set VX1 by HX1
wherever it appears. .
We omit the proof of Corollary 3.7.5, which is similar to the ones of Theorem 3.7.6
and Proposition 3.5.3. Note that the model studied in Corollary 3.7.5 is a particular
case of [34, Model 3]. However, the construction proposed in [34, Model 3] relies again
on a standard array, whose size grows exponentially with the blocklength.
3.7.3 Analysis of polar coding scheme: Proof of Theorem 3.7.6
3.7.3.1 Key rate















We make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7.13. For j ∈M\{1, imin}, we have HX1|Xj ⊂ HX1|Ximin .
Proof. Let j ∈ M\{1, imin}. We define B̃(j)imin , Bj + ∆j, with ∆j independent
of Bj and such that pB̃(j)imin
= pBimin . We set X̃
(j)
imin
, X1 + B̃(j)imin . Hence, since




























By the data processing equality, we have HX1|Xj ⊂ HX1|X̃(j)imin but we also have
H
X1|X̃(j)imin
= HX1|Ximin since pX1X̃(j)imin = pX1Ximin , whence HX1|Xj ⊂ HX1|Ximin .
By [87, Theorem 3] and by Lemma 3.7.13, for j ∈ M\{1}, Terminal j can
reconstruct K from [F, F ′] = UN [HX1|Ximin ] ⊃ U
N [HX1|Xj ] with error probability
Pe(SN) 6 NδN .
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3.7.3.4 Strong secrecy and key uniformity
Secrecy and uniformity hold since,
L(SN) + U(SN) = I (K;F ) + log|K|−H(K)
= |K|−H (K|F )
= |K|−H (KF ) +H(F )
6 |F |+|K|−H (KF )
= |VX1 ∩HX1|Ximin |+|VX1\HX1|Ximin |−H(U
1:N [VX1 ])
= |VX1|−H(U1:N [VX1 ])
6 NδN ,
where the last inequality can be shown as in the proof of Theorem 3.6.5.
3.7.4 An extension to general sources
The multiterminal model described in Section 3.7.1 only considers binary symmetric
channels between the components of the source. A natural question is whether a
similar coding scheme may be developed for general sources. We answer this by the
affirmative for the case of three terminals; however, the coding scheme is significantly
more involved than the one in Section 3.7.2. In the following, we can assume without






Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. We note U1:N , X21:NGN , and for δN , 2−Nβ , where
β ∈]0, 1/2[, we define the following sets
VX2 ,
{



























KXM , (VX2\HX2|X1)\HX2|X3 and K̄XM , (VX2\HX2|X1) ∩HX2|X3 ,
which are such that VX2\HX2|X1 = KXM ∪ K̄XM and KXM ∩ K̄XM = ∅. Finally, we
define
FX2|X1 , HX2|X1 ∩ VX2 ,
F̄X2|X1 , HX2|X1\VX2 ,
FX2|X3 , HX2|X3 ∩ VX2 ,
F̄X2|X3 , HX2|X3\VX2 ,
which are such that HX2|X1 = FX2|X1 ∪ F̄X2|X1 , FX2|X1 ∩ F̄X2|X1 = ∅, HX2|X3 =
FX2|X3 ∪ F̄X2|X3 , and FX2|X3 ∩ F̄X2|X3 = ∅.
The encoding and decoding algorithms are provided in Algorithm 7, Algorithm 8,
and Algorithm 9. The underlying principle is to make Terminals 1 and 3 reconstruct
X1:N2 and to choose the secret key as a subset of U
1:N . For the public communica-
tion, we perform universal source coding with side information with an idea similar
to [97]. Terminal 2 thus performs encoding over k blocks of size N to transmit the
side information necessary to reconstruct X1:kN2 at Terminals 1 and 3. Specifically,
Terminal 1 decodes the blocks in order from 1 to k, so that it is able to estimate
U1:Ni [HX2|X1 ] by processing the observations and the public communication in blocks
1 to i. In contrast, Terminal 3 decodes the blocks in reverse order starting from k
down to 1, so that it is able to estimate U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] by processing the observations
and the public communication in blocks k down to i. One of the challenges is to
extract a uniform key from U1:N1:k independent of the public communication messages,
which we address by protecting some of the public communication corresponding to
Block i with part of the secret-key extracted in Block i − 1. Moreover, similar to
Algorithms 1, 3, a small secret seed must be shared by the users to protect the bits in
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positions HX2|X1\VX2 ∪ HX2|X3\VX2 , which must be revealed to allow reconstruction
of the secret-key by Terminals 1, 3, but that may also leak information about the
secret-key.
The following remarks clarify why Algorithms 7, 8, 9 achieve the desired behavior.
Remark 3.7.4. In every block i, Terminal 1 observes Mi = [F
(1)
i ⊕ K̄i−1, F (2)i , F ′i ⊕







i ], which contains U
1:N
i [HX2|X1 ] by construction. Hence, Terminal 1 has
ability to run the successive cancellation decoder and reconstruct U1:Ni .




k, and F̄k using Mk and
K̃k. Since FXM ⊂ FX2|X1\FX2|X3, note that
FX2|X1\FXM = FX2|X1 ∩ F cXM
⊃ FX2|X1 ∩ (FX2|X1\FX2|X3)c
= FX2|X1 ∩ FX2|X3 .
Hence U1:Nk [FX2|X1 ∩FX2|X3 ] ⊂ F (2)k , which combined with F̄k and F ′k allows Terminal
3 to obtain U1:Nk [HX2|X3 ]. Hence, Terminal 3 has the ability to run the successive
cancellation decoder and reconstruct Û1:Nk .
For Block i ∈ Jk − 1, 1K, observe that if Û1:Ni+1 [FXM ] = U1:Ni+1 [FXM ], then we have
[F
(1)
i+1 ⊕ K̄i ⊕ Û1:Ni+1 [FXM ], F (2)i , F ′i ]
= [U1:Ni [K̄XM ], F (2)i , F ′i ]
= [U1:Ni [FX2|X3\FX2|X1 ], F (2)i , F ′i ]
⊃ [U1:Ni [FX2|X3\FX2|X1 ], U1:Ni [FX2|X1 ∩ FX2|X3 ], F ′i ]
⊃ U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ].
Consequently, Terminal 3 can form an estimate of U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] with
[F
(1)
i+1 ⊕ K̄i ⊕ Û1:Ni+1 [FXM ], F (2)i , F ′i ]
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and apply the successive cancellation decoder to form Û1:Ni an estimate of U
1:N
i .
Theorem 3.7.7. Assume the general setting of Section 3.3 with m = 3, X1 = X2 =
X3 = {0, 1}, rate-unlimited public communication, i.e., Rp = +∞, and Z = ∅, i.e.,
the eavesdropper does not have access to the observation of the source component







is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 7 and Algorithms 8, 9, which
involves a chaining of k blocks of size N , and whose complexity is O(kN logN).
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.
As a corollary we obtain the following result for a broadcast model with three
terminals.
Corollary 3.7.6. Assume the broadcast setting of Section 3.7.1 with m = 3, X1 =
X2 = X3 = {0, 1}, and an arbitrary distribution pXM. Assume that all terminals share
a seed, whose rate can be chosen in o(N). The secret-key key capacity Cs(+∞) =
min(I(X1;X2), I(X2;X3)) is achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 7 and
Algorithms 8, 9, which involves a chaining of k blocks of size N , and whose complexity
is O(kN logN).
3.8 Model 4: Multiterminal markov tree model with uniform
marginals
3.8.1 Secret-key generation model
The final model for which we develop a polar coding scheme was first introduced
in [34, Model 3]. We assume that all the observation alphabets are Xi = {0, 1} for
i ∈ M. As illustrated in Figure 21, consider a tree T with vertex set V(T ) , M
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Algorithm 7: Encoding algorithm for Terminal 2 in Model 3
Require: k independent secret keys {K̃i}i∈J1,kK of size |F̄X2|X1 ∪ F̄X2|X3| shared
by all terminals beforehand; for every block i ∈ J1, kK, the
observations (X2)
1:N
i from the source. FXM , a subset of
FX2|X1\FX2|X3 with size |K̄XM |.
1 for Block i = 1 to k do
2 if i = 1 then
3 U1:N1 ← (X2)1:N1 GN
4 K1 ← U1:N1 [KXM ]
5 K̄1 ← U1:N1 [K̄XM ]
6 F1 ← U1:N1 [FX2|X1 ]
7 F ′1 ← U1:N1 [F̄X2|X1 ∪ F̄X2|X3 ]
8 Transmit M1 ← [F1, F ′1 ⊕ K̃1] publicly to all Terminals
9 else if i = k then
10 U1:Nk ← (X2)1:Nk GN
11 Kk ← U1:Nk [KXM ∪ FXM ]
12 F
(1)
k ← U1:Nk [FXM ]
13 F
(2)
k ← U1:Nk [FX2|X1\FXM ]
14 F ′k ← U1:Nk [F̄X2|X1 ∪ F̄X2|X3 ]
15 F̄k ← U1:Nk [FX2|X3\FX2|X1 ]




k⊕ K̃k, F̄k] publicly to all Terminals
17 else
18 U1:Ni ← (X2)1:Ni GN
19 Ki ← U1:Ni [KXM ∪ FXM ]
20 K̄i ← U1:Ni [K̄XM ]
21 F
(1)
i ← U1:Ni [FXM ]
22 F
(2)
i ← U1:Ni [FX2|X1\FXM ]
23 F ′i ← U1:Ni [F̄X2|X1 ∪ F̄X2|X3 ]
24 Transmit Mi ← [F (1)i ⊕ K̄i−1, F (2)i , F ′i ⊕ K̃i] publicly to all Terminals
25 end
26 end
return : K1:k ← [K1, K2, . . . , Kk].
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Algorithm 8: Decoding algorithm for Terminal 1 in Model 3
Require: Secret keys {K̃i}i∈J1,kK of size |F̄X2|X1 ∪ F̄X2|X3| shared with
Terminal 2; for every block i ∈ J1, kK, the observations (X1)1:Ni from
the source; the set FXM defined in Algorithm 7.
1 for Block i = 1 to k do
2 if i = 1 then
3 Form [F1, F
′
1] from M1 and K̃1 and extract and estimate U
1:N
1 [HX2|X1 ]
{See Remark 3.7.4 for a justification}
4 Form Û1:N1 with the successive cancellation decoder of [87]








i ] from Mi, Û
1:N
i−1 , and K̃i and extract an estimate
of U1:Ni [HX2|X1 ]
8 Form Û1:Ni with the successive cancellation decoder of [87]
9 K̂i ← Û1:Ni [KXM ]
10 end
11 end
return : K̂1:k ← [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k].
Algorithm 9: Decoding algorithm for Terminal 3 in Model 3
Require: Secret keys {K̃i}i∈J1,kK of size |F̄X2|X1 ∪ F̄X2|X3| shared with
Terminal 2; for every block i ∈ J1, kK, the observations (X3)1:Ni from
the source; FXM used in encoding.
1 for Block i = k to 1 do





k, F̄k] from Mk and K̃k and extract an estimate of
U1:Nk [HX2|X3 ] {See Remark 3.7.5 for a justification}
4 Form Û1:Nk with the successive cancellation decoder of [87]
5 K̂1 ← Û1:N1 [KXM ]
6 else




i ] from Mi, Û
1:N
i+1 , and K̃i and extract an estimate
of U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ]
8 Form Û1:Ni with the successive cancellation decoder of [87]
9 K̂i ← Û1:Ni [KXM ]
10 end
11 end
return : K̂1:k ← [K̂1, K̂2, . . . , K̂k].
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and edge set E(T ). The joint probability distribution pXM is characterized as follows.




(1− pi,j)1{xi = xj}+
1
2
pi,j(1− 1{xi = xj}),
which means that pXi = pXj is uniform and the test channel between Xi and Xj is a
binary symmetric channel with paramater pi,j.
Furthermore, we suppose that the eavesdropper does not have access to the ob-
servation of the source component Z. This setup is called the Markov tree model
with uniform marginals. The expression of the secret-key capacity is recalled in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3.8.6 ([16]). Consider the Markov tree model with uniform marginal.
The secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) is given by
CSK(+∞) = I(Xn0 ;Xn1),
where (n0, n1) , argmin(i,j)∈E(T )I(Xi;Xj).
Note that the construction proposed in [34] is not low-complexity since it relies
on the construction of a standard array, whose size grows exponentially with the
blocklength.
3.8.2 Polar coding scheme
We first introduce some notations for the coding scheme. For any i ∈ M, we note
N j(i) the set of vertices in V(T ) that are at distance j from vertex i. Recall that we
note (n0, n1) , argmin(i,j)∈E(T )I(Xi;Xj). We also consider for the encoding process
the tree T as a rooted tree with root Xn0 . An example is depicted in Figure 21.
Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. For j ∈ M, we set U1:Nj , X1:Nj GN . For j1 ∈ M,
j2 ∈M\{j1}, and δN , 2−Nβ , β ∈]0, 1/2[, we define the sets
HXj1 |Xj2 ,
{














Figure 21. Example of Markov tree model with uniform marginal for m = 15.
Each vertex represent the random variable observed by a given terminal, and
each edge can be seen as a binary symmetric test channel. We have noted
(n0, n1) , argmin(i,j)∈E(T )I(Xi;Xj), N 1(n0) , {n1, n1,1, n1,2}, N 2(n0) , {n2,i}i∈J1,5K, N 3(n0) ,
{n3,i}i∈J1,6K .
The exact encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 10 and Algorithm
11. The principle of their operation is to have all terminal reconstruct U1:Nn0 and choose
the key as a subvector of U1:Nn0 . The idea behind the inter-terminal communication,
which is illustrated in Figure 22, is to take advantage of the tree structure to make all
Terminals reconstruct X1:Nn0 ; the source uniformity plays a crucial role to develop a
universal result in Lemma 3.8.14, similar to the one obtained for the broadcast model
in Lemma 3.7.13. Although the assumption of uniform marginal is required in our
proof, a side benefit is that no pre-shared seed is needed to ensure strong secrecy.
We note F the set of indices (i, j) for which Fi,j is defined. We note the collective
inter-terminals communication as F , {Fi,j}(i,j)∈F .
The analysis of the scheme in Section 3.8.3 leads to the following result.
Theorem 3.8.8. Consider the Markov tree model with uniform marginals. The
secret-key capacity CSK(+∞) given in Proposition 3.8.6 is achievable with perfect se-
crecy with the polar coding scheme of Section 3.8.2, whose computational complexity
is O(N logN).
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Algorithm 10: Encoding algorithm for Model 4





2 Terminal n0 transmits Fn0 publicly.
3 Define d as the maximal distance between the vertex n0 and the vertices in
V(T ).
4 for i = 1 to d− 1 do
5 for j ∈ N i(n0) do
6 if N 1(j) ∩N i+1(n0) 6= ∅ then
7 Define j∗ , argmax
j̃∈N 1(j)∩N i+1(n0)
pj̃,j.













Algorithm 11: Decoding algorithm for Model 4
Require: Observations from the source, and public messages F.






, the terminals in N 1(n0) estimate X1:Nn0 with the
successive cancellation decoder of [87], and then form K̂ an estimate of K.
2 Let k ∈ J1, d− 1K, j ∈ N k+1(n0) and i = N k(n0)∩N 1(j). With Fk,i Terminal j
estimates X1:Ni with the successive cancellation decoder of [87]. By iterating,
Terminal j is successively able to form the estimate of X1:Nik−1 , X
1:N
ik−2
, . . . , X1:Ni1 ,
X1:Nn0 , for some i1 ∈ N 1(n0), i2 ∈ N 2(n0), . . . , ik ∈ N k−1(n0).
3 Finally, Terminal j forms K̂ an estimate of K from its estimate of X1:Nn0 .
return : K̂
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Proof. See Section 3.8.3.
Note again that for this model no pre-shared seed is required because the marginal
of pXM are uniform.
3.8.3 Analysis of polar coding scheme: Proof of Theorem 3.8.8
3.8.3.1 Key Rate









= 1−H(Xn0 |Xn1) = I(Xn0 ;Xn1).
3.8.3.2 Reliability
We first show that for k ∈ J1, dK, Terminal j ∈ N k(n0) can reconstruct Xj0 with
j0 , N 1(j) ∩N k−1(n0) from Fk−1,jo . Specifically, we establish the following.
Lemma 3.8.14. Let k ∈ J1, dK, j ∈ N k(n0), j0 , N 1(j) ∩N k−1(n0). Define Dk,j0 ,
N 1(j0) ∩N k(n0), and i∗ , arg max
ĩ∈Dk,j0
pĩ,j0. We have
∀i ∈ Dk,j0 , HXj0 |Xi ⊂ HXj0 |Xi∗ .
Proof. For i ∈ D, define X̄i , Xj0 + Bi, with Bi ∼ B(pi,j0). By Lemma 3.7.13, we
now that for any i ∈ D, HXj0 |X̄i ⊂ HXj0 |X̄i∗ . Then, observe that for any i ∈ D, for
any x, y ∈ {0, 1},
pX̄iXj0 (x, y)




(1{x = y}(1− pi,j0) + pi,j0(1− 1{x = y}))
= pXiXj0 (x, y),
Hence, HXj0 |Xi = HXj0 |X̄i ⊂ HXj0 |X̄i∗ = HXj0 |Xi∗
Lemma 3.8.14 is similar to Lemma 3.7.13; however, unlike Lemma 3.7.13, the






Figure 22. Example for the reconstruction process. A dashed-line from Terminal i to
Terminal j represents a public transmission from Terminal i of the information nec-
essary for Terminal j to reconstruct Xi. A dotted-line from Terminal i to Terminal j
represents a “virtual communication” and means that Terminal j is able to reconstruct
Xi from the information corresponding to the dashed-line leaving Terminal i – this illus-
trates Lemma 3.8.14. For this example we have assumed I(Xn1,2 ;Xn2,1) 6 I(Xn1,2 ;Xn2,3),
I(Xn1 ;Xn2,5) 6 min{I(Xn1 ;Xn2,i)}i∈{2,4}, I(Xn2,1 ;Xn3,6) 6 I(Xn2,1 ;Xn3,5), I(Xn2,2 ;Xn3,4) 6
min{I(Xn2,2 ;Xn3,i)}i∈{2,3}. All in all, all the terminals can reconstruct Xn0 .






, all terminals in N 1(n0) can re-
construct X1:Nn0 with error probability O(NδN) by Lemma 3.8.14 and [87]. We then
show by induction that all terminals can reconstruct X1:Nn0 with error probability
O(NδN). Assume that for k ∈ J1, d − 1K, X1:Nn0 can be reconstructed with error
probability O(NδN) from any X
1:N
j , where j ∈ N k(n0). Let j ∈ N k+1(n0) and
i = N k(n0)∩N 1(j). With Fk,i Terminal j can reconstruct X1:Ni with error probabil-
ity O(NδN) by Lemma 3.8.14 and [87]. Then, since X
1:N
i ∈ N k(n0), Terminal j can
also reconstruct X1:Nn0 with error probability O(NδN) by induction hypothesis.






with error probability Pe(SN) = O(NδN). The global reconstruction process is illus-
trated in Figure 22.
3.8.3.3 Key Uniformity
By definition of the model, Xn0 is uniform, hence, U
1:N
n0








We first introduce an equivalent model as follows. We start by defining for i ∈ N 1(n0),
X̄i , Xn0 + Bi, with Bi ∼ B(pi,n0). Then, for k ∈ J2, dK, for i ∈ N k(n0), define
i0 , N k−1(n0)∩N 1(i), and X̄i , X̄i0 +Bi, with Bi ∼ B(pi,i0). Consequently, similar
to the proof of Lemma 3.8.14, we have
pX̄M = pXM . (61)







where Pn0,j denotes the set of vertices that form a path between Xn0 and Xj including
j and excluding n0, B̃
N
i , BNi GN , and Ū1:Nj , X̄1:Nj GN , i ∈ M\{n0}. Recall that
























F̄ , {F̄i,j}(i,j)∈F . (63)
Lemma 3.8.15. For j ∈M\{n0}, HXj |Xj∗ ⊂ HXn0 |Xn1 .
Proof. Let j ∈ M\{n0}. Let rj be such that pn0,n1 = pj,j∗ ? rj (such rj exists by
definition of (n0, n1)), where ? is defined as in Example 3.6.1. We define ∆
(1)
j ∼
B(pj,j∗) and ∆(2)j ∼ B(rj) such that Bn1 = ∆(1)j +∆(2)j . We define the dummy random
variables X̄j∗ , Xn0 + ∆
(1)




j . Then, for any x, y ∈ {0, 1},
117
and by uniformity of the marginals of pXM ,
pX̄j∗Xn0
















so that HXj |Xj∗ = HXn0 |X̄j∗ . Similarly, we have pXn1Xn0 = pX̄n1Xn0 so that HXn0 |Xn1 =
HXn0 |X̄n1 . Hence, by the data processing inequality, we obtain
HXj |Xj∗ = HXn0 |X̄j∗ ⊂ HXn0 |X̄n1 = HXn0 |Xn1 .


































































































Figure 23. Model for biometric secret generation
where (a) follows by (61), (62), and (63), (b) follows from Lemma 3.8.15 and Equa-




B̃1:NJ1,mK\{n0}. We have thus shown perfect secrecy.
3.9 Application to secrecy and privacy for biometric systems
In this final section, we show how the results obtained for Model 2 may be applied
to the related problems of secrecy and privacy for biometric systems [65,98–100]. As
noted in [65], the main difficulty in constructing practical codes for such problems is
the need for vector quantization; we show here that polar codes offer a low-complexity
solution and provably optimal solutionsfor the models studied in [65].
3.9.1 Biometric system models
Consider two biometric sequences X1:N and Y 1:N distributed according to the mem-
oryless source (XY , pXY ). Assume that X1:N is an enrollment sequence and Y 1:N an
authentication sequence observed by an encoder and a decoder, respectively. In [65],
four different models are considered. We only deal with the “generated-secret sys-
tems” and the “generated-secret systems with zero leakage,” as codes for the latter
models can be used for the “chosen-secret systems” and the “chosen-secret systems
with zero leakage” using a masking technique [65].
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3.9.1.1 Generated-secret systems
A biometric secret generation strategy SbioN is illustrated in Figure 23 and is formally
defined as follows.
Definition 3.9.3. Let R ∈ R+. Let S be an alphabet of size 2NR. The protocol defined
by the following steps is called a (2NR, N,R) biometric secret generation strategy.
• The encoder observes the enrollment sequence X1:N ;
• The encoder generates a secret S ∈ S from X1:N ;
• The encoder transmits publicly to the decoder helper data M ;
• The decoder observes the authentication sequence Y 1:N , and computes Ŝ ∈ S.
The performance of a biometric secret generation strategy is measured in terms
of
• the average probability of error between the biometric secrets with Pe(SbioN ) ,
P[S 6= Ŝ],
• the information leakage of M on S with L(SbioN ) , I(M ;S),
• the privacy leakage of M on X1:N with Pc(SbioN ) , I(M ;X1:N |S) (conditional
case), or Pu(SbioN ) , I(M ;X1:N) (unconditional case),
• the uniformity of the biometric secret U(SbioN ) , logd2NRe −H(S).
Definition 3.9.4. For a fixed privacy leakage threshold L, a biometric secret rate









Pe(SbioN ) =0, (reliability)
lim
N→∞
L(SbioN ) =0, (strong secrecy)
lim
N→∞
Pc(SbioN )/N 6L, (privacy leakage)
lim
N→∞
U(SbioN ) =0. (uniformity)
Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the biometric secret capacity and
is denoted CcBio(L). For the unconditional case, Pc(SbioN ) is replaced with Pu(SbioN ),
and the biometric secret capacity and is denoted by CuBio(L).
Note that we require a stronger security metric than in [65]. The biometric secret
capacities are known and recalled below.
Theorem 3.9.9 ([65]). Let (XY , pXY ) be a BMS and L ∈ R+ be a privacy leakage








L = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y,
|U|6 |X |.
Remark 3.9.6. The equality L = I(U ;X) − I(U ;Y ) and the range constraint |U|6
|X | are obtained from Proposition 2.5.3.
3.9.1.2 Generated-secret systems with zero leakage
A biometric secret generation strategy with zero leakage SbioZN is describes in Figure

















Figure 24. Model for biometric secret generation with zero leakage
Definition 3.9.5. Let R ∈ R+. Let S be an alphabet of size 2NR. Assume that the
encoder and decoder share a uniformly distributed secret-key P beforehand. The pro-
tocol defined by the following steps is called a (2NR, N,R) biometric secret generation
strategy with zero leakage.
• The encoder observes the enrollment sequence X1:N ;
• The encoder generates a secret S ∈ S from X1:N and P ;
• The encoder transmits publicly to the decoder helper data M which is a function
of X1:N and P ;
• The decoder observes the authentication sequence Y 1:N , and computes Ŝ ∈ S
from Y 1:N and P .
The performance of a biometric secret generation strategy with zero leakage is
measured in terms of
• the average probability of error between the biometric secrets with Pe(SbioN ) ,
P[S 6= Ŝ],
• the information leakage of M on S and X1:N with Lc(SbioN ) , I(SX1:N ;M)
(conditional case), or Lu(SbioN ) , I(S;M) + I(X1:N ;M) (unconditional case),
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• the length of the secret-key P with H(SbioZN ) , |P |−H(P ) ,
• the uniformity of the biometric secret U(SbioN ) , logd2NRe −H(S).
Definition 3.9.6. For a fixed secret-key length K, a biometric secret rate R is achiev-
able with zero leakage if there exists a sequence of (2NR, N,R) biometric secret gen-







Pe(SbioZN ) =0, (reliability)
lim
N→∞
Lc(SbioZN ) =0, (strong secrecy)
lim
N→∞
H(SbioZN )/N 6K, (secret-key length)
lim
N→∞
U(SbioZN ) =0. (uniformity)
Moreover, the supremum of achievable rates is called the zero-leakage biometric secret
capacity and is denoted CcBioZ(L). For the unconditional case Pc(SbioZN ) is replaced with
Pu(SbioZN ), and the zero-leakage biometric secret capacity and is denoted CuBioZ(L).
Note that we require a stronger security metric than in [65]. The zero-leakage bio-
metric secret capacities are known and recalled below.
Theorem 3.9.10 ([65]). Let (XY , pXY ) be a BMS and K ∈ R+ be a fixed length.








K = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ),
U → X → Y,
|U|6 |X |.
Remark 3.9.7. The equality K = I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y ) and the range constraint |U|6
|X | are obtained from Proposition 2.5.3.
123
3.9.2 Polar coding scheme for generated-secret systems
Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. Fix a joint probability distribution pXU . We note V 1:N ,
U1:NGN . For δN , 2−N
β
, where β ∈]0, 1/2[, define the following sets
HU ,
{



























i ∈ J1, NK : H
(














The scheme proposed is a special case (it corresponds to the case Z = ∅) of the
scheme in Section 3.6.2. However, for completeness and clarity, we provide its detailed
description in Algorithm 12 and Algorithm 13 with the notation of the biometric secret
generation problem. We formally define a biometric key generation strategy SbioN as
follows.
Remark 3.9.8. One may actually use S1:Nk [VU\HU |Y ] as the Sk and slightly increase
the biometric secret rate in Algorithm 12. However, one does not distinguish the last
block from the others for convenience – see Remark 3.5.1.
Based on the results established for Model 2 in Section 3.6, we obtain the following.
Theorem 3.9.11. Consider a BMS (XY , pXY ). Assume that the encoder and the de-
coder share a secret seed. For any L ∈ R, the biometric secret capacities CcBio(L), and
CuBio(L), are achieved by the polar coding scheme of Algorithm 12 and Algorithms 13,
which involves a chaining of k blocks of size N , and whose complexity is O(kN logN).




, α < 1/2.
Theorem 3.9.11 is a direct consequence of Theorem 3.6.5 for the particular case
Z = ∅, since
max(Pc(SbioN ),Pu(SbioN )) 6 H(M).
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Algorithm 12: Encoding algorithm for generated secret systems
Require: S̃0, a secret key of size |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |; AUXY be any subset of
VU\HU |Y with size |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |; Observations X1:Ni in every
block i ∈ J1, kK; a vector R1 of uniformly distributed bits with size
|VU |X |.
1 Transmit R1 publicly.
2 for Block i = 1 to k do
3 Ṽ 1:Ni [VU |X ]← R1
4 Given X1:Ni , successively draw the remaining bits of Ṽ
1:N
i according to
p̃V 1:Ni X1:Ni ,
∏N








j|Ṽ 1:j−1i X1:Ni )
,
{
pV j |V 1:j−1X1:N (v
j|Ṽ 1:j−1i X1:Ni ) if i ∈ HU\VU |X
pV j |V 1:j−1(v
j|Ṽ 1:j−1i ) if i ∈ HcU
(64)
5 S̃i ← Ṽ 1:Ni [AUXY ]
6 Si ← Ṽ 1:Ni [(VU\HU |Y )\AUXY ]
7 Fi ← Ṽ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X) ∩ VU ]
8 F ′i ← Ṽ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU ]
9 Transmit Mi ← [Fi, F ′i ⊕ S̃i−1, R1] publicly
10 end
return : S1:k ← [S1, S2, . . . , Sk]
Algorithm 13: Decoding algorithm for generated secret systems
Require: The secret-key S̃0, and the set AUXY defined in Algorithm 12;
Observations Y 1:Ni and message Mi transmitted by other party in
every block i ∈ J1, kK, vector R1.
1 for Block i = 1 to k do
2 Form Ṽ 1:Ni [HU |Y ] from (Fi, F ′i ) = Ṽ 1:Ni [HU |Y \VU |X ] and
R1 = Ri = Ṽ
1:N
i [VU |X ].
3 Create estimate V̂ 1:Ni of Ṽ
1:N
i with the successive cancellation decoder
of [87]
4 Ŝi ← V̂ 1:Ni [(VU\HU |Y )\AUXY ]
5 S̃i ← V̂ 1:Ni [AUXY ]
6 end
return : Ŝ1:k , [Ŝ1, Ŝ2, . . . , Ŝk].
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Note also that for i ∈ J0, k − 1K, S̃i = o(N).
3.9.3 Polar coding scheme for generated-secret systems with zero leakage
The encoding and decoding algorithms are given in Algorithm 14 and Algorithm 15.
The difference with the scheme of Section 3.9.2 is that the public communication is
protected with a secret-key shared by the encoder and the decoder.
Algorithm 14: Encoding algorithm for generated secret systems with zero leak-
age
Require: k secret keys {Pi}i∈J1,kK of size |HU |Y \VU |X |; observations X1:Ni in
every block i ∈ J1, kK; a vector R1 of uniformly distributed bits with
size |VU |X |.
1 Transmit R1 publicly.
2 for Block i = 1 to k do
3 Ṽ 1:Ni [VU |X ]← R1
4 Given observations X1:Ni , successively draw the remaining bits of Ṽ
1:N
i
according to p̃V X defined by (64).
5 Fi ← Ṽ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X) ∩ VU ]
6 F ′i ← Ṽ 1:Ni [(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU ]
7 Si ← [Ṽ 1:Ni [VU\HU |Y ], Fi]
8 Transmit Mi ← [Fi, F ′i ]⊕ Pi publicly
9 end
return : S1:k ← [S1, S2, . . . , Sk]
Algorithm 15: Decoding algorithm for generated secret systems with zero leak-
age
Require: the secret key Pi, Mi transmitted by other party, observations Y
1:N
i
in every block i ∈ J1, kK, and vector R1.
1 for Block i = 1 to k do
2 Form Ṽ 1:Ni [HU |Y ] from (Fi, F ′i ) = Ṽ 1:Ni [HU |Y \VU |X ] and
R1 = Ri = Ṽ
1:N
i [VU |X ].
3 Create estimate V̂ 1:Ni of Ṽ
1:N
i with the successive cancellation decoder
of [87]
4 Ŝi ← [V̂ 1:Ni [VU\HU |Y ], Fi]
5 end
return : Ŝ1:k , [Ŝ1, Ŝ2, . . . , Ŝk].
The performance of the algorithms is ensured by the following result.
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Theorem 3.9.12. Consider a BMS (XY , pXY ). For any P ∈ R, the zero-leakage
biometric secret capacities CcBioZ(K), and C
u
BioZ(K), are achieved by the polar coding
scheme of Algorithm 14 and Algorithms 15, which involves a chaining of k blocks of
size N , and whose complexity is O(kN logN).
Remark that one only needs to prove that CcBioZ(K) is achieved in Theorem 3.9.12,
since a code that achieves CcBioZ(K) also achieves C
u
BioZ(K) by [65]. The proof of
Theorem 3.9.12 for CcBioZ(K) is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.6.5 and is thus
omitted. To show that Si = [Ṽ
1:N
i [VU\HU |Y ], Fi], i ∈ J1, kK, is uniform one can use
Lemma 3.6.7, then, similar to Theorem 3.6.5, one can show that S1:k is also uniform
and that strong secrecy holds. Note also that for i ∈ J0, k − 1K, F ′i = o(N).
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3.10 Conclusion
We have proposed low-complexity secret-key capacity-achieving schemes based on
polar coding for several classes of sources. Our schemes jointly handle secrecy and
reliability, which contrasts with sequential methods that successively perform rec-
onciliation and privacy amplification. Although sequential methods apply to more
general classes of sources, our polar coding schemes may be easier to design and may
operate with lesser complexity. Nevertheless, the price to be paid for low complexity
is that our schemes often require a pre-shared seed, whose rate is negligible compared
to the blocklength. When the eavesdropper has no access to correlated observations
of the source, and when the source has uniform marginals, we have identified several
configurations, including multiterminal models, for which no pre-shared seed is re-
quired. Finally, we have applied our polar coding schemes to privacy and secrecy for
some biometric systems.
Our polar coding schemes are particularly convenient to handle rate-limited public




3.A Proofs for Model 1 in Section 3.5
3.A.1 Proof of Corollary 3.5.2
We perform the same encoding as in Section 3.5.2 for Block 1. Define the set
HX|Z ,
{












= |HX|Z | − |VX|Z |,
where (a) holds because HX|Y ⊂ HX|Z since we have assumed X → Y → Z, (b) holds
because VX|Z ⊂ HX|Z .
We conclude by Lemma 3.4.1 and [87] that |F ′1|= o(N).
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.5.3
3.A.2.1 Polar coding scheme
Let δ > 0, β ∈]0, 1/2[. Let n ∈ N and N , 2n. We set U1:N , X1:NGN . We define
for δN , 2−N
β
, β < 1/2, the following sets
HX|Y ,
{
















We define a key-generation strategy SN as follows. Define the key as K ,
U1:N [HX\HX|Y ], and the public message as F , U1:N [HX|Y ].
3.A.2.2 Scheme analysis
Observe that HX|Y ⊂ HX , because conditioning reduces entropy. We thus have









= H(X)−H(X|Y ) = I(X;Y ).
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Note that the key K is uniform because X1:N is uniform, that is
Ue(SN) = 0.
Then, by [87, Theorem 3], Bob can reconstruct K from F with an error probability
satisfying
Pe(SN) 6 NδN .
Finally, by the key uniformity and because (HX\HX|Y ) ∩HX|Y = ∅ , we have
H(K|F ) = H
(







which means that we obtain perfect secrecy, that is
L(SN) = I(K;F ) = H(K)−H(K|F ) = 0.
3.A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4.1
As in [87], for a pair of random variables (X, Y ) distributed according to pXY over
X × Y , we define the Bhattacharyya parameter as






We will need the following counterpart of [87, Proposition 1] that is proved using the
same technique as [94, Lemma 20].








2Z(X|Y )2 − Z(X|Y )4.
Proof. We have for any v1, v2 ∈ X , y1, y2 ∈ Y ,













pXY (v2, y1) pXY (v2, y2) ·
∑
v′2
pXY (1 + v
′






















2 + A (y2)
2 − 4,
















As observed in [94, Lemma 20], for i ∈ J1, 2K, A (yi)2 > 4, by the arithmetic-geometric
inequality, and x 7→
√
x2 + a is convex for a > 0. Hence, since for i ∈ J1, 2K, Pi defines











2 + (EP2 [A (y2)])
2 − 4.
We conclude by substituting EPi [A (yi)] = 2Z(Xi|Yi) , for i ∈ J1, 2K.
Let α ∈]β, 1/2[. Define the sets
FX|Z ,
{





















|FX|Z |/N = H(X|Z).
But, by [87, Proposition 2], forN large enough, |FX|Z |6 |VX|Z |, hence, limN→+∞|VX|Z |/N >
H(X|Z). Since we also have limN→+∞|HX|Z |/N = H(X|Z), by [87], and VX|Z ⊂
HX|Z , we conclude
lim
N→+∞
|VX|Z |/N = H(X|Z).
3.A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.5.4
Let i ∈ J1, kK, we note qU
K,K̃

















































2N log 2× 2−Nβ/2, (65)
where (a), (b) hold by the triangle inequality, (c) holds by Pinsker’s inequality and
Lemma 3.5.2.
Then, for N large enough (|K̃|> 4), we have
I(Ki; K̃i) 6 V(pKiK̃i , pKipK̃i) log2
|K̃|
V(pKiK̃i , pKipK̃i)
6 V(pKiK̃i , pKipK̃i) log2|K̃|−V(pKiK̃i , pKipK̃i) log2 V(pKiK̃i , pKipK̃i)
6 δ∗N ,
where δ∗N , −3
√




2N log 2× 2−Nβ/2
)
by (65) and because
x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
132
3.A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.5.5
Let i ∈ J2, kK. By applying the chain rule of mutual information repeatedly, we obtain














































= L̃1:i−1e , (67)
where the last equality follows from KiK̃iZ
1:N





























































where (a) holds by K1:i−1 → KiK̃i−1:i → Z1:Ni Mi, (b) holds by K1:i−1 → K̃i−1 →





Finally, we conclude combining (66), (67), and (68).
3.B Proofs for Model 2 in Section 3.6
3.B.1 Proof of Corollary 3.6.4
We perform the same encoding as in Section 3.6.2 for Block 1. Note that CWSK(Rp) is
obtained for U uniform by Proposition 2.5.4 since X is uniform and the tests-channel
pY |X and pZ|X are uniform. Hence, the rate R1 of randomness to perform successive
cancellation encoding can be set equal to zero by [94]. We also have
|F ′1| = |(HU |Y \VU |X)\VU |Z |
(a)
6 |HU |Z\VU |Z |
(b)
= |HU |Z | − |VU |Z |,
where (a) holds because HU |Y ⊂ HU |Z since we have assumed X → Y → Z, (b) holds
because VU |Z ⊂ HU |Z .
We conclude by Lemma 3.4.1 and [87] that |F ′1|= o(N).
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3.B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.6.6
Using the notation of [73] for conditional relative entropy, we have for i ∈ J1, kK
D(pX1:NU1:N ||p̃X1:Ni U1:Ni )
(a)
= D(pX1:NV 1:N ||p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni )
(b)





















(H(V j|V 1:j−1)−H(V j|V 1:j−1X1:N))




6 |VU |X |δN + |HcU |δN
6 NδN ,
where (a) holds by invertibility of Gn, (b) and (c) hold by the chain rule for divergence,
(d) and (e) hold by (51) and by uniformity of the components of Ṽ 1:Ni in VU |X .
3.B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.6.8
We have by [102]
|Ki|+|K̃i|−H(KiK̃i) 6 V(pKiK̃i , qUK,K̃ ) log2
|Ki|+|K̃i|
V(pKiK̃i , qUK,K̃ )










where the last inequality holds for N large enough by Lemma 3.6.7 and because
x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
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3.B.4 Proof of Lemma 3.6.9






















































where (a), (b) hold by the triangle inequality, (c) holds by Pinsker’s inequality and
Lemma 3.6.7.
Then, for N large enough (|K̃|> 4), we have
I(Ki; K̃iR1)
6 V(pKiK̃iR1 , pKipK̃iR1) log2
|K̃|
V(pKiK̃iR1 , pKipK̃iR1)












NδN)) by (69) and because x 7→
x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
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3.B.5 Proof of Lemma 3.6.10
We have
V(p̃V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , pV 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni )
6 V(p̃V 1:Ni X1:Ni Z1:Ni , pV 1:Ni X1:Ni Z1:Ni )
= V(p̃Z1:Ni |V 1:Ni X1:Ni p̃V 1:Ni X1:Ni , pZ1:Ni |V 1:Ni X1:Ni pV 1:Ni X1:Ni )
= V(p̃Z1:Ni |X1:Ni p̃V 1:Ni X1:Ni , pZ1:Ni |X1:Ni pV 1:Ni X1:Ni )






where the last inequality follows by Lemma 3.6.6, and
V(pV 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , p̃V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:Ni )
6 V(pV 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , pV 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:Ni ) + V(pV 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:Ni , p̃V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:Ni )
(a)







































where (a) holds by (70), (b) holds by Pinsker’s inequality, (c) holds because similar
to the proof of Lemma 3.5.3 |VU |Z |−H(V 1:Ni [VU |Z ]|Z1:Ni ) 6 NδN .
Hence, by (70) and (128)
V(p̃V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , p̃V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:Ni )







and for N large enough
I(Ṽ 1:Ni [VU |Z ];Z1:Ni )
6 V(p̃V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]Z1:Ni , p̃V 1:Ni [VU|Z ]pZ1:Ni ) log2
|VU |Z |










3.B.6 Proof of Lemma 3.6.12
Let i ∈ J2, kK. By applying the chain rule of mutual information repeatedly, we obtain






























































6 L̃1:i−1e , , (74)
where (a) and (c) hold by the chain rule and positivity of mutual information, (b)
holds because KiK̃iZ
1:N






































































where (d) holds by the chain rule and positivity of mutual information, (e) holds
because K1:i−1 → KiK̃i−1:iR1 → MiZ1:Ni , (f) holds because K1:i−1 → K̃i−1R1 →
KiK̃i, (g) holds because K1:i−2 → Ki−1R1 → K̃i−1, (h) holds because K1:i−2 → R1 →
Ki−1, (i) holds by recurrence.
Finally, we conclude combining (73), (74), and (75).
3.C Proof of Theorem 3.7.7
1) Existence of FXM: The set FXM exists because we have assumed I(X2;X1) 6
I(X2;X3), i.e., H(X2|X1) > H(X2|X3). Indeed,
|FX2|X1\FX2|X3|−|K̄XM | = |FX2|X1\FX2|X3|−|FX2|X3\FX2|X1|
= |FX2|X1|−|FX2|X3|,
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and limN→∞(|FX2|X1|−|FX2|X3|)/N = H(X2|X1)−H(X2|X3) by Lemma 3.4.1 and [87].
2) Key Rate: The key rate is































where (a) holds because FXM ∩ KXM = ∅, and where we have used Lemma 3.4.1
and [87] for the first limit.
3) Reliability: We only detail the reliability analysis for Terminal 3, since relia-
bility for Terminal 1 is similar.
Let i ∈ J1, k−1K. Note that Terminal 3 forms an accurate estimate of U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ]
only when U1:Ni+1 is correctly reconstructed. We note Û
1:N
i [HX2|X3 ] the estimate of
U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] formed by Terminal 3 and define Ei , {Û1:Ni [HX2|X3 ] 6= U1:Ni [HX2|X3 ]}.
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Hence,
P[Ki 6= K̂i] 6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni ]
= P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |Eci ]P[Eci ] + P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |Ei]P[Ei]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |Eci ] + P[Ei]
6 P[U1:Ni 6= Û1:Ni |Eci ] + P[U1:Ni+1 6= Û1:Ni+1 ]
(a)
6 NδN + P[U1:Ni+1 6= Û1:Ni+1 ]
(b)
6 (k − i)NδN + P[U1:Nk 6= Û1:Nk ]
(c)
6 (k − i+ 1)NδN ,





i with error probability less than NδN , (b) holds by recurrence, (c) holds
similarly as previous equations.
Then, by the union bound,
Pe(SN) = P[K1:k 6= K̂1:k]













4) Key Uniformity: Similar to Lemma 3.5.2 we have the key uniformity for each
block.
Lemma 3.3.17. Uniformity of [Ki, K̄i] holds for each block, where i ∈ J1, k − 1K.
Specifically,
|Ki|+|K̄i|−H(KiK̄i) 6 NδN .
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Hence, we also have
|K̄i|−H(K̄i) 6 NδN ,
|Ki|−H(Ki) 6 NδN .
The global key K1:k is asymptotically uniform as, similar to the proof of Theorem
3.5.3 in Section 3.5.3.4, we have
U(SN) = |K1:k|−H(K1:k) 6 kNδN .
5) Strong Secrecy: Similar to Lemma 3.5.3, we obtain the following result showing
that secrecy holds for each block.







Similar to Lemmas 3.5.4 and 3.5.5 we also have the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.3.19. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have for N large enough








2N log 2× 2−Nβ/2
)
.
Lemma 3.3.20. For i ∈ J2, kK, define
L̃1:ie , I(K1:iK̄i;M1:i).
We have










Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.5.3, using Lemmas 3.3.18, 3.3.20, 3.3.19, we
obtain
L(SN) 6 2kNδN + (k − 1)δ∗N .










where we have used Lemma 3.4.1 and [87].
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CHAPTER 4
MULTIPLEXING PUBLIC AND CONFIDENTIAL
MESSAGES OVER THE WIRETAP CHANNEL
4.1 Summary
In this chapter, we propose and analyze a source-channel coding architecture over a
wiretap channel, in which secrecy is achieved by multiplexing public and confiden-
tial messages. Our main contribution is to circumvent the assumption that random
numbers with perfectly uniform distributions are available, and to show that strong
secrecy may be achieved “at negligible cost”, in the sense of maintaining the overall
communication rate of the same channel without secrecy constraints. Our source-
channel coding architecture relies on a standard wiretap code combined with a modi-
fied source code, which we call a “uniform compression code,” in which a small shared
secret seed is used to enhance the uniformity of the source code output. We carry
out an extensive analysis of uniform compression codes and characterize the optimal
size of the seed.
4.2 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to show that the cost of secrecy can be made negligible
in the sense that it needs not incur a reduction in overall communication rate and
need not require extra randomness resources. The crux of our approach is to ana-
lyze the wiretap channel model illustrated in Figure 25. Unlike the wiretap channel
model presented in Section 1.3.1, here, the encoder is deterministic and is only used
to multiplex a confidential source with a public source, and the objective is then to
maximize the sum-rate of secret and public communication. The idea of multiplexing
messages to achieve secrecy already implicitly appears in the original work of Csiszár
and Körner [36], and is explicitly formalized in [48, 49]; however, our approach dif-













Figure 25. Multiplexing of confidential and public sources in the absence of additional
local randomness at the transmitter. The confidential source must be reconstructible
by the receiver and kept secret from the eavesdropper. The public source should be
reconstructible by the receiver, and information may be leaked to the eavesdropper.
distributed, which is unrealistic even if messages are compressed with optimal source
codes [93, 103], and we consider a strong notion of security.
The main contribution of this chapter is a source-channel coding architecture
that achieves information-theoretic secrecy over this channel model. Our scheme,
illustrated in Figure 26, combines a wiretap code designed to operate with perfectly
uniform randomization with a modified source encoder, which compresses data while
simultaneously ensuring good uniformity properties. This architecture explicitly re-
quires the encoder and the decoder to share in advance a small secret seed K; however,
we will see in Section 4.5 that the seed rate can be made arbitrarily small. Note that
a secret key is anyway required for authentication [104,105].
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.3, we formally
describe the communication model under consideration. In Section 4.4, we show how
to render the output of a source code nearly uniform. In Section 4.5, we prove that the
architecture shown in Figure 26 achieves near-optimal performance using the result


























Figure 26. Proposed architecture to multiplex secure and public sources.
4.3 Preliminaries and Problem Statement
4.3.1 Wiretap channel model
Let X , Y and Z be finite alphabets. As illustrated in Figure 25, we consider a discrete
memoryless wiretap channel
(




X , pY |X ,Y
)
is called
the main channel while the channel
(
X , pZ|X ,Z
)
is called the eavesdropper’s channel.
We assume that the transmitter, Alice, wishes to transmit the realizations of the
DMSs (Vc, pVc) and (Vp, pVp). Both sources are to be reconstructed without errors by
the receiver observing Y n, Bob, while the source (Vc, pVc) should be kept secret from
the eavesdropper observing Zn, Eve.
Definition 4.3.1. A code for Cn the wiretap channel consists of the following.
• A deterministic encoding function fn : Vnc × Vnp → X n, which maps n symbols
of the confidential source and n symbols of the public source to a codeword of
length n;
• A decoding function gn : Yn → (Vnc ×Vnp ), which maps a sequence of n channel
output observations to n symbols of the confidential source and n symbols of the
public source.
146
The performance of Cn is measured in terms of the average probability of error
Pe(Cn) , P
[
(V nc , V
n
p ) 6= gn(Y n)
]
,





pZn|V nc =vnc , pZn
)
.
4.3.2 Source-channel coding theorem
Theorem 4.3.1. Consider a confidential DMS (Vc, pVc) and a public DMS (Vp, pVp)
to be transmitted over a wiretap channel
(
X , pY Z|X ,Y × Z
)
. For any random variable




H(Vc) +H(Vp) < I(X;Y )
H(Vc) < I(X;Y |U)− I(X;Z|U)
H(Vp) > I(X;Z|U)
,






Conversely, if there exists a sequence of codes {Cn}n>1 such that limn→∞ Pe(Cn) =





H(Vc) +H(Vp) 6 I(X;Y )
H(Vc) 6 I(X;Y |U)− I(X;Z|U)
H(Vp) > I(X;Z|U)
.
Although the result might seem intuitive, the achievability proof does not follow
from standard arguments and known results because we do not assume the existence
of a local source of uniform random numbers; consequently, the encoder must only
operate on the sequences emitted by the sources. The main contribution of this
chapter is the achievability proof detailed in Section 4.5 using the architecture of
Figure 26. The converse follows by combining the proofs in [45,46].
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Remark 4.3.1. Unlike the capacity region of the broadcast channel with confidential
messages, the information constraints in Theorem 4.3.1 do not include an auxiliary
random variable V such that U − V −X − Y Z. This result is not surprising, as this
extra random variable accounts for the addition of artificial noise (channel prefixing)
in the encoder, which is not allowed by our model, as we require all encoder inputs to
be decoded at the receiver. The random variable U is merely a time-sharing random
variable [46, 55].
4.4 Uniform compression codes
Consider a DMS (X , pX). Let n ∈ N, dn ∈ N, and let Udn be a uniform random
variable over Udn , J1, 2dnK, independent of Xn. In the following we refer to Udn as
the seed and dn as its length. As illustrated in Figure 27, our objective is to design
a source code to compress and reconstruct the DMS (X , pX) with the assistance of a
seed Udn .
Definition 4.4.2. A (2nR, n, 2dn) uniform compression code Cn for a DMS (X , pX)
consists of
• A message set Mn , J1,MnK, with Mn , 2nR,
• A seed set Udn , J1, 2dnK,
• An encoding function φn : X n × Udn →Mn,
• A decoding function ψn :Mn × Udn → X n.
Xn
Udn
M ,  n(Xn, Udn)  n(M, Udn)Encoder Decoder
Figure 27. Source encoder and decoder with uniform outputs.
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The performance of the code is measured in terms of the average probability of
error and the uniformity of its output as
Pe(φn, ψn) , P[Xn 6= ψn(φn(Xn, Udn), Udn)],
Ue(φn) , V[pφn(Xn,Udn ), pUMn ],
where UMn has uniform distribution over Mn.
Remark 4.4.2. Uniformity could be measured with the stronger metric U ′e(φn) ,
D[pφn(Xn,Udn ), pUMn ], where D(·, ·) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence; however, by [102,




nUe(φn) = 0, which will be the
case.
Definition 4.4.3. A rate R is achievable, if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n, 2dn)











Pe(φn, ψn) = 0, and lim
n→∞
Ue(φn) = 0.
Our main result in this section is the characterization of the infimum of achievable
rates with uniform compression codes as well as the optimal scaling of the seed length
dn. In the following, we use the Landau notation to characterize the limiting behavior
of the seed scaling, with the convention that for any real functions f and g, f = Ω(g)
means f = o(g) is false.
Proposition 4.4.1. Let (X , pX) be a DMS. Then,
inf{R : R is achievable with a uniform compression code} = H(X).
Moreover, the optimal seed length dn for (2
nR, n, 2dn) code verifies
dn ∈ Ω(n1/2) ∩O(n1/2+ε) for any ε > 0. (76)
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.
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As a first attempt to develop a more practical scheme for uniform compression
codes, we propose an achievability scheme for Proposition 4.4.1 based on invertible
extractors [106]. We start by recalling known facts about extractors.
Definition 4.4.4 ( [106]). Let ε > 0. Let m, d, l ∈ N and let t ∈ R+. A polynomial
time probabilistic function Ext : {0, 1}m × {0, 1}d 7→ {0, 1}l is called a (m, d, l, t, ε)-
extractor, if for all binary source X satisfying H∞(X) > t, we have
V(pExt(X,Ud), pUl) 6 ε,
where Ud is a sequence of d uniformly distributed bits, Ul is the uniform distribution
over {0, 1}l.
Moreover, a (m, d, l, t, ε)-extractor is said invertible if the input can be reconstructed
from the output and Ud.
It can be shown [106,107] that there exists explicit invertible (m, d,m, t, ε)-extractor
such that
d = m− t+ 2 logm+ 2 log 1
ε
+O(1). (77)
The following proposition shows that one can establish optimal uniform compression
codes using such invertible extractors.
Proposition 4.4.2. Let (X , pX) be a binary memoryless source. For any R > H(X)
and for any ε > 0, the rate R can be achieved with a sequence of uniform compression
codes such that
• the seed length scales as dn = Θ(n1/2+ε);
• the encoder φn : X n×Udn →Mn is composed of a typical-sequence based source
code combined with an invertible extractor as described in Figure 28.












Figure 28. Encoding/Decoding scheme for Proposition 4.4.2. The encoder/decoder is
obtained from a typical-sequence based source code, and EXT0 is an invertible extrac-
tor.
Unfortunately, this scheme is not fully explicit because it relies on a typical-
sequence based compression. To provide at least one explicit example, we finally de-
velop a uniform compression code based on polar codes for a binary memoryless source





be the source polarization transform defined in [87], and set AN , XNGN .
For any set A , {ij}|A|j=1 of indices in J1, NK, we define AN [A] ,
[
Ai1 , Ai2 , . . . , Ai|A|
]
.
We also define the sets
VX ,
{
















A polar-based uniform compression code is obtained by defining the encoding function
φN as follows.
φN : (X
N , U|HX\VX |) 7→
(
AN [VX ], AN [HX\VX ]⊕ U|HX\VX |
)
Proposition 4.4.3. Let (X , pX) be a binary memoryless source. For any R < H(X),
the rate R is achievable with a sequence of polar-based uniform compressions codes
with length N such that the seed length |HX\VX | scales as o(N). In addition, the
complexity of the encoding is O(N logN).
Proof. See Appendix 4.C.
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4.5 Source-channel coding architecture based on uniform com-
pression codes
Recall that our objective is to circumvent the impossibility of generating uniform
random numbers with source codes [93, Theorem 4]. The approach to overcome this
impossibility is to introduce a small shared uniformly distributed sequence, which we
call a “seed”, and to use the result of Section 4.4. While, the price paid is that the
emitter and the receiver must now share a seed of negligible rate, we will show how
to further reduce the seed rate.
4.5.1 Achievability of Theorem 4.3.1 based on uniform compression codes
The uniform compression codes of Section 4.4 may now be combined with known
wiretap codes (as depicted in Figure 26), whose properties we recall in the following
lemma.
Lemma 4.5.1 (Adapted from [46, Proposition 1]). Consider a Discrete Memoryless
Channel (DMC) (X , pY Z|X ,Y × Z), in which a message M ∈ J1, 2nRK is encoded
by means of a uniform auxiliary message Mp ∈ J1, 2nRpK. If there exists a joint
distribution pUXY Z that factorizes as pUpX|UpY Z|X such that
R +Rp < I(X;Y ) (78)
R < I(X;Y |U)− I(X;Z|U) (79)
Rp > I(X;Z|U), (80)




























Let ε > 0. Going back again to the setting of Section 4.3.1, we encode the
confidential DMS using a traditional source code, and the public DMS using a uniform
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compression code as in Proposition 4.4.1. The corresponding source encoder-decoder






n), respectively, and we set Mc , f cn(V nc ) ∈
J1, 2nRcK and Mp , fpn(V np ) ∈ J1, 2nRpK. We assume n large enough so that






where UnRp is uniformly distributed over J1, 2nRpK. Under the conditions (78)-(80) of
Lemma 4.5.1, which are met whenever
H(Vc) +H(Vp) < I(X;Y ),
H(Vc) < I(X;Y |U)− I(X;Z|U),
H(Vp) > I(X;Z|U),
for n sufficiently large there exists a wiretap code Cn so that for any mc, and for M̃p



























Note that (83)-(85) holds by Lemma 4.5.1 because we have assumed M̃p uniformly
distributed. We now study the consequences of using the wiretap code Cn with Mp
(not exactly uniformly distributed) instead of M̃p. Specifically, we note (M̂p, M̂c) the













































+ V(p̃Zn , pZn)
(d)

















where (a), (c), and (e) follow by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by (85), (d) and (f)
hold by (82).
Consider then an optimal coupling [96] between Mp and M̃p such that P[E ] =
V(pMp , pUnRp ), where E , {Mp 6= M̃p}. We have for any mc,
P
[




M̂p 6= Mp|Mc = mc, Ec
]
P [Ec] + P
[





M̂p 6= Mp|Mc = mc, Ec
]
+ P [E ]
= P
[
M̂p 6= Mp|Mc = mc, Ec
]
+ V(pMp , pUnRp )
6 2ε,
where the last inequality follows from (82) and (83). Similarly, using (82) and (84),
we have for any mc,
P
[












p )), and forming estimates
from the channel output Y n as V̂ nc , gcn(gn(Y n)), and V̂ np , gpn(gn(Y n)), we obtain
again
P[(V nc , V np ) 6= (V̂ nc , V̂ np )]
6 P[(V nc , V np ) 6= (V̂ nc , V̂ np )|(M̂p, M̂c) = (Mp,Mc)] + P[(M̂p, M̂c) 6= (Mp,Mc)]
6 5ε,
and for any vnc ∈ Vnc , by noting that pZn|V nc =vnc = pZn|V nc =vnc ,Mc=fcn(vnc ) = pZn|Mc=fcn(vnc ),
where the last equality holds because Zn →Mc → V nc , we have by (86)
V
(
pZn|V nc =vnc , pZn
)
6 3ε.




We have proposed and analyzed a source-channel coding architecture for multiplexing
confidential and public messages that achieves information-theoretic secrecy over the
wiretap channel. Our architecture exploits uniform compression codes that output
nearly uniform messages. By showing that secrecy can be achieved without extra ran-
domness resources, and without reducing the overall rate of reliable communication,
we show that secrecy can be achieved at negligible cost and provide a step towards
integrating physical-layer security into communication systems.
While our architecture introduces a new coding scheme at the application layer,
another approach consisting in modifying the physical-layer of the protocol stack,
could be possible relying on wiretap codes that do not require uniform randomiza-
tion [46]. This topic is left for future work and will be addressed in [108].
An important issue that we have not addressed is the design of universal wiretap
codes that merely require that the public message carries enough randomness, and do




4.A Proof of Proposition 4.4.1
4.A.1 Achievability
There exists a sequence of (2nR, n, 2dn) uniform compression codes {Cn}n∈N∗ such that
C is achievable with a seed length dn scaling as
dn = Θ(n
1/2+ε),
where ε > 0 is arbitrary.
Proof. Let ε1 > 0, ε > 0, n ∈ N, dn ∈ N, R > 0. Define Mn , 2nR andMn , J1,MnK.
Consider a random mapping Φ : X n × Udn → Mn, and its associated decoder Ψ :
Mn × Udn → X n. Given (m,udn) ∈ Mn × Udn , the decoder outputs x̂n if it is the
unique sequence such that x̂n ∈ T nε1 (X) and Φ(x̂n, udn) = m; otherwise it outputs






• We first determine a condition over R to ensure EΦ [Ue] 6 ε. Remark that





p(xn, u)1{Φ(xn, u) = m},
hence, on average ∀m ∈Mn, EΦ [pM(m)] = 2−nR, which allows us to write



























p(xn, u)1{Φ(xn, u) = m},
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withA1 , T nε1 (X) andA2 , Ac1. After some manipulations we bound the second











6 4|X |e−nε21µX , (88)
with µX = min
x∈supp(PX)
































































exp2 [−2n(1− ε1)H(X)] 2−d
1
Mn
6 exp2 [n(1 + ε1)H(X)] exp2 [−2n(1− ε1)H(X)] 2−d2−nR
6 exp2 [−n(1− 3ε1)H(X)] 2−dn2−nR. (90)






































Hence, if R < H(X) + dn
n
− 3ε1H(X), then asymptotically EΦ [Ue] 6 ε by (88)
and (91).
• We now derive a condition over R to ensure EΦ[Pe] 6 ε. We define E0 , {Xn /∈
T nε1 (X)}, and E1 , {∃x̂n 6= Xn,Φ(x̂n, U) = Φ(Xn, U) and x̂n ∈ T nε1 (X)} so that
by the union bound, EΦ[Pe] 6 P[E0] + P[E1]. We have
P[E0] 6 2|X |e−nε
2
1µX , (92)







































p(xn, u) exp2 [nH(X)(1 + ε1)] 2
−nR
6 exp2 [n(H(X)(1 + ε1)−R)] . (93)
Hence, if R > H(X) + ε1H(X), then asymptotically EΦ(Pe) 6 ε by (92) and
(93).
All in all, if R is such that




then asymptotically by the selection lemma, EΦ[Ue] 6 ε and EΦ[Pe] 6 ε. Thus, we
choose dn such that
4nε1H(X) < dn 6 4nε1H(X) + 1,
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to obtain




We can also choose ε1 = n
−1/2+εb , with any εb > 0,




6 4nεb−εaH(X) + n−1/2−εa ,
which means dn = o(n
1/2+εa). Finally, by means of the selection lemma applied to Pe
and Ue, there exists a realization of Φ such that Ue 6 ε and Pe 6 ε.
4.A.2 Converse
We first show that any achievable rate R must satisfy R > H(X). Assume that R is
an achievable rate. We note M , φn(Xn, Udn). We have
nR > H(M)
= H(M |Udn) + I(Udn ;M)
= I(Xn;M |Udn) + I(Udn ;M)
= H(Xn|Udn)−H(Xn|MUdn) + I(Udn ;M)
(a)





where (a) holds by Fano’s inequality and limε→0 δ(ε) = 0, (b) holds by positivity of
the mutual information, and (c) holds by independence of Xn and Udn .
Hence it remains to show an upper bound for the optimal scaling of dn. It is
done by means of a second order asymptotic study. We consider an arbitrary source
X , {Xn}∞n=1, where Xn is a random variable taking values in X n subject to PXn .
Specifically, we generalize some results of [93] to our setup, and show that if dn =
o(
√
n), with n the code length, then the trade-off between error probability and
1See Equations (88) and (92).
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uniformity of [93] cannot be improved. In the following, we use the notation Pe ,
Pe(φn, ψn) and Ue , Ue(φn), for a code Cn , (φn, ψn,Mn).
For the fixed-length source coding problem, for ε > 0, for d , {dn}n ∈ RN+ and
for a code Cn , (φn, ψn,Mn), we define the following first order asymptotics









: lim Pe < ε
}
,








: lim Pe < ε
}
,
as well as the following second order asymptotics



























: lim Pe < ε
}
.
For the intrinsic randomness problem, for ε > 0, for d ∈ RN+, and for a code C ′n ,
(φn,Mn), we define the following first order asymptotics
























as well as the following second order asymptotics





























We express the first order and the second order asymptotics, defined above, in the
following lemmas.
Lemma 4.1.2. Let ε > 0. Let d ∈ RN+. The first order asymptotics have the following
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expression
R(d, ε|X) = H(0, 1− ε|X),
R+(d, ε|X) = H(0, 1− ε|X),
S(d, ε|X) = H(d, ε|X),


































Proof. We proceed as in [93] with the lemmas derived in the proof of Proposition 4.1.3.
Lemma 4.1.3. Let ε > 0. Let d ∈ RN+. The second order asymptotics have the
following expression
R(d, ε, a0|X) = H(0, 1− ε, a0|X),
R+(d, ε, a
+
0 |X) = H(0, 1− ε, a+0 |X),
S(d, ε, a1|X) = H(d, ε, a1|X),
S−(d, ε, a
−








































Proof. Let ε > 0. If we decide not to use the additional randomness available, then
by [93] we obtain
R(d, ε, a|X) 6 R(0, ε, a|X) = H(0, 1− ε, a|X),
R+(d, ε, a|X) 6 R+(0, ε, a|X) = H(0, 1− ε, a|X),
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We proceed as in [93, Theorem 3], using [109, Lemma 1.3.2], which remains unchanged
when additional randomness is available at encoder and decoder, to obtain
R(d, ε, a|X) > H(0, 1− ε, a|X),
R+(d, ε, a|X) > H(0, 1− ε, a|X).
From [109, Lemma 2.1.2] we now derive a lemma similar to [93, Lemma 4] for the
metrics Ue.











Proof. Let φn : X n×Udn →Mn. We apply [109, Lemma 2.1.2] to φn so that for any
n ∈ N, for any a, for any γ > 0
Ue = V[φn(Xn, Udn),UMn ]
> P[(Xn, Udn) /∈ S ′n(a)]− P[UMn ∈ Tn(a+ γ)]− e−nγ














































for any γn ∈]0,Mn[, we choose γ , 1n log Mnγn and a ,
1
n




logMn and P[UMn ∈ Tn(a+ γ)] = 0. Hence, we obtain


























Then, with Lemma 4.1.4 we proceed as in [93, Theorem 3] to obtain
S(d, ε, a|X) 6 H(d, 1− ε, a|X),
S−(d, ε, a|X) 6 H(d, 1− ε, a|X).
Finally, from [109, Lemma 2.1.1] we derive a lemma similar to [93, Lemma 3] for the
metric Ue.












Proof. By [109, Lemma 2.1.1], there exists φn : X n×Udn →Mn such that for any a,
for any γ > 0
Ue = V(φn(Xn, Udn),UMn)
6 max (P[(Xn, Udn) /∈ S ′n(a+ γ)],P[UMn ∈ Tn(a)]) + e−nγ
6 max (P[Xn /∈ Sn(a+ γ − dn/n)],P[UMn ∈ Tn(a)]) + e−nγ,
For any γn > Mn, we choose γ , 1n log
γn
Mn
and a , 1
n
logMn, such that a + γ =
1
n
log(γn) and P[UMn ∈ Tn(a)] = 0. Hence, we obtain




























We conclude, as in [93, Theorem 3], using Lemma 4.1.5, that
S(d, ε, a|X) > H(d, 1− ε, a|X),
S−(d, ε, a|X) > H(d, 1− ε, a|X).
From the first order and the second order asymptotics derived in Lemma 4.1.2 and
Lemma 4.1.3, we study the trade-off between Pe and Ue, for i.i.d. sources following
the same method as in [93]. We consider the intrinsic randomness problem for the code
C ′n = (φn,Mn) and the fixed-length source coding for the code Cn = (φn, ψn,Mn). We
want to know whether there exists a sequence of triplet {(φn, ψn,Mn)}n∈N such that
lim Pe = ε and lim Ue = ε
′, where ε, ε′ ∈]0, 1[ can be chosen arbitrarily small, while
ensuring dn negligible compared to n. We first simplify the first order asymptotics of
Lemma 4.1.2, when dn = o(n).
Lemma 4.1.6. Let d ∈ RN+. Assume i.i.d. sources and assume dn = o(n). Then,
H(0, ε|X), H(0, ε|X), H(d, ε|X), H(d, ε|X), H(0, ε|X), H(0, ε|X) are all equal to
H(X).
Proof. By the law of large number we already have
{
H(0, ε|X), H(0, ε|X), H(0, ε|X), H(0, ε|X)
}
= {H(X)}.


































































= ε0 +H(0, ε|X). (94)
We also have by Proposition 4.1.2
H(d, ε|X) = S−(d, ε|X) > S−(0, ε|X) = H(0, ε|X), (95)
hence, by (94), (95), since ε0 is arbitrary, we have
H(d, ε|X) = H(0, ε|X).
Similarly,
H(d, ε|X) = H(0, ε|X).




lim Pe + lim Ue > 1.
Proof. We prove the two statements in order. Note that, for i.i.d. sources, by
Lemma 4.1.2 and Lemma 4.1.6, all the first asymptotics considered are equal, hence
by definition of the second order asymptotics, the following must hold
S−(d, ε








> R(d, ε, a|X), (96)








> R+(d, ε, a|X). (97)
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Assume dn = o(
√
n). By Equations (96), (97), we have by Lemma 4.1.3
H(d, ε′, a|X) > H(0, 1− ε, a|X), (98)
H(d, ε′, a|X) > H(0, 1− ε, a|X). (99)
















































































= ε0 +H(0, ε
′, a|X),
and similarly
H(d, ε′, a|X) 6 ε0 +H(0, ε′, a|X).
Thus, by (98), (99), we have
ε0 +H(0, ε
′, a|X) > H(d, ε′, a|X) > H(0, 1− ε, a|X),
ε0 +H(0, ε
′, a|X) > H(d, ε′, a|X) > H(0, 1− ε, a|X),
which means
H(0, ε′, a|X) > H(0, 1− ε, a|X),
H(0, ε′, a|X) > H(0, 1− ε, a|X),
since ε0 is arbitrary. Thus, for i.i.d. sources, since H(0, ε, a|X) and H(0, ε, a|X) are
continuous and increasing w.r.t. ε, we find that
lim Pe + lim Ue > 1.
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4.B Proof of Proposition 4.4.2
Let ε > 0, δ > 0 and n ∈ N. Let t, m, and dn to be expressed later. We know
from [106, 107] that there exists an invertible (m, d,m, t, ε)-extractor EXT0, such
that (77) is satisfied. Assume that the emitter and the receiver share a sequence
Udn of dn uniformly distributed bits. As described in Figure 28, we proceed in two
steps to encode Xn. First, we perform a typical sequence based compression of Xn
to form S, we note this operation φ′n : X n → M′n, such that S , φ′n(Xn), and we
note ψ′n :M′n → X n the inverse operation such that
lim
n→∞
P[Xn 6= ψ′n ◦ φ′n(Xn)] = 0. (100)





log||φ′n||6 H(X) + δ. (101)
Then, we apply the extractor EXT0 to S and Udn , to form the encoded message
M = EXT0(S, Udn). We define the encoding function φn : X n × Udn →Mn as
φn(X
n, Udn) ,M = EXT0(φ′n(Xn), Udn),
and the decoding function ψn :Mn × Udn → X n as
ψn(M,Udn) , ψ′n(EXT−10 (M,Udn)) = ψ′n(S) = ψ′n ◦ φ′n(Xn), (102)
which is possible since EXT0 is invertible. Note that by (100), (102), we have
lim
n→∞
P[Xn 6= ψn(φn(Xn, Udn), Udn)] = lim
n→∞
P[Xn 6= ψ′n ◦ φ′n(Xn)] = 0,






log||φn||6 H(X) + δ.
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Moreover, [106, 107] also shows that Ue 6 ε. It remains to show that for any εb > 0,
we can choose dn , Θ(n1/2+εb). Let ε0 > 0. We first compute
pS(s) = P[(Xn = s ∈ T nε0 (X)) or (Xn /∈ T nε0 (X) and s is chosen uniformly in T nε0 (X))]
6 2−n(1−ε0)H(X) + δε0(n)|T nε0 (X)|










where T nε0 (X) is the ε0-letter-typical set with respect to pX [78], δε0(n) , 2|X |e−nε
2
0µX ,



















Thus, since the input size m of the extractor verifies m 6 dn(1 + ε0)H(X)e, by (77)
and (103) we obtain














Then, we choose ε0 = n
−1/2+εb and εb > 0,
2 such that for any εa > εb
dn
n1/2+εa











which means dn = o(n
1/2+εa).
2The probability of error of the compression scheme is dominated by a term similar to δε0(n).
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4.C Proof of Proposition 4.4.3




















These sets cardinalities satisfy the following properties.
Lemma 4.3.7. The sets HX and VX verify
1. limN→+∞|HX |/N = H(X),
2. limN→+∞|VX |/N = H(X),
3. limN→+∞|HX\VX |/N = 0.
Proof. 1) follows from [87]. 2) follows from Lemma 3.4.1. 3) holds by 1) and 2) since
VX ⊂ HX .





















> |VX |(1− δN) ,
where the first inequality holds because conditioning reduces entropy and the last
inequality follows from the definition of VX . We thus obtain
log 2|VX | −H(AN [VX ]) 6 |VX |δN 6 NδN .
Finally, by [87], the receiver can reconstructXN fromAN [VX ] and I0 , AN [HX\VX ],
where I0 is encrypted via a one-time pad with the uniform seed shared by Alice and
Bob. Hence, by Lemmas 4.3.7, 4.3.8, we obtain a polar code construction for a uni-
form compression code, whose seed length scales as o(N).
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CHAPTER 5
POLAR CODING SCHEMES FOR THE BROADCAST
CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
5.1 Summary
We develop a low-complexity polar coding scheme for the discrete memoryless broad-
cast channel with confidential messages under strong secrecy and randomization con-
straints. This model encompasses the wiretap channel model presented in Section 1.3.
Our scheme extends previous work by using an optimal rate of uniform randomness
in the stochastic encoder, and avoiding assumptions regarding the symmetry or de-
graded nature of the channels. The price paid for these extensions is that the encoder
and decoders are required to share a secret seed of negligible size and to increase
the block length through chaining. We also highlight a close conceptual connection
between the proposed polar coding scheme and a random binning proof of the secrecy
capacity region. This chapter is based on the results obtained in [110,111]
5.2 Introduction
In this chapter, we develop a low-complexity polar coding scheme for the broadcast
channel with confidential messages [36]. Rather than view randomness as a free
resource, which could be used to simulate random numbers at arbitrary rate with no
cost, we adopt the point of view put forward in [46,55], in which any randomness used
for stochastic encoding must be explicitly accounted for. In particular, our proposed
polar coding scheme exploits the optimal rate of randomness identified in [55] and
relies on polar codes for channel prefixing.
When specialized to Wyner’s wiretap model (see Section 1.3), our scheme is also
related to [92], but with a number of notable distinctions. Specifically, while no pre-
shared secret seed is required in [92], the coding scheme therein relies on a two-layer
construction for which no efficient code construction is presently known [92, Section
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3.3]. In contrast, our coding scheme requires a pre-shared secret seed, but at the
benefit of only using a single layer of polarization.
The remaining of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.3 formally intro-
duces the notation and the model under investigation. Section 5.4 develops a random
binning proof of the results in [55], which serves as a guideline for the design of the po-
lar coding scheme. Section 5.5 describes the proposed polar coding scheme in details,









be the source polarization transform
defined in [87]. We note the components of a vector, X1:N , of sizeN , with superscripts,
i.e., X1:N , (X1, X2, . . . , XN). When the context makes clear that we are dealing
with vectors, we write XN in place of X1:N .
5.3.2 Channel model and capacity region
We consider the problem of secure communication over a discrete memoryless broad-
cast channel (X , pY Z|X ,Y ,Z) illustrated in Figure 29. This model generalizes the
wiretap channel model presented in Section 1.3. The marginal probabilities pY |X
and pZ|X define two DMCs (X , pY |X ,Y) and (X , pZ|X ,Z), which we refer to as Bob’s
channel and Eve’s channel, respectively.
Definition 5.3.1. A (2NRO , 2NRM , 2NRS , 2NRR , N) code CN for the broadcast channel
consists of
• a common message set O , J1, 2NROK
• a private message set M , J1, 2NRM K
































Figure 29. Communication over a broadcast channel with confidential messages. O is
a common message that must be reconstructed by both Bob and Eve. S is a confi-
dential message that must be reconstructed by Bob and kept secret from Eve. M is
a private message that must be reconstructed by Bob, but may neither be secret nor
reconstructed by Eve. R represents an additional randomization sequence used at the
encoder.
• a randomization sequence set R , J1, 2NRRK
• an encoding function f : O ×M × S × R → XN , which maps the messages
(o,m, s) and the randomness r to a codeword xN
• a decoding function g : YN → O ×M × S, which maps each observation of
Bob’s channel yN to the messages (ô, m̂, ŝ)
• a decoding function h : ZN → O, which maps each observation of Eve’s channel
zN to the message ˆ̂o
For uniformly distributed O, M , S, and R, the performance of
a (2NRO , 2NRM , 2NRS , 2NRR , N) code CN for the broadcast channel is measured in
terms of its probability of error
Pe(CN) , P
[
(Ô, M̂ , Ŝ) 6= (O,M, S) or ̂̂O 6= O
]
,
and its leakage of information about the confidential message to Eve
Le(CN) , I(S;ZN).
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Definition 5.3.2. A rate tuple (RO, RM , RS, RR) is achievable for the broadcast chan-
nel if there exists a sequence of (2NRO , 2NRM , 2NRS , 2NRR , N) codes {CN}N>1 such that
lim
N→∞
Pe(CN) = 0, (reliability condition)
lim
N→∞
Le(CN) = 0.(strong secrecy)
The achievable region RBCC is defined as the closure of the set of all achievable rate
quadruples.
The exact characterization of RBCC was obtained in [55].
Theorem 5.3.1 ( [55]). RBCC is the closed convex set consisting of the quadruples
(RO, RM , RS, RR) for which there exist auxiliary random variables (U, V ) such that
U − V −X − (Y, Z) and
RO 6 min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
RO +RM +RS 6 I(V ;Y |U) + min[I(U ;Y ), I(U ;Z)],
RS 6 I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U),
RM +RR > I(X;Z|U),
RR > I(X;Z|V ).
The main contribution of the present work is to develop a polar coding scheme
achieving the rates in RBCC.
5.4 A binning approach to code design: from random bin-
ning to polar binning
In this section, we argue that our construction of polar codes for the broadcast chan-
nel with confidential messages is essentially the constructive counterpart of a random
binning proof of the region RBCC. While random coding is often the natural tool to
address channel coding problems, random binning is already found in [112] to estab-
lish the strong secrecy of the wiretap channel, and is the tool of choice in quantum
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information theory [113]; there has also been a renewed interest for random binning
proofs in multi-user information theory, motivated in part by [114]. In Section 5.4.1,
we sketch a random binning proof of the characterization of RBCC established in [55],
which may be viewed as a refinement of the analysis in [114] to obtain a more precise
characterization of the stochastic encoder. While the results we derive are not new,
we use this alternative proof in Section 5.4.2 to obtain high-level insight into the
construction of polar codes. The main benefit is to clearly highlight the crucial steps
of the construction in Section 5.5 and of its analysis in Section 5.6. In particular,
the rate conditions developed in the random binning proof of Section 5.4.1 directly
translate into the definition of the polarization sets in Section 5.4.2.
5.4.1 Information-theoretic random binning
Information-theoretic random binning proofs rely on the following well-known lem-
mas. We use the notation δ(N) to denote an unspecified positive function of N that
vanishes as N goes to infinity.
Lemma 5.4.1 (Source-coding with side information). Consider a DMS (X×Y , pXY ).
For each xN ∈ XN , assign an index Φ(xN) ∈ J1, 2NRK uniformly at random. If
R > H(X|Y ), then ∃N0 such that ∀N > N0, there exists a deterministic function





pXNXN , pXNgN (Y N )
))
6 δ(N).
Lemma 5.4.2 (Privacy amplification, channel intrinsic randomness, output statistics
of random binning). Consider a DMS (X×Z, pXZ) and let ε > 0. For each xN ∈ XN ,
assign an index Ψ(xN) ∈ J1, 2NRK uniformly at random. Denote by qM the uniform





pΨ(XN )ZN , qMpZN
))
6 δ(N).
One may obtain more explicit results regarding the convergence to zero in
Lemma 5.4.1 and Lemma 5.4.2, but we ignore this for brevity.
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The principle of a random binning proof of Theorem 5.3.1 is to consider a DMS
(U × V ×X × Y ×Z, pUV XY Z) such that U − V −X − Y Z, and to assign two types
of indices to source sequences by random binning. The first type identifies subset of
sequences that play the roles of codebooks, while the second type labels sequences
with indices that can be thought of as messages. As explained in the next paragraphs,
the crux of the proof is to show that the binning can be “inverted,” so that the sources
may be generated from independent choices of uniform codebooks and messages.
Common message encoding. We introduces two indices ψU ∈ J1, 2NρU K and
o ∈ J1, 2NROK by random binning on uN such that:
• ρU > max (H(U |Y ) ,H(U |Z)), so that Lemma 5.4.1 ensures that the knowledge
of ψU allows Bob and Eve to reconstruct the sequence uN with high probability
knowing yN or zN , respectively;
• ρU + RO < H(U), so that Lemma 5.4.2 ensures that the indices ψU and o are
almost uniformly distributed and independent of each other.
The binning scheme induces a joint distribution pUNΨUO. To convert the binning
scheme into a channel coding scheme, Alice operates as follows. Upon sampling in-
dices ψ̃U ∈ J1, 2NρU K and õ ∈ J1, 2NROK from independent uniform distributions, Alice
stochastically encodes them into a sequence ũN drawn according to pUN |ΨUO(ũ
N |ψ̃U , õ).
The choice of rates above guarantees that the joint distribution pŨN Ψ̃U Õ approximates
the distribution pUNΨUO in variational distance, so that disclosing ψ̃
U allows Bob and
Eve to decode the sequence ũN .
Secret and private message encoding. Following the same approach, we intro-
duce three indices ψV |U ∈ J1, 2NρV |U K, s ∈ J1, 2NRSK, and m ∈ J1, 2NRM K by random
binning on vN such that
• ρV |U > H(V |UY ), to ensure that knowing ψV |U , uN , and yN , Bob may recon-
struct the sequence vN ;
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• ρV |U + RS < H(V |UZ), to ensure that the indices are almost uniformly dis-
tributed and independent of each other, as well as of the source sequences UN
and ZN .
The binning scheme induces a joint distribution pV NUNΨV |USM . To obtain a chan-
nel coding scheme, Alice encodes the realizations of independent and uniformly dis-
tributed indices ψ̃V |U ∈ J1, 2NρV |U K, s̃ ∈ J1, 2NRSK, m̃ ∈ J1, 2NRM K, and the sequence
ũN , into a sequence ṽN drawn according to the distribution
pV N |UNΨV |USM(ṽ
N |ũN , ψ̃V |U , s̃, m̃).
The resulting joint distribution is again a close approximation of pV NUNΨV |USM , so
that the scheme inherits the reliability and secrecy properties of the random binning
scheme upon disclosing ψ̃V |U .
Channel prefixing. Finally, we introduce the indices ψX|V ∈ J1, 2NρV |X K and r ∈
J1, 2NRRK by random binning on xN such that
• ρX|V < H(X|V Z) to ensure that ψX|V is independent of the source sequences
V N and ZN ;
• ρX|V +RR < H(X|V ) to ensure that the indices are almost uniformly distributed
and independent of each other, as well as of the source sequences V N .
The binning scheme induces a joint distribution pXNV NUNΨX|V R. To obtain a chan-
nel prefixing scheme, Alice encodes the realizations of uniformly distributed indices
ψ̃X|V and r̃, and the previously obtained ṽN into a sequence x̃N drawn according to
pXN |V NΨX|V R(x̃
N |ṽN ψ̃X|V r̃). The resulting joint distribution induced is once again a
close approximation of pXNV NUNΨX|V R.
Chaining to de-randomize the codebooks. The downside of the schemes de-
scribed earlier is that they require sharing the indices ψ̃U , ψ̃V |U , and ψ̃X|V , identifying
the codebooks between Alice, Bob, and Eve; however, the rate cost may be amortized
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by reusing the same indices over sequences of k blocks. Specifically, the union bound
shows that the average error probability over k blocks is at most k times that of an
individual block, and a hybrid argument shows that the information leakage over k
blocks is at most k times that of an individual block. Consequently, for k and N large
enough, the impact on the transmission rates is negligible.
Total amount of randomness. The total amount of randomness required for
encoding includes not only the explicit random numbers used for channel prefixing
but also all the randomness required in the stochastic encoding to approximate the
source distribution. One can show that the rate randomness specifically used in the
stochastic encoding is negligible; we omit the proof of this result for random binning,
but this is analyzed precisely for polar codes in Section 5.6.
By combining all the rate constraints above and perform Fourier-Motzkin elimi-
nation, one recovers the rates in Theorem 5.3.1.
5.4.2 Binning with polar codes
The main observation to translate the analysis of Section 5.4.1 into a polar coding
scheme is that Lemma 5.4.1 and Lemma 5.4.2 have the following counterparts in
terms of source polarization.
Lemma 5.4.3 (adapted from [87]). Consider a DMS (X ×Y , pXY ). For each x1:N ∈
FN2 polarized as u1:N , Gnx1:N , let u1:N [HX|Y ] denote the high entropy bits of u1:N in




> δN} and δN , 2−Nβ with β ∈]0, 12 [.






1 {ũi = ui} if i ∈ HY |X
pU i|U1:i−1Y N (ũ
i|ũ1:i−1yN) if i ∈ HcY |X .
and create x̃1:N = ũ1:NGn. Then,





∣∣ = H(X|Y ).
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In other words, the high entropy bits in positions HX|Y play the same role as the
random binning index in Lemma 5.4.1. However, note that the construction of x̃1:N
in Lemma 5.4.3 is explicitly stochastic.
Lemma 5.4.4 (adapted from Section 3.4.2). Consider a DMS (X×Z, pXZ). For each
x1:N ∈ FN2 polarized as u1:N , Gnx1:N , let u1:N [VX|Z ] denote the very high entropy bits




> 1− δN} and δN , 2−Nβ
with β ∈]0, 1
2













∣∣ = H(X|Z) by Lemma 3.4.1.
The very high entropy bits in positions VX|Z therefore play the same role as the
random binning index in Lemma 5.4.2.
This suggests that any result obtained from random binning could also be derived
using source polarization as a linear and low-complexity alternative; intuitively, in-
formation theoretic constraints resulting from Lemma 5.4.1 translate into the use of
“high entropy” sets H, while those resulting from Lemma 5.4.2 translate into the use
of “very high entropy” sets V . However, unlike the indices resulting from random
binning, the high entropy and very high entropy sets may not necessarily be aligned,
and the precise design of a polar coding scheme requires more care.
In the remainder of the chapter, we consider a DMS (U ×V×X ×Y×Z, pUV XY Z)
such that U −V −X − Y Z, I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) > 0, and |X |= |U|= |V|= 2. The
extension to larger alphabets is obtained following ideas in [115]. We also assume
without loss of generality I(U ;Y ) 6 I(U ;Z), the case I(U ;Y ) > I(U ;Z) is treated
similarly.
Common message encoding. Define the polar transform of U1:N , as A1:N ,
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U1:NGn and the associated sets
HU ,
{















i ∈ J1, NK : H(Ai|A1:i−1Z1:N) > δN
}
. (107)
If we could guarantee that HU |Z ⊆ HU |Y ⊆ VU , then we could directly mimic the
information-theoretic random binning proof. We would use random bits in positions
HU |Z to identify the code, random bits in positions VU \ HU |Z for the message, suc-
cessive cancellation encoding to compute the bits in positions VcU and approximate
the source distribution, and chaining to amortize the rate cost of the bits in positions
HU |Z . Unfortunately, the inclusion HU |Y ⊆ HU |Z is not true in general, and one must
also use chaining as to “realign” the sets of indices. Furthermore, only the inclu-
sions HU |Z ⊆ HU and HU |Y ⊆ HU are true in general, so that the bits in positions
HU |Z ∩VcU and HU |Y ∩VcU must be transmitted separately. The precise coding scheme
is detailed in Section 5.5.1.
Secret and private messages encoding. Define the polar transform of V 1:N as
B1:N , V 1:NGn and the associated sets
VV |U ,
{















i ∈ J1, NK : H(Bi|B1:i−1U1:NY 1:N) > 1− δN
}
, (111)
MUV Z , VV |U\VV |UZ . (112)
If the inclusion HV |UY ⊆ VV |UZ were true, then we would place random bits iden-
tifying the codebook in positions HV |UY , random bits describing the secret message
in positions VV |UZ \ HV |UY , random bits describing the private message in positions
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VV |U \ VV |UZ , use successive cancellation encoding to compute the bits in positions
VcV |U and approximate the source distribution, and use chaining to amortize the rate
cost of the bits in positions HV |UY . This is unfortunately again not directly possible
in general, and one needs to exploit chaining to realign the indices, and transmit the
bits in positions HV |UY ∩ VcV |U separately and secretly to Bob. The precise coding
scheme is detailed in Section 5.5.2.
Channel prefixing. Finally, define the polar transform of X1:N as T 1:N , X1:NGn
and the associated sets
VX|V ,
{





i ∈ J1, NK : H(T i|T 1:i−1V 1:NZ1:N) > 1− δN
}
. (114)
One performs channel prefixing by placing random bits identifying the code in posi-
tions VX|V Z , random bits describing the randomization sequence in positions VX|V \
VX|V Z , and using successive cancellation encoding to compute the bits in positions
VcX|V and approximate the source distribution. Chaining is finally used to amortize
the cost of randomness for describing the code. The precise coding scheme is detailed
in Section 5.5.3.
5.5 Polar coding scheme
In this section, we describe the details of the polar coding scheme resulting from
the discussion of the previous section. Recall that the joint probability distribution
pUV XY Z of the original source is fixed and defined as in Section 5.4.2. As alluded
to earlier, we perform the encoding over k blocks of size N . We use the subscript
i ∈ J1, kK to denote random variables associated to encoding Block i. The chaining
constructions corresponding to the encoding of the common, secret, and private mes-
sages, and randomization sequence, are described in Section 5.5.1, Section 5.5.2, and
Section 5.5.3, respectively. Although each chaining is described independently, all
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Figure 30. Chaining for the encoding of the Ã1:Ni ’s, which corresponds to the encoding
of the common messages.
every block i ∈ J1, k − 1K, Alice successively encodes the common message, the secret
and private messages, and performs channel prefixing, before she moves to the next
block i+ 1.
5.5.1 Common message encoding
In addition to the polarization sets defined in (104)-(107) we also define
IUY , VU\HU |Y ,
IUZ , VU\HU |Z ,
AUY Z , any subset of IUZ\IUY with size |IUY \IUZ |.
Note that AUY Z exists since we have assumed I(U ;Y ) 6 I(U ;Z). In fact,
|IUZ\IUY |−|IUY \IUZ |= |IUZ |−|IUY |> 0.
The encoding procedure with chaining is summarized in Figure 30.
In Block 1, the encoder forms Ũ1:N1 as follows. Let O1 be a vector of |IUY |
uniformly distributed information bits that represents the common message to be
reconstructed by Bob and Eve. Upon observing a realization o1, the encoder samples
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if j ∈ IUY
1/2 if j ∈ VU\IUY
pAj |A1:j−1(a
j
1|a1:j−11 ) if j ∈ VcU
, (115)
where the components of o1 have been indexed by the set of indices IUY for conve-
nience, so that O1 , Ã1:N1 [IUY ]. The random bits that identify the codebook and
that are required to reconstruct Ã1:N1 are Ã
1:N
1 [HU |Z ] for Eve and Ã1:N1 [HU |Y ] for Bob.
Moreover, we note
ΨU1 , Ã1:N1 [VU\IUY ] = Ã1:N1 [VU ∩HU |Y ],
ΦU1 , Ã1:N1 [(HU |Y ∪HU |Z) ∩ VcU ].
Both ΨU1 and Φ
U
1 are publicly transmitted to both Bob and Eve. Note that, unlike in
the random binning proof, the use of polarization forces us to distinguish the part ΨU1
that is nearly uniform from the part ΦU1 that is not. We show later that the rate cost
of this additional transmission is negligible. We also write O1 , [O1,1, O1,2], where
O1,1 , Ã1:N1 [IUY ∩ IUZ ] and O1,2 , Ã1:N1 [IUY \IUZ ]. We will retransmit O1,2 in the
next block. Finally, we compute Ũ1:N1 , Ã1:N1 Gn.
In Block i ∈ J2, k − 1K, the encoder forms Ã1:N1 as follows. Let Oi be a vector
of |IUY | uniformly distributed information bits representing the common message in
that block. Upon observing the realizations oi and oi−1, the encoder draws ã
1:N
i from





























if j ∈ VU\(IUY ∪ AUY Z)
pAj |A1:j−1(a
j
i |a1:j−1i ) if j ∈ VcU
, (116)
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where the components of oi, oi−1,2, and ψ
U
1 , have been indexed by the set of indices
IUY , AUY Z , and VU\(IUY ∪ AUY Z), respectively. Consequently, note that
Oi = Ã
1:N
i [IUY ] and Oi−1,2 = Ã1:Ni [AUY Z ].
The random bits that identify the codebook and that are required to reconstruct
Ã1:Ni are Ã
1:N
i [HU |Y ] for Bob and Ã1:Ni [HU |Z ] for Eve. Parts of these bits depend on
messages in previous blocks. For the others, we define
ΨUi , Ã1:Ni [VU\(IUY ∪ AUY Z)],
ΦUi , Ã1:Ni [(HU |Y ∪HU |Z)\VU ].
Note that the bits in ΨUi are reusing the bits in Ψ
U
1 ; however, it is necessary to make
the bits ΦUi available to both Bob and Eve, to enable the reconstruction of Oi. We
show later that this entails a negligible rate cost. Finally, we write Oi , [Oi,1, Oi,2],
where Oi,1 , Ã1:Ni [IUY ∩ IUZ ] and Oi,2 , Ã1:Ni [IUY \IUZ ], and we retransmit Oi,2 in
the next block, We finally compute Ũ1:Ni , Ã1:Ni Gn.
Finally, the encoder forms Ã1:Nk in Block k, as follows. Let Ok be a vector of
|IUY ∩ IUZ | uniformly distributed bits representing the common message in that
block. Given realizations ok and ok−1, the encoder samples ã
1:N
k from the distribution





























if j ∈ VU\(AUY Z ∪ (IUY ∩ IUZ))
pAj |A1:j−1(a
j
k|a1:j−1k ) if j ∈ VcU
,
(117)
where the components of ok, ok−1,2, and ψ
U
1 have been indexed by the set of indices
IUY ∩ IUZ , AUY Z , and VU\(AUY Z ∪ (IUY ∩ IUZ)), respectively. Consequently,
Ok = Ã
1:N
k [IUY ∩ IUZ ], Ok−1,2 = Ã1:Nk [AUY Z ].
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The random bits that identify the codebook and that are required to reconstruct
Ã1:Nk are Ã
1:N
k [HU |Y ] for Bob and Ã1:Nk [HU |Z ] for Eve. Parts of these bits depend on
messages in previous blocks. For the others, we define
ΨUk , Ã1:Nk [VU\(AUY Z ∪ (IUY ∩ IUZ))],
ΦUk , Ã1:Nk [(HU |Y ∪HU |Z)\VU ],




k is made available to both Bob
and Eve to help them reconstruct Ok, but this incurs a negligible rate cost.
The public transmission of (ΨU1 ,Φ
U
1:k) to perform the reconstruction of the common
message is taken into account in the secrecy analysis in Section 5.6.
5.5.2 Secret and private message encoding
In addition to the polarization set defined in (108)-(112), we also define
BV |UY , a fixed subset of VV |UZ with size |VV |UY ∪ ((HV |UY \VV |UY ) ∩ VV |U))|
MUV Z , VV |U\VV |UZ .
The encoding procedure with chaining is summarized in Figure 31.
In Block 1, the encoder forms Ṽ 1:N1 as follows. Let S1 be a vector of |VV |UZ |
uniformly distributed bits representing the secret message and let M1 be a vector
of |MUV Z | uniformly distributed bits representing the private message to be recon-
structed by Bob. Given a confidential message s1, a private message m1, and ũ
1:N
1
resulting from the encoding of the common message, the encoder samples b̃1:N1 from























if j ∈MUV Z
pBj |B1:j−1U1:N (b
j
1|b1:j−11 ũ1:N1 ) if j ∈ VcV |U
, (118)
where the components of s1 and m1 have been indexed by the set of indices VV |UZ





































































Figure 31. Chaining for the encoding of the B̃1:Ni ’s, which corresponds to the encoding
of the private and confidential messages.
B̃1:N1 [MUV Z ]. The random bits that identify the codebook required for reconstruction
are those in positions HV |UY , which we split as
Ψ
V |U
1 , B̃1:N1 [VV |UY ∪ ((HV |UY \VV |UY ) ∩ VV |U))],
Φ
V |U
1 , B̃1:N1 [(HV |UY \VV |UY ) ∩ VcV |U ].
Note that Ψ
V |U
1 is uniformly distributed but Φ
V |U
1 is not. Consequently, we may
reuse Ψ
V |U
1 in the next block but we cannot reuse Φ
V |U
1 . We instead share Φ
V |U
1
secretly between Alice and Bob and we show later that this may be accomplished
with negligible rate cost. Finally, define Ṽ 1:N1 , B̃1:N1 Gn.
In Block i ∈ J2, kK, the encoder forms Ṽ 1:Ni as follows. Let Si be a vector of
|VV |UZ\BV |UY | uniformly distributed bits and Mi be a vector of |MUV Z | uniformly
distributed bits that represent the secret and private message in block i, respectively.
Given a private message mi, a confidential message si, ψ
V |U
i−1 , and ũ
1:N
i resulting from
the encoding of the common message, the encoder draws b̃1:Ni from the distribution
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if j ∈MUV Z
pBj |B1:j−1U1:N (b
j
1|b1:j−11 ũ1:Ni ) if j ∈ VcV |U
,
(119)
where the components of si, ψ
V |U
i−1 , and mi have been indexed by the set of in-





i [BV |UY ], and Mi = B̃1:Ni [MUV Z ]. The random bits that identify the
codebook required for reconstruction are those in positions HV |UY , which we split as
Ψ
V |U
i , B̃1:Ni [VV |UY ∪ ((HV |UY \VV |UY ) ∩ VV |U))],
Φ
V |U
i , B̃1:Ni [(HV |UY \VV |UY ) ∩ VcV |U ].
Again, Ψ
V |U
i is uniformly distributed but Φ
V |U
i is not, so that we reuse Ψ
V |U
i in the
next block but we share Φ
V |U
i securely between Alice and Bob. We show later that
the cost of sharing Φ
V |U





with Bob. Finally, define Ṽ 1:Ni , B̃1:Ni Gn.
5.5.3 Channel prefixing
The channel prefixing procedure with chaining is illustrated in Figure 32.
In Block 1, the encoder forms X̃1:N1 as follows. Let R1 be a vector of |VX|V \VX|V Z |
uniformly distributed bits representing the randomness required for channel prefixing.
Given a randomization sequence r1 and ṽ
1:N






































Figure 32. Chaining for the encoding of the T̃ 1:Ni ’s, which corresponds to channel
prefixing.

















if j ∈ VX|V \VX|V Z
pT j |T 1:j−1V 1:N (t
j
1|t1:j−11 ṽ1:N1 ) if j ∈ VcX|V
,
(120)
where the components of r1 have been indexed by the set of indices VX|V \VX|V Z , so
that R1 = T̃
1:N
i [VX|V \VX|V Z ]. The random bits that identify the codebook are those
in position VX|V Z , which we denote
Ψ
X|V
1 , T̃ 1:N1 [VX|V Z ].
Finally, compute X̃1:N1 , T̃ 1:N1 Gn, which is transmitted over the channel WY Z|X . We
note Y 1:N1 , Z
1:N
1 the corresponding channel outputs.
In Block i ∈ J2, kK, the encoder forms X̃1:Ni as follows. Let Ri be a vector of
|VX|V \VX|V Z | uniformly distributed bits representing the randomness required for
channel prefixing in block i. Given a randomization sequence ri and ṽ
1:N
i resulting
from the encoding of secret and private messages, the encoder draws t̃1:Ni from the
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if j ∈ VX|V \VX|V Z
pT j |T 1:j−1V 1:N (t
j
i |t1:j−1i ṽ1:Ni ) if j ∈ VcX|V
,
(121)
where the components of ri have been indexed by the set of indices VX|V \VX|V Z , so
that Ri = T̃
1:N
i [VX|V \VX|V Z ]. Note that the random bits describing the codebook
are Ψ
X|V
i , T̃ 1:Ni [VX|V Z ], and are reused from the previous block. Finally, define
X̃1:Ni , T̃ 1:Ni Gn and transmit it over the channel WY Z|X . We note Y 1:Ni , Z1:Ni the
corresponding channel outputs.
5.5.4 Decoding
The decoding procedure is as follows.
Reconstruction of the common message by Bob. Bob forms the estimate
Â1:N1:k of Ã
1:N




1 ), which contains all the
bits Ã1:N1 [HU |Y ] by construction. Bob runs the successive cancellation decoder for
source coding with side information of [87] using Y 1:N1 and Ã
1:N
1 [HU |Y ]. In Block
i ∈ J2, kK, Bob estimates Ã1:Ni [HU |Y ] with (ΨU1 , Â1:Ni−1[IUY \IUZ ],ΦUi ), and uses this
estimate along with Y 1:Ni to run the successive cancellation decoder for source coding
with side information.






1:k starting from Block k and going backwards as follows. In Block k,
Eve knows (ΨUk ,Φ
U
k ), which contains all the bits in Ã
1:N
k [HU |Z ] by construction.
Eve runs the successive cancellation decoder for source coding with side informa-
tion using Z1:Nk and Ã
1:N
k [HU |Z ]. For i ∈ J1, k − 1K, Eve estimates Ã1:Nk−i[HU |Z ] with
(ΨU1 ,
̂̂
A1:Nk−i+1[AUY Z ],ΦUk−i), and uses this estimate along with Z1:Nk−i to run the succes-
sive cancellation decoder for source coding with side information.
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Reconstruction of the private and confidential messages by Bob. Bob
forms the estimate B̂1:N1:k of B̃
1:N









k ), Bob estimates B̃
1:N
k with the successive cancellation decoder
for source coding with side information. From B̃1:Nk , an estimate Ψ̂
V |U
k−1 , B̂1:Nk [VV |UY ]
of Ψ
V |U








k−i ), Bob estimates
B̃1:Nk−i with the successive cancellation decoder for source coding with side information.
From B̃1:Nk−i , an estimate of Ψ
V |U
k−i−1 is formed. Once all the estimates B̂
1:N
1:k have been
formed, Bob extracts the estimates Ŝ1:k and M̂1:k of S1:k and M1:k, respectively.
5.6 Analysis of polar coding scheme
We now analyze in details the characteristics and performances of the polar coding
scheme described in Section 5.5. Specifically, we show the following.
Theorem 5.6.2. Consider a discrete memoryless broadcast channel (X , pY Z|X ,Y ,Z).
The coding scheme of Section 5.4, whose complexity is O(N logN) achieves the region
RBCC.
The result of Theorem 5.6.2, follows in four steps. First, we show that the polar
coding scheme of Section 5.5 approximates the statistics of the original DMS (U ×
V × X × Y × Z, pUV XY Z) from which the polarization sets were defined. Second, we
show that the various messages rates are indeed those in RBCC. Third, we show that
the probability of decoding error vanishes with the block length. Finally, we show
that the information leakage vanishes with the block length.
5.6.1 Approximation of original DMS statistics




i , and X̃
1:N
i , generated in block i ∈ J1, kK
do not have the exact joint distribution of the vectors A1:N , B1:N , V 1:N , and X1:N ,
induced by the source polarization of the original DMS (U×V×X ×Y×Z, pUV XY Z).
However, the following lemmas show that the joint distributions are close to one
another, which is crucial for the subsequent reliability and secrecy analysis.
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Lemma 5.6.5. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have
D(pU1:N , p̃U1:Ni ) = D(pA1:N , p̃A1:Ni ) 6 NδN .
Hence, by Pinsker’s inequality










Proof. See Appendix 5.A.
Lemma 5.6.6. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have
D(pV 1:NU1:N ||p̃V 1:Ni U1:Ni ) = D(pB1:NU1:N ||p̃B1:Ni U1:Ni ) 6 2NδN .
Hence, by Pinsker’s inequality










Proof. See Appendix 5.B.
Lemma 5.6.7. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have
D(pX1:NV 1:N ||p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni ) = D(pT 1:NV 1:N ||p̃T 1:Ni V 1:Ni ) 6 3NδN .
Hence, by Pinsker’s inequality










Proof. See Appendix 5.C.
Combining the three previous lemmas, we obtain the following.
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Lemma 5.6.8. For i ∈ J1, kK, we have














Proof. See Appendix 5.D.
As noted in [116], upper-bounding the divergence with a chain rule is easier than
directly upper-bounding the variational distance as in [94,95].
5.6.2 Transmission rates
We now analyze the rate of common message, confidential message, private message,
and randomization sequence, used at the encoder, as well as the different sum rates
and the rate of additional information sent to Bob and Eve.
Common message rate. The overall rate RO of common information bits trans-
mitted satisfies
RO =











N→∞−−−→ I(Y ;U)− I(Y ;U)
k
k→∞−−−→ I(Y ;U),
where we have used [87]. Since we also have RO 6 |IUY |N
N→∞−−−→ I(Y ;U), we conclude
RO
N→∞,k→∞−−−−−−−→ I(Y ;U).
Confidential message rate. First, observe that
|ΨV |U1 | = |VV |UY ∪ ((HV |UY \VV |UY ) ∩ VV |U))|
6 |VV |UY |+|HV |UY \VV |UY |
= |VV |UY |+|HV |UY |−|VV |UY |
6 |HV |UY |,
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and |ΨV |U1 |> |VV |UY |. Hence, since limN→∞|VV |UY |/N = H(V |UY ) by Lemma 3.4.1
and





= H(V |UY ).
Then, the overall rate RS of secret information bits transmitted is
RS =
|VV |UZ |+(k − 1)|VV |UZ\BV |UY |
kN
=
|VV |UZ |+(k − 1)(|VV |UZ |−|BV |UY |)
kN
=











N→∞−−−→ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U) + H(V |UY )
k
k→∞−−−→ I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U).






|VV |U\VV |UZ |
N
=
|VV |U |−|VV |UZ |
N
N→∞−−−→ I(V ;Z|U),
where we have used Lemma 3.4.1.
Randomization rate. The uniform random bits used in the stochastic encoder
includes those of the randomization sequence for channel prefixing, as well as those
required to identify the codebooks and run the successive cancellation encoding. Us-







N→∞−−−→ H(U |Y )
k
k→∞−−−→ 0.
Similarly, the rate required to identify the codebook for the secret and private mes-




k ), which is transmitted to Bob to allow






|B̃1:Nk [HV |UY ]|
kN
N→∞−−−→ H(V |UY )
k
k→∞−−−→ 0,
where we have used [87].
The randomization sequence rate used in channel prefixing is
|VX|V |+(k − 1)|VX|V \VX|V Z |
kN
=















where we have used Lemma 3.4.1. We now show that the rate of uniform bits required
for successive cancellation encoding in (115), (116), (117), (118), (119), (120), (121)
is negligible trough a series of lemmas.







H(Ãji |Ã1:j−1i ) = 0.
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Proof. See Appendix 5.E.








H(B̃ji |B̃1:j−1i Ũ1:Ni ) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.F.








H(T̃ ji |T̃ 1:j−1i Ṽ 1:Ni ) = 0.
The proof of Lemma 5.6.11 is similar to that of Lemma 5.6.10 using Lemma 5.6.7
in place of Lemma 5.6.6.
Hence, the overall randomness rate RR used at the encoder is asymptotically
RR
N→∞,k→∞−−−−−−−→ I(X;Z|V ).
Sum rates. The sum of the private message rate RM and the randomness rate RR
is asymptotically
RM +RR
N→∞,k→∞−−−−−−−→I(V ;Z|U) + I(X;Z|V )
(a)





where (a) and (b) hold by U − V −X − Z.
Moreover, the sum of the common message rate RO, the private message rate RM ,
and the confidential message rate RS is asymptotically
RO +RM +RS
N→∞,k→∞−−−−−−−→I(Y ;U) + I(V ;Z|U) + I(V ;Y |U)− I(V ;Z|U)
= I(Y ;U) + I(V ;Y |U).
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Seed Rate. The rate of the secret sequence that must be shared between the legiti-











6 |HV |UY |
kN
+
|HV |UY \VV |UY |
N
6 |HV |UY |
kN
+
|HV |UY |−|VV |UY |
N
N→∞−−−→ H(V |Y )
k
k→∞−−−→ 0,
where we have used Lemma 3.4.1 and [87].








|VU\IUY |+k(|HU |−|VU |)
kN








N→∞−−−→ H(U |Y )
k
k→∞−−−→ 0.
5.6.3 Average probability of error
We first show that Eve and Bob can reconstruct the common messagesO1:N1:k with small
probability. For i ∈ J1, kK, consider an optimal coupling [94,96] between p̃U1:Ni Y 1:Ni and









= P[Û1:Ni 6= Ũ1:Ni ]
= P[Û1:Ni 6= Ũ1:Ni |EcUi,Yi ∩ Eci ]P[EcUi,Yi ∩ Eci ]
+ P[Û1:Ni 6= Ũ1:Ni |EUi,Yi ∪ Ei]P[EUi,Yi ∪ Ei],
6 P[Û1:Ni 6= Ũ1:Ni |EcUi,Yi ∩ Eci ] + P[EUi,Yi ∪ Ei]
(a)
6 NδN + P[EUi,Yi ] + P[Ei]
(b)
6 NδN + δ(P )N + P[Ei]
6 NδN + δ(P )N + P[Û1:Ni−1 6= Ũ1:Ni−1 ]
(c)
6 (i− 1)(NδN + δ(P )N ) + P[Û1:N1 6= Ũ1:N1 ]
(d)
6 i(NδN + δ(P )N ), (122)
where (a) follows from the error probability of source coding with side information [87]
and the union bound, (b) holds by the optimal coupling and Lemma 5.6.8, (c) holds
by induction, (d) holds similar to the previous inequalities. We thus have by the
union bound and (122)




















Next we show how Bob can recover the secret and private messages. Informally,
the decoding process of the confidential and private messages (M1:k, S1:k) for Bob is









can reconstruct Ṽ 1:Nk , from which Ψ
V |U










k−i ), Bob can reconstruct Ṽ
1:N
k−i , from which Ψ
V |U
k−i−1 is deduced.
Finally, S1:k can be recovered from Ṽ
1:N
1:k .
Formally, the analysis is as follows. For i ∈ J1, kK, consider an optimal coupling [96]
between p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni Y 1:Ni and pU1:NV 1:NY 1:N such that
P[EUi,Vi,Yi ] = V(p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni Y 1:Ni , pU1:NV 1:NY 1:N ),





, {Ψ̂V |Ui 6= ΨV |Ui }, EŨi , {Û1:Ni 6= Ũ1:Ni }, and EΨV |Ui ,Ũi , EΨV |Ui ∪ EŨi .
For i ∈ J1, k − 1K, we have
P[(Mi, Si) 6= (M̂i, Ŝi)]
(a)
= P[Ṽi 6= V̂i]








+ P[Ṽi 6= V̂i|EUi,Vi,Yi ∪ EΨV |Ui ,Ũi ]P[EUi,Vi,Yi ∪ EΨV |Ui ,Ũi ]
6 P[Ṽi 6= V̂i|EcUi,Vi,Yi ∩ EcΨV |Ui ,Ũi ] + P[EUi,Vi,Yi ∪ EΨV |Ui ,Ũi ]
6 P[Ṽi 6= V̂i|EcUi,Vi,Yi ∩ EcΨV |Ui ,Ũi ] + P[EUi,Vi,Yi ] + P[EΨV |Ui ,Ũi ]
6 P[Ṽi 6= V̂i|EcUi,Vi,Yi ∩ EcΨV |Ui ,Ũi ] + P[EUi,Vi,Yi ] + P[EΨV |Ui ] + P[EŨi ]
(b)
6 P[Ṽi 6= V̂i|EcUi,Vi,Yi ∩ EcΨV |Ui ,Ũi ] + P[EUi,Vi,Yi ] + P[Ṽi+1 6= V̂i+1] + P[Û
1:N
i 6= Ũ1:Ni ]
(c)
6 NδN + P[EUi,Vi,Yi ] + P[Ṽi+1 6= V̂i+1] + P[Û1:Ni 6= Ũ1:Ni ]
(d)








+ P[Ṽi+1 6= V̂i+1]
(f)






+ P[Ṽk 6= V̂k]
(g)







where (a) holds because Ṽi contains (Mi, Si,Ψ
V |U
i−1 ) by construction, (b) holds because
Ṽi+1 contains Ψ
V |U
i by construction, (c) follows from the error probability of loss-
less source coding with side information [87], (d) holds by the optimal coupling and
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Lemma 5.6.8, (e) holds by (122), (f) holds by induction, (g) is obtained similar to
the previous inequalities.
Hence,


























The functional dependence graph for the coding scheme of Section 5.4 is given in








Note that we have introduced (ΨU1 ,Φ
U
1:k), since these random variables have been made
available to Eve. Recall that ΦU1:k is additional information transmitted to Bob and
Eve to reconstruct the common messages O1:k. Recall also that Ψ
U
1 ⊃ ΨUi , i ∈ J2, kK,
as it is the randomness reused among all the blocks that allows the transmission of
the common messages O1:k. We start by proving that secrecy holds for a given block
i ∈ J2, kK in the following lemma.
































Proof. See Appendix 5.G.
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Figure 33. Functional dependence graph of the block encoding scheme. For Block i, Oi
is the common message, Mi is the private message, Si is the confidential message. Ψ
V |U
i
is the side information retransmitted in the next block to allow Bob to reconstruct Mi
and Si given Φ
V |U




i is the randomness used to form Ũ
1:N
i ,
ΨUi ⊂ ΨU1 is reused from the previous block. Ri and Ψ
X|V
i represent the randomness




1 is reused from the previous
block. Finally, ΦUi is information, whose rate is negligible, sent to Bob and Eve to allow
them to reconstruct the common messages.
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Recall that for channel prefixing in the encoding process we reuse some randomness
Ψ
X|V




i , i ∈ J2, kK. We show in the following
lemma that Ψ
X|V








i ). This fact will
be useful in the secrecy analysis of the overall scheme.
















N is defined as in Lemma 5.6.12.
Proof. See Appendix 5.H.
Using Lemmas 5.6.12 and 5.6.13, we show in the following lemma a recurrence
relation that will make the secrecy analysis over all blocks easier.
Lemma 5.6.14. Let i ∈ J1, k − 1K. Define L̃i , I(S1:k; ΨU1 ΦU1:iZ1:N1:i ). We have
L̃i+1 − L̃i 6 3δ(∗)N .
Proof. See Appendix 5.I.
We then have





















6 δ(∗)N + I(S2:k; ΨU1 ΦU1 Z1:N1 |S1)





where (a) follows from Lemma 5.6.12, (b) follows from independence of S2:k and the
random variables of Block 1.
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6 δ(∗)N + (k − 1)(3δ
(∗)
N )
= (3k − 2)δ(∗)N .
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5.7 Conclusion
Our proposed polar coding scheme for the broadcast channel with confidential mes-
sages and constrained randomization provides an explicit low-complexity scheme
achieving the capacity region of [55]. Although the presence of auxiliary random vari-
ables and the need to re-align polarization sets through chaining introduces rather
involved notation, the coding scheme is conceptually close to a binning proof of the
capacity region, in which polarization is used in place of random binning. We be-
lieve that a systematic use of this connection will effectively allow one to translate




5.A Proof of Lemma 5.6.5
Let i ∈ J2, k − 1K. We have
D(pU1:N ||p̃U1:Ni )
(a)


















6 NδN , (124)
where (a) holds by invertibility of Gn, (b) holds by the chain rule, (c) holds by (116),
(d) holds by (116) and uniformity of Oi and Oi−1,2, (e) holds by definition of VU .
Similarly for i ∈ {1, k}, using (115) and (117) we also have
D(pU1:N ||p̃U1:Ni ) 6 NδN . (125)
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5.B Proof of Lemma 5.6.6
Let i ∈ J2, kK. We have

















6 |VV |U |δN
6 NδN , (126)
where (a) holds by the chain rule, (b) holds by (119), (c) holds by (119) and uniformity
of Ψ
V |U
i−1 , Si, and Mi, (d) holds by definition of VV |U .
Then,
D(pV 1:NU1:N ||p̃V 1:Ni U1:Ni )
(a)
= D(pB1:NU1:N ||p̃B1:Ni U1:Ni )
(b)
= D(pB1:N |U1:N ||p̃B1:Ni |U1:Ni ) + D(pU1:N ||p̃U1:Ni )
(c)
6 2NδN ,
where (a) holds by invertibility of Gn, (b) holds by the chain rule, (c) holds by (126)
and Lemma 5.6.5.
Similarly, using (118) and Lemma 5.6.5, we have
D(pV 1:NU1:N ||p̃V 1:N1 U1:N1 )62NδN .
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5.C Proof of Lemma 5.6.7
Let i ∈ J2, kK. We have















(1−H(T j|T 1:j−1V 1:N))
(d)
6 |VX|V |δN
6 NδN , (127)
where (a) holds by the chain rule, (b) holds by (121), (c) holds by (121) and uniformity
of the bits in T̃ 1:Ni [VX|V ], (d) holds by definition of VX|V .
Then,
D(pX1:NV 1:N ||p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni )
(a)
= D(pT 1:NV 1:N ||p̃T 1:Ni V 1:Ni )
(b)
= D(pT 1:N |V 1:N ||p̃T 1:Ni |V 1:Ni ) + D(pV 1:N ||p̃V 1:Ni )
(c)
6 3NδN ,
where (a) holds by invertibility of Gn, (b) holds by the chain rule, (c) holds by (127)
and Lemma 5.6.6.
Similarly, using (120) and Lemma 5.6.6, we have
D(pX1:NV 1:N ||p̃X1:N1 V 1:N1 )63NδN .
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5.D Proof of Lemma 5.6.8
We have
V(pU1:NV 1:NX1:NY 1:NZ1:N , p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni X1:Ni Y 1:Ni Z1:Ni )
= V(pY 1:NZ1:N |U1:NV 1:NX1:NpU1:NV 1:NX1:N , p̃Y 1:Ni Z1:Ni |U1:Ni V 1:Ni X1:Ni p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni X1:Ni )
(a)
= V(pY 1:NZ1:N |X1:NpU1:NV 1:NX1:N , p̃Y 1:Ni Z1:Ni |X1:Ni p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni X1:Ni )
(b)
= V(pU1:NV 1:NX1:N , p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni X1:Ni )
= V(pX1:N |U1:NV 1:NpU1:NV 1:N , p̃X1:Ni |U1:Ni V 1:Ni p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni )
(c)
= V(pX1:N |V 1:NpU1:NV 1:N , p̃X1:Ni |V 1:Ni p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni )
(d)
6 V(pX1:N |V 1:NpU1:NV 1:N , p̃X1:Ni |V 1:Ni pU1:NV 1:N )
+ V(p̃X1:Ni |V 1:Ni pU1:NV 1:N , p̃X1:Ni |V 1:Ni p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni )
= V(pX1:N |V 1:NpU1:NV 1:N , p̃X1:Ni |V 1:Ni pU1:NV 1:N ) + V(pU1:NV 1:N , p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni )
(e)
6 V(pX1:N |V 1:NpU1:NV 1:N , p̃X1:Ni |V 1:Ni pU1:NV 1:N ) + δ
(UV )
N




6 V(pX1:N |V 1:NpV 1:N , p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni ) + V(p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni , p̃X1:Ni |V 1:Ni pV 1:N ) + δ
(UV )
N
= V(pX1:NV 1:N , p̃X1:Ni V 1:Ni ) + V(p̃V 1:Ni , pV 1:N ) + δ
(UV )
N




6 2δ(UV )N + δ
(XV )
N ,
where (a) and (c) follow from the Markov condition U → V → X → (Y Z) and
Ũ1:Ni → Ṽ 1:Ni → X̃1:Ni → (Y 1:Ni Z1:Ni ) , (b) follows from pY 1:NZ1:N |X1:N = p̃Y 1:Ni Z1:Ni |X1:Ni
and [117, Lemma 17], (d) holds by the triangle inequality, (e) holds by Lemma 5.6.6,
(f) hold by the triangle inequality, (g) holds by Lemmas 5.6.6 and 5.6.7.
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5.E Proof of Lemma 5.6.9
We have for i ∈ J1, kK, for j ∈ VcU ,
|H(Ãji |Ã1:j−1i )−H(Aj|A1:j−1)|
6 |H(Ã1:ji )−H(A1:j)|+|H(Ã1:j−1i )−H(A1:j−1)|
(a)
6 V(pA1:j , p̃A1:ji ) log
2j










N − log2 δ(U)N
)
, δ(A)N ,
where (a) holds by [102], (b) holds by Lemma 5.6.5 and because x 7→ x log x is



















6 |HU |−|VU |+
∑
j∈HcU
(H(Aj|A1:j−1) + δ(A)N )
6 |HU |−|VU |+|HcU |(δN + δ(A)N )
6 |HU |−|VU |+N(δN + δ(A)N ),
and we obtain the result by Lemma 3.4.1 and [87].
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5.F Proof of Lemma 5.6.10
We have for i ∈ J1, kK, for j ∈ VcV |U ,
|H(B̃ji |B̃1:j−1i Ũ1:Ni )−H(Bj|B1:j−1U1:N)|
6 |H(B̃1:ji Ũ1:Ni )−H(B1:jU1:N)|+|H(B̃1:j−1i Ũ1:Ni )−H(B1:j−1U1:N)|
(a)
6 V(pB1:jU1:N , p̃B1:ji U1:Ni ) log
2j+N
V(pB1:jU1:N , p̃B1:ji U1:Ni )




2N − log2 δ(UV )N
)
+ |H(B̃1:j−1i Ũ1:Ni )−H(B1:j−1U1:N)|
6 2δ(UV )N
(
2N − log2 δ(UV )N
)
, δ(B)N ,
where (a) holds by [102], (b) holds by Lemma 5.6.6 and because x 7→ x log x is












H(B̃ji |B̃1:j−1i Ũ1:Ni )




H(B̃ji |B̃1:j−1i Ũ1:Ni )




H(B̃ji |B̃1:j−1i Ũ1:Ni )




(H(Bj|B1:j−1U1:N) + δ(B)N )
6 |HV |U |−|VV |U |+|HcV |U |(δN + δ(B)N )
6 |HV |U |−|VV |U |+N(δN + δ(B)N ),
and we obtain the result by Lemma 3.4.1 and [87].
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5.G Proof of Lemma 5.6.12
We have
V(pB1:N [VV |UZ ]U1:NZ1:N , p̃B1:Ni [VV |UZ ]p̃U1:Ni Z1:Ni )
6 V(pB1:N [VV |UZ ]U1:NZ1:N , pB1:N [VV |UZ ]pU1:NZ1:N )
+ V(pB1:N [VV |UZ ]pU1:NZ1:N , p̃B1:N [VV |UZ ]p̃U1:NZ1:N )
(a)
6 V(pB1:N [VV |UZ ]U1:NZ1:N , pB1:N [VV |UZ ]pU1:NZ1:N )
+ V(pB1:N [VV |UZ ], p̃B1:N [VV |UZ ]) + V(pU1:NZ1:N , p̃U1:NZ1:N )
(b)
























where (a) follows from the triangle inequality, (b) holds by Lemma 5.6.8, (c) holds
by Pinsker’s inequality, (d) holds because using the fact that conditioning reduces
entropy we have
I(B1:N [VV |UZ ];U1:NZ1:N)
= H(B1:N [VV |UZ ])−H(B1:N [VV |UZ ]|U1:NZ1:N)








V(p̃B1:Ni [VV |UZ ]U1:Ni Z1:Ni , p̃B1:Ni [VV |UZ ]p̃U1:Ni Z1:Ni )
(a)
6 V(p̃B1:Ni [VV |UZ ]U1:Ni Z1:Ni , pB1:N [VV |UZ ]U1:NZ1:N )









where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by Lemma 5.6.8, and (128).










6 I(B̃1:Ni [VV |UZ ];Z1:Ni Ũ1:Ni )
6 V(p̃B1:Ni [VV |UZ ]U1:Ni Z1:Ni , p̃B1:Ni [VV |UZ ]p̃U1:Ni Z1:Ni )
× log2
|VV |UZ |


















where we have used (129) and that x 7→ x log x is decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
5.H Proof of Lemma 5.6.13
By the triangle inequality we can write
V(pT 1:N [VX|V Z ]U1:NV 1:NZ1:N , p̃T 1:Ni [VX|V Z ]p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni Z1:Ni )
6 V(pT 1:N [VX|V Z ]U1:NV 1:NZ1:N , pT 1:N [VX|V Z ]pU1:NV 1:NZ1:N )
+ V(pT 1:N [VX|V Z ]pU1:NV 1:NZ1:N , p̃T 1:Ni [VX|V Z ]p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni Z1:Ni )
(a)

























where (a) holds by the triangle inequality and Lemma 5.6.8, (b) holds by Pinsker’s
inequality, (c) holds because using the fact that conditioning reduces entropy and
U − V −X we have
I(T 1:N [VX|V Z ];Z1:NU1:NV 1:N)
6 |VX|V Z |−
∑
j∈VX|V Z
H(T j|T 1:j−1Z1:NU1:NV 1:N)
= |VX|V Z |−
∑
j∈VX|V Z
H(T j|T 1:j−1Z1:NV 1:N)
6 |VX|V Z |+|VX|V Z |(δN − 1)
6 NδN .
Hence,
V(p̃T 1:Ni [VX|V Z ]U1:Ni V 1:Ni Z1:Ni , p̃T 1:Ni [VX|V Z ]p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni Z1:Ni )
6 V(p̃T 1:Ni [VX|V Z ]U1:Ni V 1:Ni Z1:Ni , pT 1:N [VX|V Z ]U1:NV 1:NZ1:N )








where (a) holds by the triangle inequality, (b) holds by Lemma 5.6.8, and (130).












= I(T̃ 1:Ni [VX|V Z ];Z1:Ni B̃1:Ni [HV |UZ ]ΦUi ΨUi )
6 I(T̃ 1:Ni [VX|V Z ];Z1:Ni B̃1:Ni Ũ1:Ni )
(a)
= I(T̃ 1:Ni [VX|V Z ];Z1:Ni Ṽ 1:Ni Ũ1:Ni )
6 V(p̃T 1:Ni [VX|V Z ]U1:Ni V 1:Ni Z1:Ni , p̃T 1:Ni [VX|V Z ]p̃U1:Ni V 1:Ni Z1:Ni )
× log2
|VX|V Z |




















where (a) holds by invertibility of Gn, (b) holds by (131) and because x 7→ x log x is
decreasing for x > 0 small enough.
5.I Proof of Lemma 5.6.14


















i+1 |ΨU1 ΦU1:iZ1:N1:i ) + I(Si+2:k; ΦUi+1Z1:Ni+1 |ΨU1 ΦU1:iZ1:N1:i S1:i+1)
(a)















i+1 |ΨU1 ) + I(S1:iΦU1:iZ1:N1:i ; ΦUi+1Z1:Ni+1 |ΨU1 Si+1)
6 I(Si+1; ΦUi+1Z1:Ni+1 ΨU1 ) + I(S1:iΦU1:iZ1:N1:i ; ΦUi+1Z1:Ni+1 |ΨU1 Si+1)
(c)
6 δ(∗)N + I(S1:iΦU1:iZ1:N1:i ; ΦUi+1Z1:Ni+1 |ΨU1 Si+1)
6 δ(∗)N + I(S1:iΦU1:iZ1:N1:i ; ΦUi+1Z1:Ni+1Si+1|ΨU1 )
(d)












































































i+1 |ΨU1 Si+1) + I(ΨX|Vi ; ΦUi+1Z1:Ni+1 |ΨV |Ui ΨU1 Si+1)






















where (a) holds by the chain rule and positivity of mutual information, (b) holds
by independence of Si+2:k with all the random variables of the previous blocks, (c)





to be able to break the dependencies between the random variables of block (i + 1)











1 → ΦUi+1Z1:Ni+1Si+1, (f) holds because (ΨV |Ui ,ΨX|Vi ,ΨUi ) is independent of
Si+1, (g) holds by Lemmas 5.6.12, 5.6.13 and because Ψ
X|V






Secure communication will remain a major concern with the amount of sensitive data
such as medical records, financial transactions, or control information, transmitted
over wireless networks. Information-theoretic security has the potential of enhancing
security of future wireless networks by adding a level of security at the physical layer.
Privacy is also a growing concern with the increasing amount of private informa-
tion collected in databases or the introduction of smart meters by utility providers,
e.g., electricity, gas, water, to monitor individual consumptions. Information-theoretic
security could also provide strong mathematical foundations and practical solutions
to such problems.
However, the limit of many information-theoretic models for secure communica-
tion networks is an over-simplification of the problems studied. Moreover, many
achievability theorems rely on random coding techniques that are impractical for
computationally bounded users. Consequently, the need exists for models with as few
simplifying assumptions as possible and for constructive schemes that could bridge
the gap between information theory and coding theory. A partial answer to theses
issues starts with the study of fundamental primitives for information-theoretic se-
curity, such as secret-key generation between two parties and communication over a
channel tapped by an eavesdropper. Although these problems appeared in the litera-
ture several decades ago, only few practical coding schemes have been proposed until
now.
6.1 Contributions
In Chapters 2, 3, we have addressed the problem of secret-key generation, for which
we have accounted for bandwidth constraint and computationally bounded legitimate
users.
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In Chapter 2, we have studied sequential key-generation strategies, whose strength
is to translate into practical designs – with the caveat of potentially high-complexity
vector quantization required for the reconciliation step. Specifically, we have shown
that the best known bound for rate-limited secret-key capacity are often achievable by
a sequential strategy that separates reliability and secrecy thanks to a reconciliation
step followed by a privacy amplification step with extractors. However, we have also
qualified robustness and flexibility of sequential strategy to rate-limited communica-
tion, by showing that achieving the reconciliation capacity in a sequential strategy is,
unlike the case of rate-unlimited communication, not necessarily optimal. We have
further provided scenarios for which it stays optimal.
In Chapter 3, we have proposed low-complexity secret-key capacity-achieving
schemes based on polar coding for several classes of sources. Unlike the sequential
strategies proposed in Chapter 2, our polar coding schemes jointly handle secrecy and
reliability. The price to be paid for low complexity is that our schemes often require a
pre-shared seed, whose rate is negligible compared to the blocklength. Nevertheless,
our polar coding schemes are the first provably optimal and low complexity scheme
to handle rate-limited public communication and multi-terminal scenarios, which are
often the major hurdle in designing optimal key-generation schemes.
In Chapters 4, 5, we have addressed the problem of secret communication over a
wire-tapped channel, for which we have accounted for computationally bounded legiti-
mate users, bandwidth efficiency, and imperfect and rate-limited randomness available
at the encoder.
In Chapter 4, we have showed that multiplexing unprotected and protected data
allows, first, to avoid the necessity of additional randomness at the encoder and, sec-
ond, to efficiently use the bandwidth available between the legitimate users. Specifi-
cally, the overall communication rate of the same channel without secrecy constraints
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is maintained. The scheme leverage the results about the fundamental limits of loss-
less source coding with uniform encoder output. We have proposed an extension to
multiple access channel in [118].
In Chapter 5, we have proposed a low-complexity and capacity-achieving scheme
based on polar codes for the wiretap channel extended to a broadcast setting, in
which a common message sent over the channel must be reconstructed by two users
and a confidential message must be reconstructed by one user but must remain con-
cealed from the other user. The main contribution, compared to previous works, is a
scheme that deals with potentially asymmetric and non-degraded channels, and that
also takes into account the cost of channel simulation. The resulting scheme is also
optimal in terms of the amount of randomness used at the stochastic encoder.
Finally, the present work on secret-key generation and the wiretap channel model
has generated tools whose interest and application go beyond the area of information-
theoretic security.
Random binning with polar codes. In Chapter 5, we have drawn a parallel between
random binning and polar coding scheme for the wiretap channel. It directly sheds
light on the underlying fundamental mechanisms of the coding scheme, which could,
at first glance, appear very ad hoc. Moreover, this parallel has the potential to allow
a direct translation of any random binning achievability proof to a low-complexity
polar coding scheme.
Data compression with uniform encoder output. It has been widely believed that
the encoder output of compression codes were random number generators until T. S.
Han formally proved it wrong. However, as shown in Chapter 4, this impossibility can
be overcome when encoder and decoder share a seed, i.e., a small sequence of random
numbers. Moreover, we have characterized the optimal length of the latter. We have
also provided a practical coding scheme based on polar codes. Subsequent work in
217
collaboration with the co-authors of [119] has shown that a seed is even unnecessary
under lossy reconstruction.
Coding for channel resolvability. Channel resolvability characterizes the amount
of randomness required to simulate a process at the output of a channel and plays
a key role in the analysis of secure communication over wiretap channels. However,
channel resolvability is a primitive that is also useful for the analysis of other problems
such as the common information between random variables, and agents coordination
in network. We have proposed low-complexity channel resolvability codes based on
efficiently invertible extractors in [120], and based on polar codes in [121] using polar
coding techniques developed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5. We have shown that the
latter construction yields optimal polar coding schemes for the problem of empirical
coordination and strong coordination in two-node network [122].
6.2 Perspectives
As discussed in Chapter 1, many other constraints should be taken into account in
information-theoretic models from a practical point of view. We list, below, some of
them. Being able to successfully tackle all these constraints is highly challenging.
Finite-length regime. Asymptotic settings are of interest as a first approximation,
as they provide insight for practical designs into the optimality of a given strategy.
However, in practical applications, the finite-length regime should be considered to
account for computational and data storage limitations. While several work have
studied this problem, e.g. [14, 26, 27, 123], finding practical coding schemes nearly
optimal in the finite-length regime remains elusive.
Unknown eavesdroppers statistics. The physical position of the eavesdropper, and
thus the statistics of its observations, may not be known by the legitimate users.
Compound models [124] represents an interesting way to model uncertainties about
the eavesdropper statistics. MIMO settings could also be of interest as suggested
by [52, 75], in which the requirement of the eavesdropper’s statistics knowledge to
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ensure secrecy is replaced by a condition on the number of antennas available at the
eavesdropper. Specifically, strictly positive secrecy rate are achievable provided that
the legitimate users have more antennas than the eavesdropper.
Multi-user settings. The study and understanding of multi-users setting is pri-
mordial for large-scale application of information-theoretic security in tomorrow’s
communication networks. As alluded to earlier, the transition from point-to-point to
network communication is a challenging task. Results on closed-form expressions for
the secret-key capacity in multi-user settings, e.g. [4,9,31], or for the secrecy capacity
of wiretap channels in multiple access or broadcast settings, e.g. [125–127], are only
known for very specific scenarios and still remain incomplete in general.
Practical validations. Last but not least, practical implementations or proof of con-
cept need to support theory. Although an increasing number of works have recently
studied practical implementations of information-theoretic security [5,7,128–130], the
gap between theory and practice remains far from being bridged.
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